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ABSTRACT
Partnering People with Deep Learning Systems: Human Cognitive Effects of Explanations
by
Sean E. Dougherty
May 2019
Chair: Pamela Scholder Ellen
Major Academic Unit: Executive Doctorate in Business
Advances in “deep learning” algorithms have led to intelligent systems that provide
automated classifications of unstructured data. Until recently these systems could not provide the
reasons behind a classification. This lack of “explainability” has led to resistance in applying
these systems in some contexts. An intensive research and development effort to make such
systems more transparent and interpretable has proposed and developed multiple types of
explanation to address this challenge. Relatively little research has been conducted into how
humans process these explanations. Theories and measures from areas of research in social
cognition were selected to evaluate attribution of mental processes from intentional systems
theory, measures of working memory demands from cognitive load theory, and self-efficacy
from social cognition theory. Crowdsourced natural disaster damage assessment of aerial images
was employed using a written assessment guideline as the task. The “Wizard of Oz” method was
used to generate the damage assessment output of a simulated agent. The output and
explanations contained errors consistent with transferring a deep learning system to a new
disaster event. A between-subjects experiment was conducted where three types of natural
language explanations were manipulated between conditions.

xiv

Counterfactual explanations increased intrinsic cognitive load and made participants
more aware of the challenges of the task. Explanations that described boundary conditions and
failure modes (“hedging explanations”) decreased agreement with erroneous agent ratings
without a detectable effect on cognitive load. However, these effects were not large enough to
counteract decreases in self-efficacy and increases in erroneous agreement as a result of
providing a causal explanation. The extraneous cognitive load generated by explanations had the
strongest influence on self-efficacy in the task. Presenting all of the explanation types at the same
time maximized cognitive load and agreement with erroneous simulated output. Perceived
interdependence with the simulated agent was also associated with increases in self-efficacy;
however, trust in the agent was not associated with differences in self-efficacy. These findings
identify effects related to research areas which have developed methods to design tasks that may
increase the effectiveness of explanations.

Keywords: Interpretability, Human-Agent Interaction, XAI
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I
I.1

INTRODUCTION

Explanations in Application
Intelligent systems that utilize artificial intelligence (AI) are increasingly being paired

with humans to perform tasks. Some of the earliest theorists in computer science anticipated that
computers would augment human intelligence (Wiener, 1950). Today, humans are being
introduced into work flows to augment intelligent systems and improve their performance
(Kamar & Manikonda, 2017). Accenture (2017) surveyed 1,201 executives and senior managers
and found that 61% reported an increase in the number of roles expected to collaborate with
intelligent systems. Additionally, 46% reported that some job descriptions within their firms had
become obsolete due to intelligent systems. A recent survey by Gartner (2018) found that of 460
executive and senior manager respondents, 40% believed AI will make a material impact on
production or service operations, and 50% on the products or services themselves.
The benefits of partnering people with intelligent systems depends not just on the
capacity of the technology, but also on the ability for people to understand the reasons behind the
system’s output and take proper action. The impact of failures in this has been significant.
Knight Capital Group lost over $400 million in 40 minutes after a coordination failure between
its staff and automated trading software led to millions of erroneous trading orders. The system
produced warnings prior to the opening of the market; however, those were not addressed by the
staff (SEC, 2013). The MD Anderson Cancer Center’s $62 million effort to integrate IBM’s
Watson technology into the selection of treatment plans resulted in headlines about the system
offering “unsafe and inappropriate” treatments, but users were not provided information about
the limitations of the system’s training data to be able to evaluate why they might disagree with
the system’s recommendations (Ross & Swetlitz, 2018). In the criminal justice context, some
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jurisdictions have used intelligent systems to predict recidivism. These evaluations have
influenced the bail and sentencing decisions for thousands of defendants. An investigative report
claimed that Northpointe’s COMPAS system exhibited racial biases in risk scoring; however,
analysis of the system’s predictions have not identified any distinctions in system rating
performance by race (Flores, Bechtel, & Lowenkamp, 2016). On the other hand, there is
evidence that biases do arise when people use the scores to make decisions (Green & Chen,
2019).
Compounding the challenge of understanding system output is a surge in the application
of intelligent systems where the reasons behind system output are inherently difficult to
understand (Došilović, Brčić, & Hlupić, 2018). Early algorithms in AI were designed to produce
output that was intrinsically human intelligible, such as decision trees or lists of rules (Biran &
Cotton, 2017). In contrast to these are “deep neural networks,” which learn how to perform a
task by estimating large numbers of numeric parameters in a multiple layer network. An example
system of this type are “deep learning systems,” which can process images and generate
classifications based on objects the algorithm detects (Ball, Anderson, & Chan, 2017). A neural
network in these systems has 5 × 107 learned parameters which define its function, and the
system performs around 1010 mathematical operations to produce a single classification (Gilpin
et al., 2018). Any explanation which describes the internal parameters or computation of the
system would be unlikely to have meaning or be persuasive to a human user.
Not surprisingly, some stakeholders are uncomfortable deploying intelligent systems
when even the creators of the system do not understand why it produces correct output
(Holzinger et al., 2017). In addition, computer vision techniques do not yet have generalized
understanding of the content of images and can produce implausible classifications with high
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confidence (Akhtar & Mian, 2018). The lack of common sense in algorithms and fear over
algorithmic bias has led to the European Union adopting broad legal requirements for AI systems
to be able to explain their behavior (Doshi-Velez et al., 2017). While technologists had accepted
AI systems that were unable to explain their output if the system was more capable than a more
interpretable system, that is now changing (Adadi & Berrada, 2018).
Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) is an area of research which seeks to maximize
human interpretability of deep learning systems by developing means to expose logic or
highlight elements of the data most salient to the output (Miller, 2019). These efforts have
employed varying degrees of translation of data structures and interrogation of the deep learning
system. Such a system is the automated bird classification system with explanations proposed by
Hendricks, Hu, Darrell, and Akata (2018). This system presents the underlying reasons for a
classification based on objects detected in the image by combining object recognition with a
recurrent neural network to generate natural language explanations. An example output of this
system is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 Example Incorrect Explanation
Note. Reprinted from Figure 4 (page 9) of Hendricks et al. (2018). Copyright 2018 by Springer
Nature. Reprinted with permission.
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The explanation in the example claims the bird is a “northern flicker” because it has a red
beak. However, the bird in the image is in fact holding a red fruit in its beak. This does not mean
the classification is necessarily incorrect. However, the basis of the justification provided by the
explanation can be invalidated without needing domain knowledge about bird classification. The
presence of the explanation may lead both to better understanding of the intelligent system and
the requirements of the task.
Despite optimism in the literature and the apparent utility of explanations, there is reason
to be cautious about the value of explanations in application. Adding “explainability” to deep
learning systems may increase their acceptance, but there is conflicting evidence that
explanations are processed by humans as expected in application. While the XAI area is
relatively new and focused on algorithms that have been inherently uninterpretable, explanation
has been examined within other types of intelligent systems such as expert systems,
recommendation engines, and decision support systems (Nunes & Jannach, 2017). Past research
has resulted in multiple proposed quality models for explanations with competing objectives, and
has frequently identified challenges with humans utilizing explanations as intended (Miller,
2019). Nunes and Jannach (2017) called for explanations to be tailored and adapted to users;
however, designers do not have clear guidelines for that effort.
I.2

Computation in Disaster Assessment
In the aftermath of a large natural disaster there is a need to rapidly assess vast amounts

of unstructured data to make disaster relief and recovery decisions. Volunteers have been utilized
extensively to monitor and assess information collected following natural disasters in the
response and recovery phases of disaster management, using a method known as
“crowdsourcing” (Yu, Yang, & Li, 2018). Chamales (2013) summarized crowdsourcing
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technology as “bringing together a distributed workforce of individuals in order to collect
resources, process information, or create new content” (p. 4). Many platforms have been
designed to leverage crowdsourcing in numerous contexts to engage human evaluation as a
central aspect of data processing systems, which has been termed “human computation”
(Michelucci, 2016). Also driving this is an increase in the availability of high-resolution aerial
imagery through the use of remote-sensing technologies, such as unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) (Kiatpanont, Tanlamai, & Chongstitvatana, 2016). As with any labor force, the quality
of crowd workers must be monitored and controlled. This has led to the development of
sophisticated architectures and methods to evaluate crowdsourcing products and individual
workers (Daniel, Kucherbaev, Cappiello, Benatallah, & Allahbakhsh, 2018); however, full
automation remains attractive.
A large area of literature explores deep learning algorithms which can automatically
detect and rate damage to structures in aerial imagery. The goal of this research has been to fully
automate damage assessment by utilizing successful systems trained on previous events to
process new events, without adapting or retraining (known as “full transferability”). However,
there are limits and challenges due to unique geographic and damage properties of each event
(Vetrivel, Gerke, Kerle, & Vosselman, 2015). Efforts have improved transferability over time
under conditions with ideal image quality (Vetrivel, Gerke, Kerle, Nex, & Vosselman, 2018), but
in order to evaluate the performance of a transferred system on a new event at scale, images must
be classified by hand to have a basis for performance evaluation.
State-of-the-art methods to achieve transferability include humans into the processing
work flow as “trainers” for the algorithm and a source of inter-rater agreement. An example of
this architecture is the microblog classification system from Imran, Castillo, Lucas, Meier, and
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Vieweg (2014) where both crowdsourced individuals and trusted trainers review classifications
made by the system, with the resulting data fed back to the system for further training. Proposals
have been made to combine human computation and AI in disaster assessment with the goals of
reducing human workload requirements and training intelligent systems to produce more rapid
assessments (Imran et al., 2014; Ofli et al., 2016; Ostermann, 2015; R. Q. Wang, Mao, Wang,
Rae, & Shaw, 2018). However, many of the AI methods applied today for automated assessment
of damage are “black box” and unable to describe how they determined their output beyond
highlighting areas of detected damage (Abdul, Vermeulen, Wang, Lim, & Kankanhalli, 2018).
This interpretability issue and lack of training data have been identified as open issues by the
review by Ball et al. (2017), which evaluated algorithms in remote sensing.
At the highest level, the goal of disaster management is to take advantage of aerial
images collected immediately after an event to make better disaster response and recovery
decisions. At the mid-level, the goal of the data analysis team is to produce more rapid
assessments that identify areas requiring assistance. At the lowest-level of the task, the goal of
individual damage assessors is to judge damage levels on individual images accurately. When
that lowest level task is a partnership between a human and intelligent system, adding
explanations of the system’s judgment for each image provides an opportunity to identify
erroneous system performance, as well as challenge incorrect human evaluations or
understanding of the damage assessment guidelines.
A damage assessment task environment was created for this study to test the effect of
explanations. Damage classifications and explanations were developed using guidelines and
templates from the literature. These classifications and explanations were provided as if they had
been produced by an intelligent system (the “simulated agent”). Images of structures damaged

7

during Hurricane Michael (NGS, 2018) were used for the damage assessments. The objects
identified in images and referenced by the explanations are aspects of structures identified by the
Harvard Humanitarian Initiative’s Wind Damage Rating guideline (Achkar, Baker, & Raymond,
2016). The causal and counterfactual explanation types generated by the system from Hendricks
et al. (2018) were adopted for this study. In addition, an explanation type was included that
discloses boundary conditions and failure modes relevant to the image (“hedging explanation”).
These explanations were based on specific failure modes of real-world systems disclosed in the
deep learning damage assessment literature. While an example implementation of this
explanation type was not identified, such an explanation has been advocated by Hoffman, Miller,
Mueller, Klein, and Clancey (2018).
An example damage assessment task from this study appears in Figure 2. The first
statement is the simulated output where “Heavy Significant” refers to the structure and damage
classifications from the guideline. Following this statement are the causal, counterfactual, and
hedging explanation types examined by this study, in that order. As in the classification of bird
species in Figure 1, domain knowledge is required to determine whether the classifications are
correct. But it is possible to evaluate the coherence of the explanation with the image even
without such knowledge. Further, with access to the guidelines for classification, the simulated
output and explanations can be evaluated against a standard without requiring domain
knowledge.
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Figure 2 Example Damage Classification and Explanation

The advantage of utilizing the disaster assessment context in this research is that it has an
extensive literature which has evaluated both human and automation performance. This supports
the ability to generate a realistic task and to benchmark the results against prior findings. In
addition, participants can be readily recruited to take part in the study. While this task is
specialized, it may serve as an analogue for tasks in other contexts where the output of intelligent
systems has unknown validity and people are partnered with intelligent systems to make rapid
judgments.
I.3

Conceptual Framework
A conceptual framework was assembled to focus the research and identify constructs

useful to develop understanding human information processing of explanations. The Van de Ven
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(2007) formulation of Abraham Kaplan’s levels of abstraction is used here to start with
semantically defined “theoretical concepts.” These concepts are expanded into one or more
middle-range “theoretical constructs” drawn from the literature, which are then operationalized
using “observable variables” of those constructs. Those variables become the basis of the
research model. The theoretical concepts appear in Table 1 and the conceptual framework which
connects these concepts appears in Figure 3. Theoretical constructs are developed in Chapter 3 to
refine the concepts and provide theory and empirical evidence to evaluate.
Table 1 Concept Definitions
Concept

Definition

Worker

The human interacting with the simulated agent.

Microtask

A single instance of the process cycle where the human
produces a structure and damage assessment.

Simulated Output

A classification generated by a simulated object recognition
process of the agent.

Explanation

Information provided to the human to increase the
performance of the human-agent partnership.

Type(s) of Explanation

One or more forms of explanation with content distinction
from other types of explanation.

Information Processing

The human’s processing of the information presented to them
by the microtask (particularly, the simulated output and any
explanation).
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The human’s conclusion of the correct classification for the

Judgment

microtask, which is informed by and feeds back to other
attitudes.
The human’s mental attitudes toward and beliefs about the

Attitudes about Agent

simulated agent.
Performance Attitudes

The human’s attitudes about their performance of damage
assessments.

Human
Attitudes about
Agent

Simulated Output
Information
Processing

Judgment

Type(s) of Explanation
Performance
Attitudes

Figure 3 Conceptual Framework

I.4

Theory and Previous Research
Human interaction with intelligent agents has been extensively studied in the discipline of

human-computer interaction (Smith, 2018). The earliest thinkers in this space considered natural
communication the key to human-machine symbiosis (Licklider, 1960; Wiener, 1950). It was
observed early that placing humans as supervisors of intelligent systems was a less-than-optimal
configuration (Woods, 1985), but achieving “joint activity” between humans and intelligent
systems instead of supervision by either participant is not trivial (Bradshaw et al., 2009). Several
researchers within XAI research believe that the fitness for intelligent agent explanations is
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based not just on the quality of the explanation logically but also how the explanation is
perceived by humans (Doran, Schulz, & Besold, 2017; Miller, 2019; Tintarev & Masthoff,
2011). Despite human-computer interaction being strongly rooted in cognitive science and
information theory from psychology, cognitive psychology has not strongly informed research in
XAI (Abdul et al., 2018). Research of human perception of explanation in XAI has frequently
focused on the extent to which specific explanation engines generate trust or rating preferences,
but provide limited insight into how humans interpret those explanations (Miller, 2019).
Understanding how explanations can improve human-agent interaction can aid not just the
disaster assessment context, but many areas where intelligent agents have the potential to
improve safety, quality, and cost.
Social cognition, rooted in psychology and cognitive science, seeks to understand how
humans process information from their environment, perceive other intelligent behavior, and
learn through observation (Fiske & Taylor, 2016). The theoretical framework of this study
leverages three areas of theory from social cognition: intentional systems theory (Dennett, 1971),
which examines the extent to which people perceive mental processes in observed behavior even
in artifacts that do not have a mind; social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986), which examines
how social interactions inform attitudes about our capacity and motivation to engage and devote
effort into an activity; and cognitive load theory (Sweller, 1988), which has developed
understanding of the limits of human cognitive architecture.
Dennett (1971) proposed intentional systems theory, which states that humans will
attribute an observed actor as having a mind, and predict its behavior as such, even when that is
clearly impossible. When humans are interacting with other humans, empirical research in
attribution theory has identified that differences in attribution of observed behavior are heavily
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based on the information available to the observer and how well they can simulate the thinking
of the observed (Malle, 2011). The perception of mind has been explored in an increasing
number of dimensions (H. M. Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007), and these concepts have been
specifically used in robotics to understand how humans interpret actions by robots that are
normally conducted by humans (Terada & Yamada, 2017; Thellman, Silvervarg, & Ziemke,
2017). To the extent that workers perceive mental processes as taking place in the agent, making
it predictable and rational, workers will be able to coordinate activity more appropriately and
detect both the machine and their own inappropriate classifications.
Social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986) and cognitive load theory (Sweller, 1988) were
originally developed in instructional settings for the purpose of optimizing how learners build
and manipulate mental schemas of a task, and to predict future behavior such as interest in and
effort undertaken in a learning task. Central to social cognitive theory is the theoretical construct
of “self-efficacy,” which is perhaps closest in meaning colloquially to “confidence,” and is
distinct from the ability to perform a task (Bandura, 1977). It has been called the foundation of
human performance (Peterson & Arnn, 2005), and strong correlations have been identified across
many studies of both job performance and satisfaction in a workplace setting (Judge & Bono,
2001). Within the area of crowdsourcing damage assessment, the review by Dittus (2017)
examined the factors of worker training and feedback through the lens of self-efficacy, citing its
importance in having crowd workers return for future damage assessment efforts. Cognitive load
theory has frequently been studied with self-efficacy and focuses on how limitations in working
memory lead to challenges in manipulating and constructing mental schemas to understand a
task (Sweller, 1988). Explanations of the intelligent agent’s logic for classification have the
potential to focus damage assessment on relevant and differentiating content of the images. In
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turn, this has the potential to direct the worker’s attention to the guideline, and more rapidly and
accurately construct mental schemas for damage assessment. However, high cognitive load has
been found to produce less accurate attributions of observed behavior (Molden, Plaks, & Dweck,
2006), making it possible that the agent could create sufficient cognitive load to prevent its
behavior from being perceived as intelligent.
The XAI literature has touted the benefits of counterfactual explanations, which offer
contrasting reasons for not making other potential classifications (Wachter, Mittelstadt, &
Russell, 2017). Hoffman et al. (2018) proposed that explanations which offer boundary
conditions and known failure modes have the potential to increase trust. This type of explanation
is termed as “hedging explanations” by this study. By allowing the worker to assess the role of
any potential boundary conditions, hedging explanations may provide clarification for how an
agent reached an otherwise seemingly irrational classification. The need for such explanations
may rise to a legal requirement when the providers of a system are aware of failure modes, even
if the explanations are challenging to accomplish (Doshi-Velez et al., 2017). While causal
explanations that provide “why” information about output have been researched extensively
since intelligent agents were first in use, no empirical evidence was identified regarding the
effectiveness of counterfactual and hedging explanations in an interactive judgment. However,
literature advocates for the utilization of such explanations (Hoffman et al., 2018; Miller, 2019;
Wachter et al., 2017).
I.5

Research Questions
The explanation types appropriate in an application may be most determined by the

“explainees” and whether they process the explanation types as expected. Counterfactual
explanations allow damage assessment novices to observe the agent applying the guidelines and
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demonstrate contrasting logic. Hedging explanations allow workers that are unaware of the
limitations of the agent to better evaluate the appropriateness of the output based on the image
contents. While the potential of both types of explanation is compelling, is not clear that they
will achieve these objectives individually, nor that the types can be combined without exceeding
cognitive limitations of the workers. As such, the following research questions are proposed:
1)

How will people process counterfactual and hedging explanations of damage
assessments by a deep learning system?

2)
I.6

How does combining the explanation types affect their processing?

Motivation for the Study
I have spent nearly my entire professional career developing and deploying enterprise

resource management systems and information systems which have included intelligent agents in
their functionality. Those were expected to partner well with workers to improve outcomes, but
the potential of these agents was rarely fully realized. This outcome is not uncommon despite
high expectations for and excitement about the potential for intelligent agents. Over time I have
come to see how intelligent agents do not make ideal partners and teammates. The workers have
largely remained responsible for outcomes despite being paired up with intelligent agents, since
these seem to operate mysteriously and carry little, if any, responsibility for outcomes. The
ability for workers to understand how an intelligent agent has reached a decision is a major step
towards opening areas that were previously impractical or impermissible. The context used to
explore this challenge is also uniquely motivating compared to many other possible tasks
because of the potential for humanitarian impact.
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I.7

Contribution and Significance
This research contributes to the understanding of how three types of explanation are

processed by humans by measuring cognitive load, attribution of agent intelligence, and selfefficacy in the task. This study found that the most common construct evaluated in the literature,
trust in the intelligent agent, did not have a significant relationship with self-efficacy when these
other constructs were considered. The study also identified that cognitive load and perceived
interdependence had the greatest effect on self-efficacy. The instructional literature that
developed cognitive load theory has identified a number of approaches that could be applied to
explanation to operate within the limitations of human working memory. Perceived
interdependence was also associated with increased self-efficacy, and is an existing area of
research within human-robot interaction with the aim of increasing the effectiveness of joint
activity. These two constructs were identified as having a similar or greater effect on selfefficacy as did previous task experience. Finally, this study indicates that when workers agree
with erroneous output, it is most likely as a result of “going along,” rather than an illusion of
explanatory understanding.
I.8

Dissertation Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows:
• Chapter II: A literature review is conducted in the areas of Computation in Disaster
Assessment, Social Cognition, and Explanation by Intelligent Agents with the purpose
of identifying current knowledge and theoretical constructs that have explanatory power.
• Chapter III: A research model is developed with hypotheses of relationships between
the theoretical constructs, and a measurement model is developed to evaluate the research
questions.
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• Chapter IV: The methodology used to conduct the research and the analysis of the data
is presented. A method to develop simulated output and explanations is described.
• Chapter V: The results of the analysis are reported with discussion of the results,
contributions, practical implications, limitations, and future research directions.
• Chapter VI: A summary is offered of the study and its findings.
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II
II.1

LITERATURE REVIEW

Computation in Disaster Assessment

II.1.1 Background
On January 12, 2010 a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck Haiti, creating one of the largest
humanitarian crises of modern times, with enormous uncertainty of the impact and extent of
damage (Kolbe et al., 2010). Large parts of the country were unmapped with tools common in
developed countries (Zook, Graham, Shelton, & Gorman, 2010). It was one of the first major
natural disasters where “crowdsourced” mapping and damage assessments using remotely sensed
aerial imagery was utilized to make disaster relief decisions (Corbane et al., 2011). Information
challenges and capabilities arising out of natural disasters has given rise to crisis informatics,
which has been defined as the “interconnectedness of people, organizations, information, and
technologies during crisis.” (Hagar, 2010).
The initial rapid assessment in the immediate aftermath of a disaster requires processing a
large volume of unstructured data using a variety of approaches both to collect the data and to
turn it into useful information (Poblet, García-Cuesta, & Casanovas, 2014). Crowdsourcing in
disaster damage assessment has become highly organized, with groups such as Humanitarian
OpenStreetMap Team emerging to develop training and pools of workers, as well as
coordinating crowd efforts with international relief agencies (See et al., 2016). The results of
crowdsourced disaster mapping efforts have been positive and the learnings from each disaster
have been carried to the next in continuous improvement (GIScorps, 2013; Lallemant et al.,
2017). While automated approaches perform well once trained, successful systems do not
necessarily perform well on images from a new disaster event (Vetrivel et al., 2015).
Complicating efforts across both crowdsourced and machine learning domains is an inherent
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difficulty in establishing a “correct rating” for any given image, along with disagreement
between aerial and ground-based surveys (GIScorps, 2013; Westrope, Banick, & Levine, 2014).
As a result, inter-rater agreement is commonly used to determine the “correct” rating, even
among groups of expert raters.
II.1.2 Crowd Workers in Disaster Assessment
Albuquerque, Herfort, and Eckle (2016) examined volunteer crowdsourced humanitarian
mapping in a non-disaster context in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Crowd workers
reviewed images and reported whether a satellite image contained roads or a settlement. This
provided an opportunity to compare crowdsourced interpretation with a reference map data set.
The consensus of the crowdsourced data had high agreement and accuracy with the reference
data (accuracy and precision of 89%, and sensitivity for feature detection of 73%). A low degree
of rating consensus was strongly predictive of task difficulty on an image. Despite a large
number of contributors, only a small number of volunteers completed the majority of the image
classification effort. The average user classified 66 images with a median of just 21 images.
GIScorps (2013) compared damage ratings between volunteers and experts in rating
aerial images from Hurricane Sandy. They found that volunteer classifications for images
exceeded 95% inter-rater agreement confidence once they had been rated by five workers, with
little practical difference made by the experience level of the volunteers. Expert consensus
ratings were generated for the images with the lowest volunteer consensus (a total of 2% of
images). Experts and volunteers produced identical consensus ratings in 64% of these most
difficult images, and 11% of this subset was rated at the opposite end of the damage scale
between the two groups. Images with greater volunteer agreement were not assessed by experts.
GIScorps also identified several areas of improvement. Among these was a proposal to consider
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allowing participants to decline to rate invalid images, and to provide specific classification
definitions to raters. In a separate review, Westrope et al. (2014) found that low agreement
between raters most often occurs due to image quality, there tends to be a focus on high impact
areas such as major cities and high-profile incidents, and lack of pre-disaster imagery
significantly hampers any classification effort. While some of these efforts are volunteer-driven,
it has been recommended that crowdsourced damage assessments be a paid task supervised by
expert raters (GIScorps, 2013).
Rather than being an on-call population of repeating workers, the review of 26 disaster
events served by the Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team by Dittus (2017) found that the 20,000
crowdsourced contributors were mostly first-time workers (50.2% overall, and as high as 84.7%
for the Nepal Earthquake event). Collaborative mapping (including disaster assessment) was
reviewed from a cognitive systems engineering perspective by Kerle and Hoffman (2013), with
specific observations about how current processes in complex geographic information systems
are designer-focused instead of work-focused, leading to overly complex task design unsuitable
for the varied expertise levels of participants.
II.1.3 Automation in Disaster Assessment
Much of the literature on automated damage assessment has focused on fully automating
assessments rather than combined human-AI approaches; however, humans frequently create the
training information used by these fully-automated approaches. Techniques from computer
vision, where algorithms interpret images, have been applied to disaster damage assessment for
events such as tropical cyclones (Cao & Choe, 2018), earthquakes (Joshi, Tarte, Suresh, &
Koolagudi, 2017), tsunamis (Fujita et al., 2017), and wildfires (Trekin, Novikov, Potapov,
Ignatiev, & Burnaev, 2018). Some researchers have focused efforts on a single element of the
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challenge such as understanding and evaluating the complex structure of residential rooftops (F.
Wang, 2017). Computer vision techniques have been used to augment workers by highlighting
areas of change and aligning images with maps (Trekin et al., 2018).
Cheng and Han (2016) reviewed 270 articles to identify a taxonomy of object detection
methods in remote sensing, including damage assessment applications. That review divided
algorithms into four types: template matching to detect change; knowledge-based, which uses
geometric and context rules (such as shadows) to detect buildings; object analysis; and machine
learning. Machine learning approaches were broken into steps of feature extraction (the detection
of individual image points, edges, and “blobs”) and classifier training to detect objects using
detected features. Mayer (1999) developed a list of elements of buildings such as roofs,
windows, and other structural components useful for classifying damage in aerial images. In
addition to detecting the objects that comprise a building, automated building extraction
techniques can identify individual buildings and center them in an image for evaluation by other
algorithms or human damage assessors (Shrestra, 2018). Ball et al. (2017) reviewed over 400
articles on deep learning in remote sensing. The top two open issues they identified were
limitations in available training data, and challenges in human interpretability of deep learning
algorithms. The set of computer vision algorithms in aerial imagery, damage assessment, and
object detection reviewed for this research appears in Table 2, listing the types of data
considered, the purpose of the algorithm, and types of disasters evaluated (where applicable).
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Table 2 Example Computer Vision Algorithms
Article

Type, Purpose: Disaster

Attari, Ofli, Awad, Lucas, and Chawla
(2017)
Cao and Choe (2018)

UAV Oblique Images, Damage Assessment:
Hurricane
Satellite images, Damage Assessment:
Hurricane
UAV Oblique Images, Damage Assessment:
Earthquakes
Multiple aerial image sources, Damage
Assessment: Earthquakes
Satellite images, Damage Assessment: Tsunami
Multiple data sources, Damage Assessment:
Hurricane
Aerial images, Semantic object extraction.

Duarte, Nex, Kerle, and Vosselman (2017)
Duarte, Nex, Kerle, and Vosselman (2018)
Fujita et al. (2017)
Kersbergen (2018)
Kluckner, Mauthner, Roth, and Bischof
(2009)
Moranduzzo and Melgani (2014)
Nguyen, Ofli, Imran, and Mitra (2017)
Qi, Yang, Guan, Wu, and Gong (2017)
Trekin et al. (2018)
Vetrivel et al. (2018)
F. Wang (2017)

UAV Images, Car Counting.
Ground-level image damage assessment in
natural disasters: Earthquakes, Hurricanes
Satellite images, Building and land use
classification.
Satellite images, building segmentation in
natural disasters: Wildfire.
UAV Oblique Images, 3D point cloud inference
in damage assessment: Earthquakes
Aerial images, Debris Detection and Roof
Condition Assessment: Hurricanes

The ability to use existing successful models on new disasters has improved with ultrahigh resolution imagery and advanced 3D point imputation; however, results still must be
assessed compared to data labeled with the “correct” classification to validate performance
(Vetrivel et al., 2018). Sensitivity to sparse and incorrect training information has an unknown
impact on new event classifications until sufficient training labels are generated for that event
(Frank, Rebbapragada, Bialas, Oommen, & Havens, 2017). Multiple authors have suggested
combining human computation with automated assessments to generate labeled training data, as
well as classify challenging images (Albuquerque et al., 2016; Ofli et al., 2016; Ostermann,
2015). Such architecture has been used in social media microblog classification in disaster
(Imran et al., 2014) and non-disaster settings (Sadilek et al., 2016).
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II.1.4 Open Issues
Perhaps the largest open issue is that accuracy of ratings in aerial damage assessment is
not straightforward to determine. Comparisons between crowdsourced aerial damage surveys
and field surveys have been found to have low agreement, with Cohen’s kappa agreement scores
of less than 0.4 (Westrope et al., 2014). Similarly, GIScorps (2013) found the ratings of their
experts were not entirely consistent with Federal Emergency Management Agency field
assessments. Damage assessments in earthquake events have particularly low agreement between
field and aerial image assessments as building damage is less visible from above. Users of
disaster data are accustomed to what they believe to be over-estimation of disaster damage
(Westrope et al., 2014). There may not be a definitively correct classification for any single
image.
There is limited knowledge of how combined human-automation systems or explanation
operate in damage assessment using aerial images. A comparable system was not identified that
joined human-generated labels with emerging disaster data similar to AIDR (Imran et al., 2014)
for image data. Additionally, machine learning models in damage assessment have made limited
efforts in interpretability where the deep learning techniques most commonly applied in this
space provided only highlights of the areas the model classifies as damaged. None of the articles
reported providing natural language or other forms of justification for their classifications.
The role of individual expertise and skill in crowdsourced damage assessment has
conflicting findings at different levels of analysis. Kerle and Hoffman (2013) identify
misperceptions about the consistency in skill levels to assess damage across crowd workers, and
particularly note that they consider efforts to open damage assessment to untrained analysts as
“misguided.” However, the effects of these differences in expertise were not identified by
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GIScorps (2013) to create meaningful differences in consensus ratings aggregated across
multiple raters.
II.2

Social Cognition

II.2.1 Scope
Social cognition is an area of psychology interested in perception and information
processing in the context of social interactions (Pennington, 2012). Heider (1958) put forth the
concept that people are naïve psychologists that predict, understand, and control their social
environment by attempting to understand why others behave the way they do. This area became
the foundation of social cognition through the development of attribution theories (Reeder,
2013). Research in this area has considered and developed theories of how observers and actors
explain their own behavior as compared to the behavior of those observed. In the context of this
study, the simulated agent is conjectured to be an observed actor.
The social cognition approach sees behavior as a sequence of stimulus (and its
interpretation), person (particularly the reasoning process within the person), and response (the
behavioral outcomes of cognition), with a strong emphasis on rationality such that even
erroneous inferences are a result of goal-directed thought (Fiske & Taylor, 2016). These
inferences are subject to systematic failure modes, but the heuristics behind these flaws are
generally efficient and accurate (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Attitudes about the agent and an
individual’s own performance are core to two of the three main principles of social cognition
identified by Pennington (2012): first, people are cognitive misers and attempt to minimize
cognitive effort; and second, self-esteem and positive self-evaluation are critical to being
confident with one’s own capacities as well as being confident in other people. The third
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principle, that people have separations between spontaneous and deliberative thought, is relevant
here in the form of biases and heuristics in the judgment of classifications.
Three areas within social cognition were identified with relevance to the task of
interacting with the simulated agent. Intentional systems theory (Dennett, 1971), a successor of
earlier naïve psychology, approaches the understanding of how humans infer mental states of
observed actors, which are often technological artifacts. Self-efficacy arose from social learning
theory (Bandura, 1977) and later social cognitive theory of behavior (Bandura, 1986), which has
explored how humans learn from each other through observation, imitation, and modeling.
Cognitive load theory developed out of attempts to understand how humans build mental
schemas under human cognitive limitations (Sweller, 1988), which has been studied as a
underlying mechanism that supports the development of self-efficacy (statistically modeled as a
“mediator”). Explanations are likely to introduce additional cognitive load in the task, which
may be beneficial to support understanding or harmful if exceeding limitations.
II.2.2 Intentional Systems Theory
II.2.2.1 Background
Some of the earliest research that informed attribution theory found that people ascribed
human traits to non-human things, even simple animated shapes that seemed to interact with
each other in a movie (Heider & Simmel, 1944). Intentional systems theory (Dennett, 1971)
proposed that there were three mechanisms of prediction that humans use: a physical stance,
where predictions of outcomes are made with one’s understanding of the physical laws of
science; a design stance, where the behavior of objects is predicted by their designed purpose;
and the intentional stance, where predictions of future actions are based on inferred mental states
of the observed actor, such as belief and desire. The scope of the inquiry within the broad
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literature here draws on learnings of how humans that interact with artificial intelligent agents on
a task develop attitudes about the agent and the task.
Within XAI, attribution theory has been seen as a way to explore how belief-desire-intent
agents can relate themselves to their users (Miller, Howe, & Sonenberg, 2017). The intentional
stance claims that people perceive mental states even when we know that machines are incapable
of them (Dennett, 1989). The perception of mental states of others has been cited as critical to
observational learning with specific neural structures designated for both automatic and
purposeful inference of mental states (Frith & Frith, 2012). Attributions of mental states have
also been found to be stable whether they are requested as immediate impressions, or when
respondents are given time to think about the nature of the observed individuals (Lobato,
Wiltshire, Hudak, & Fiore, 2014).
II.2.2.2 Dimensions of Mind
Dennett (1971) noted the difficulty of differentiating the behavior of complex artifacts
from systems with arguably true beliefs and desires. For instance, a chess-playing computer does
not have beliefs and desires in comparison to human chess players. However, their behavior is
outwardly identical, and Dennett (1971) argues that for the practical purpose of understanding
behavior the difference is irrelevant. Even the designers of a chess-playing computer speak of the
system as intentional in terms of an identity or person rather than in the way we speak of
designed objects as toward their purposes. This thought has been extended by experiments which
have found that humans perceive that robots have social traits, as well as the perception of
having mental traits. This occurs even in non-anthropomorphized robots, suggesting that this
arises from the interaction rather than the perception of a human (K. Gray & Wegner, 2012).
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Attribution of mind has been found to be neither binary nor unidimensional across
varying status and types of people and technology. H. M. Gray et al. (2007) explored how
respondents perceived 12 different “characters” representing living animals or people on 18
dimensions. They found two emergent dimensions: agency, which is mostly made up of
cognitive activities; and experience, which is made up of mainly biological and emotional
attributes. Weisman, Dweck, and Markman (2017) expanded on this by examining 21 entities for
40 “a priori” concepts of mental capacity where entities included a broad range of subjects
including a desktop stapler, a computer, a robot, various animals, and varying mental states of
humans. They identified three emergent factors: body, physiological sensations; heart, affective
states; and mind, cognitive properties of communication, planning, and making choices. In the
case here, the observed behaviors that are consistent with the cognitive properties of a mind are
most relevant.
II.2.2.3 Attribution of Behavior of Technological Artifacts
Several frameworks have been proposed to study the attribution of behavior for
technological artifacts, as well as approaches to study the source of these perceptions. While
attributions are relatively similar between humans and humanoid robots, differences have been
observed as systems become increasingly non-human.
Thellman et al. (2017) evaluated how people interpret the behavior of humanoid robots
compared to humans and found little difference in inferences of intelligence, which were also not
modified by situational cues (Thellman et al., 2017). This study used the causal network of
explanation framework proposed by Böhm and Pfister (2015). This framework provides a model
of attributions which they claim classifies both behavior and explanations of behavior. They
evaluate the actor’s goals, enduring dispositions, temporary states such as emotions, actions
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(intentional behaviors that are goal-directed), outcomes, uncontrollable events, and stimulus
attributes which are the “features of the person or object toward which a behavior is directed.”
Some studies have altered the appearance or portrayal of the observed entity where the
behavior was otherwise equivalent. The study by de Visser et al. (2016) varied the type of agent
(human, avatar, and computer) and the accuracy of its advice, evaluating trust, trust repair, and
confidence in an agent-assisted cooperative synthetic number-guessing task. Similarly, Terada
and Yamada (2017) varied the type of agent (a laptop computer, an intelligent toy bear, a humanlike robot, or a human) as an opponent in a simple coin flipping game. In both of these
experiments the portrayal of the other participant altered attributions without any change to the
interaction or behavior.
Other studies have explored how differences in behavior with the same portrayal affect
the perception of intelligence. Kryven, Ullman, Cowan, and Tenenbaum (2016) examined how
participants attributed intelligence to videos of an animated non-human character moving around
a maze. Each respondent rated many separate videos while the maze search approaches were
manipulated. A single item 5-point scale of intelligence from “less intelligent” to “more
intelligent” was used, and at the end of the entire sequence the participant was asked an openended question: “how did you make your decision?”, which was then coded as either being based
on “outcome” or “strategy” per respondent. Many participants provided ratings of intelligence
based not on the strategy used, but the outcome of the strategy. They speculated that evaluating
outcomes was a shortcut to evaluating intelligence as a form of satisficing, since reading the
mind of the animated character required more cognitive effort.
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II.2.2.4 Biases and Asymmetries in Attribution
Some research has linked the cause of attributions to incorrect inferences resulting from
differences in information availability between actors and observers (Malle, 2011; Robins,
Spranca, & Mendelsohn, 1996). Explanations change the information available to an observer,
and may interrupt systematic attribution processes based on asymmetry. Anderson (1983) found
that the availability of items of information, such as having the necessary aids, using the right
approach, and knowing relevant information, were cited more often in failure than success.
Actors are generally able to project what observers would observe, but observers are unable to
project what actors perceive (Krueger, Ham, & Linford, 1996). Other studies have not agreed
with information asymmetry, such as Storms (1973), which found that actors provided similar
explanations as observers when they watched themselves on videotape even though they had
access to the same information as actors.
Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, and Dawe (1999) proposed a framework of human-automation
teaming based in part on cognitive biases and social processes. They used that framework to
construct four experiments which found that social, cognitive, and motivational processes each
impact the potential use of and reliance on automation. Van Dongen and van Maanen (2006)
examined how failures were attributed in a hypothetical decision aid system. They found that
that attributions of failures were related to stable permanent traits of the decision aid, rather than
relating to causes outside of the decision aid; meanwhile, failures in human decisions were
attributed to more temporary and external causes.
Fein (1996) found that providing suggestions of an observed actor’s mental states was
sufficient to decrease the role of biases in attributions of behavior and inferences about the actor.
While Fein (1996) anticipated that people understand computers as objects without intentions
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and therefore not subject to suspicion, intelligent agents perceived as intentional systems may
encounter this phenomenon.
II.2.3 Self-Efficacy
II.2.3.1 Background
Social cognitive theory proposed that there are two conceptions that determine behavior:
expectations relating to outcomes of the behavior, and beliefs about the ability to perform. This
second set of beliefs was conceptualized as self-efficacy, or as defined in Bandura (1986):
“judgments of their capabilities to organize and execute courses of action required to attain
designated types of performances. It is not concerned with the skills one has but with one’s
judgments of what one can do with whatever skills one possesses” (page 391). Bandura (1977)
conceptualized self-efficacy as the expectation of performance which drives behavior to attempt
an activity, predicting the amount of effort people will expend. Bandura (1986) proposed that
humans acquire knowledge primarily by observing others while taking part in social interactions.
Self-efficacy is a self-perception of competence and future performance as opposed to actual
competence in a task. The construct has been described as the foundation of all human
performance (Peterson & Arnn, 2005).
Bandura identified four ways to increase self-efficacy: successful performance, watching
others succeed (also known as vicarious learning), persuasion and encouragement, and
physiological/affective factors (Bandura, 1986). The first two of these are particularly relevant in
interacting with an intelligent agent to perform classification, where agreement can be
interpreted as successful performance, and mimicking of observed reasoning and logic for
classifications similarly produces learning leading to successful performance. Gist and Mitchell
(1992) examined the inter-relationships and feedback between performance and self-efficacy,
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noting that interventions designed to modify self-efficacy had to address specific determinants of
self-efficacy, such as perceptions of ability and task complexity.
II.2.3.2 Application to the Workplace
While originally developed in an educational context, self-efficacy has also been
extensively explored in an employment setting. Studies have consistently identified positive
relationships with job satisfaction and performance. The meta-analysis by Stajkovic and Luthans
(1998) of 114 studies found the effect of self-efficacy on job performance to be greater than
goal-setting, feedback interventions, and organizational behavior modification. General selfefficacy was found to have higher correlations with job satisfaction than other predictors (selfesteem, locus of control, and emotional stability) and comparable correlations with job
performance in the meta-analysis by Judge and Bono (2001) of 135 studies. The meta-analytic
path model by Brown, Lent, Telander, and Tramayne (2011) used data from 8 studies identifying
that self-efficacy had similar effects as cognitive ability on work performance. The study by
Koutsoumari and Antoniou (2016) identifies occupational self-efficacy as having correlations
with multiple dimensions of work engagement, and they advocate for using training and
development to positively influence the self-efficacy of employees.
II.2.3.3 Application to Human-Computer Interaction
An early adaptation of self-efficacy in human-computer interaction was by Compeau and
Higgins (1995) which developed a scale for the use of computers based upon social cognitive
theory (Bandura, 1986). Compeau and Higgins (1995) established that an individual’s reactions
to an information system would be impacted by their self-efficacy that they could use the system.
Self-efficacy appeared in later conceptions of Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) such as the
extension of TAM (Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989), TAM2 (Venkatesh, 2000), and UTAUT
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(Dwivedi, Rana, Jeyaraj, Clement, & Williams, 2017). Within this space self-efficacy is
positioned as an antecedent to use attitudes (Thompson, Compeau, & Higgins, 2006). Selfefficacy has been examined as an antecedent to automation complacency (Parasuraman &
Manzey, 2010), and as a way of accounting for over-use of manual control in automation settings
(Lee & See, 2004).
Self-efficacy has been examined in the context of specific systems both in case study and
experimental observation, including disaster assessment. In a study by Zheng, McAlack, Wilmes,
Kohler‐Evans, and Williamson (2009), it was used within a computer-based learning context to
evaluate the learning impact of manipulating the multimedia conditions of a tool, where more
complex displays lowered cognitive load and increased self-efficacy. The design of interaction
for a website to retrieve information was examined where a more complex website decreased
self-efficacy (P. J.-H. Hu, Hu, & Fang, 2017). In these two cases the tasks were modified in
complexity through the way information was presented. In Leaman and La (2017), concepts
from self-efficacy were integrated into training plans which increased successful adoption among
users of smart wheelchairs. Within crowdsourced disaster assessment, Dittus (2017) utilized selfefficacy as a framework to analyze microtask design and worker feedback, finding reinforcement
led to retention of volunteers in future projects, which was interpreted as deriving from selfefficacy.
II.2.3.4 Illusory Understanding
Participants do not get graded feedback on their performance during damage assessment,
leading to the potential of having high confidence in assessments which are inconsistent with the
scenarios and the guideline. McKenna and Myers (1997) explored the role of accountability in
ungraded tasks and found that people who were briefed to expect an assessment of their skill
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level provided lower ratings of their understanding than participants that were not advised of an
assessment. Kruger and Dunning (1999) performed a series of studies which examined how
people rated their own performance in groups. They found that low performing participants often
rated themselves as high as the highest performing participants. The illusion of explanatory
understanding arises when heuristics mislead us in assessing our understanding of explanations.
This is particularly deceptive for early learners, causing them to believe they understand more
than they actually do through perceived surges in understanding and insight that are not, in fact,
coherent (Keil, 2006). Previous studies have found that even experts can be misled by the
explanations of an automated judgment into producing confident but incorrect decisions
(Bussone, Stumpf, & O'Sullivan, 2015).
II.2.4 Cognitive Load Theory
II.2.4.1 Background
Cognitive load theory (Sweller, 1988) originated in cognitive psychology’s studying of
instruction and learning, and was later investigated together with self-efficacy to optimize
learning tasks (Hesketh, 1997; Steele-Johnson, Beauregard, Hoover, & Schmidt, 2000).
Cognitive load theory crossed over into the Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) literature in
computer-based instruction (Nicholson, Hardin, & Nicholson, 2003) and in automated decision
aids (Benbasat & Todd, 1996), and later integrated into HCI more broadly (Hollender, Hofmann,
Deneke, & Schmitz, 2010). Cognitive load theory extends schema theory’s perspective that
knowledge is stored in mental schemata which are constructed through learning processes, where
limitations in working memory interfere with mentally manipulating a task’s schema (Hollender
et al., 2010). Cognitive load theory has conceptualized three kinds of cognitive load: inherent
(the basic mental load required for a task), germane (mental load that is not inherent to the task,
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but is beneficial to learning), and extraneous (mental load that is not related to the task) (Sweller,
van Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998). Key to the theory is how differences between people, tasks, and
situations influence cognitive load. It is also known that cognitive load, by reducing information
processing resources available to other processes, modifies attributions of observed behavior to
those more consistent with the existing views of the observer (Molden et al., 2006), and prevents
situational information from entering into the judgment of causal processes (Hilton, 2007).
Worked examples is an instructional method used to reduce cognitive load while
increasing the rate of learning by showing the reasoning used to complete a problem-solving task
(Sweller & Chandler, 1991), which in some respects is similar to the explanations of damage
assessments. Example-based learning (Van Gog & Rummel, 2010) similarly has learners observe
someone else performing a task to facilitate learning.
II.2.4.2 Applications in Computing Systems
Benbasat and Todd (1996) reviewed a series of experiments which manipulated the
cognitive load of tasks in a decision support system to test the effect on which paths of options
users followed. They found that users chose more complex and appropriate methods when
cognitive load was considered in task design, and avoided the same paths otherwise. Potter and
Balthazard (2004) investigated how a computing system assisted problem-solving by directing
attention to causes (“cause cueing”), increasing the number of solution ideas generated. They
also found that identification of causes decreased with distraction and increasing working
memory requirements. Cognitive load was evaluated as a mediator for human information
processing to understand how to work in split-attention and complex problem-solving
environments (Oviatt, 2006). Cognitive load theory has been used to evaluate learning and
performing tasks using information systems (P. J.-H. Hu et al., 2017; Zheng et al., 2009).
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Worked examples have been used in a computer-based learning interface to explain chemical
reactions, resulting in increased self-efficacy (Crippen & Earl, 2007). Within explanations,
cognitive load was seen as a key factor in user acceptance of recommendations (Giboney,
Brown, Lowry, & Nunamaker, 2015), and was also found to increase cognitive load, disrupting
ease of use as the amount of explanatory information increased (Nunes & Jannach, 2017).
II.2.4.3 Expertise and Explanation
Task designs have been found to be sensitive to level of expertise with no “one size fits
all” solution. In the review by Sawicka (2008), self-explanation and cognitive elaboration by
learners was found to increase germane load for novices and increase extraneous load for
experts. Seufert, Jänen, and Brünken (2007) found that “help” offered by an instructional system
was sensitive to levels of existing knowledge, where insufficiently low levels were related to not
being able to take advantage of the assistance, and levels that were too high related to “expertise
reversal,” resulting in increased cognitive load without a benefit in understanding. Between these
extremes, not all kinds of help were useful, and hyperlinked information and elaborations did not
improve learning performance. This was further supported by Mascha and Smedley (2007)
which found that computerized decision aids used by experienced people decreased the skill
levels of experts on non-complex cases, even though the same aid was useful to novices
approaching the same cases. As such, cognitive load can be sensitive not just to the content of
the information but how and to whom it is being presented.
II.2.5 Open Issues
While research has identified multiple dimensions of mind perception across many types
of entities, the task of this study imagines a non-embodied intelligent agent that is not
anthropomorphized. No studies were identified that evaluated the attribution of intelligence or
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the dimensionality of such attribution where the technological artifact provided explanations.
Further, no studies of mind perception were identified within the context of XAI systems.
Additionally, to the extent that agents are seen as intentional systems, the presence or lack of
explanations may modify suspicion of the simulated output, and therefore modify the accuracy of
resulting inferences about the agent. However, it is not clear whether explanations increase or
decrease suspicion.
II.3

Explanation by Intelligent Agents

II.3.1 Scope
The goal of this portion of the review is to identify the state-of-the-art methods and key
learnings from XAI to apply to the simulated agent and to identify areas to explore in the
research model. More specifically, the intention of this review is to support construct validity for
the explanations considered in the experiment, support content validity for the simulation of a
system, and maximize face validity of the findings for AI researchers that are focused on
algorithm development.
II.3.2 Background
While interest in XAI has recently surged, the effort to make AI interpretable and
develop models able to explain their output goes at least as far back as expert systems in the
1970’s (Abdul et al., 2018). Knowledge-based AI systems have employed argumentation as an
extension of Toulmin’s model (Moulin et al., 2002). The societal and legal requirements for
explanations arises not much differently from how people are expected to explain themselves in
court, as explanations act as a central tool for accountability (Doshi-Velez et al., 2017).
The target audience for explanations differs across the literature. Nunes and Jannach
(2017) consider a narrow audience of data scientists. Doran et al. (2017) defined “interpretable”
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as the user being able to understand the mathematical connections between inputs and outputs,
which limits the potential audience and roles of explainees in many contexts. Other authors
position explanations as being understandable by a broad audience with potentially no
understanding of the function of the model either explicitly through their definition (Chander,
Srinivasan, Chelian, Wang, & Uchino, 2018; Gilpin et al., 2018; Miller, 2019; Ribeiro, Singh, &
Guestrin, 2016), or by framing understandability such that it does not require knowledge of the
model’s operation (Adadi & Berrada, 2018; Chander et al., 2018; Doshi-Velez & Kim, 2017;
Lipton, 2016). In the case here, explanations are being used by individuals that certainly are not
experts in the algorithm, and may not have proficiency in the damage assessment task.
Many current XAI approaches have not considered the utility of the explanations to
humans and whether they are usable or practical in real-world situations (Abdul et al., 2018). The
goals of the explainer are most often different from the explainee (Miller, 2019), creating
potential mismatches in communication. Explainability supports predictability, which is key to
human-agent teamwork (Ahrndt, Fähndrich, & Albayrak, 2016), however this addresses just one
of the ten challenges in teamwork identified by Klein, Woods, Bradshaw, Hoffman, and
Feltovich (2004). Interactive XAI, such as a dialogue of explanation, might overcome many of
the remaining challenges, but this remains a technical challenge yet to be practically solved
(Weld & Bansal, 2018), and relies on an elaborate process to unfold reasoning.
II.3.3 Composition of Explanations
Any given event has a very large number of possible explanations going back in time
through a causal chain. At the greatest extreme of detail are “accounts” which are narratives
developed through a process of event comprehension designed to support claims across many
preceding events and contributing causes (McLaughlin, Cody, & Read, 2013). Even if
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comprehensive accounts could be algorithmically generated, the cognitive burden of complete
explanations is too great for most decisions (Miller, 2019). Hesslow (1988) identified a series of
traits of causes which made them preferable for inclusion in an explanation. Of these, unexpected
conditions, abnormal conditions, precipitating causes, variable conditions, predictive value, and
deviations from the ideal are most relevant and machine-detectable in images.
Research has explored how people will expect an AI system to explain itself. When
multiple people are asked to explain a shared event, they generally provide very similar and brief
explanations, suggesting that there are systematic mechanisms people use to develop and select
explanations (Malle, 2006). While explanations may be possible across many conceptual levels
of causation, Miller (2019) claims that inferring the why-question that is provoking the need for
an explanation produces the greatest relevance in explanations to the user. Gilpin et al. (2018)
advocates that systems should account for trade-offs between completeness and interpretability,
and err on the side of providing more detail even if it makes the explanation less understandable.
Counterfactual explanations highlight the minimum conditions which would have
changed the classification (Wachter et al., 2017). This is closely related to contrasting
explanations, which provide information about the features that differentiate the actual cause
history from the outcome that did not happen (Van Bouwel & Weber, 2002). Counterfactual
explanations may appear to be only a small semantic shift from simple causal explanations, but
their framing, in contrast, has been found to make them more memorable and persuasive even
when they contain the same information (Roese, 1997). When humans generate counterfactual
explanations we employ the simulation heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1981) to imagine how
small changes in circumstances would have altered the outcome. Within the Wachter et al.
(2017) formulation this is a computable proposition where the contrasting outcome is the
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smallest possible change to move to another category, while Miller (2019) considers that the best
counterfactual explanation addresses a contrasting categorization relevant to the user, which is
generally non-explicit and not necessarily the minimum change.
Since intelligent agents do not have generalized understanding and can be easily fooled
(Akhtar & Mian, 2018), the ability for an agent to detect and explain conditions where its model
has not been trained or is known to fail adds factual explanatory value and can clarify why a
classification is incorrect (Hoffman et al., 2018). To the extent that good explanations should be
persuasive, contingencies and hedges on explanations can be perceived as lack of conviction
even in scientific contexts (Hyland, 1996a). In AI argumentation a persuasive argument is
considered one which defends against other competing arguments (Moulin et al., 2002), but
when the purpose of the explanation is truth instead of changing someone else’s position this can
be counterproductive. The result is a tension between persuasive explanations and ones that are
useful to detect an erroneous classification. A classification of hedges in academic writing is
provided by (Hyland, 1996b), where the author claims that the purposes of hedges are “fuzzy”
and that the true intent of a hedge must be inferred by the reader as they are rarely explicit.
II.3.4 Explanation Engines in Deep Learning
Many of the visual explanation engines were inspired or derived from image description
approaches. An example adapted system was proposed by Nushi, Kamar, and Horvitz (2018). In
this multi-step process a visual detector identifies objects in the image which are fed as a list into
a system-generated observation engine. That engine uses a human-tuned language model to
combine the terms identified; however, that engine is not able to interpret the image itself. Those
candidate descriptions are then fed into a caption ranker that has access to the original image to
decide which generated description is most appropriate. This approach combines training on how
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people would express the relationships between objects without the machine having an explicit
understanding of why the terms are combined, and what words are used to join them. Within
evaluation methods for explanations, similar methods have been used to leverage humans to
score automatically generated phrases for relevance to images, such as the influential scoring
mechanism CIDEr proposed by Vedantam, Lawrence Zitnick, and Parikh (2015).
As an expansion on this concept, Antol et al. (2015) proposed “visual question
answering” where users could ask a computer vision model questions about an image and
responses would be produced tailored to the question. Due to the errors in the output of these
types of systems, Ghosh, Burachas, Ray, and Ziskind (2018) and Park et al. (2018) separately
explored generating explanations of the answers by combining natural language with
highlighting areas of images relevant to classifications. Daniels and Metaxas (2018) proposed a
context-sensitive method of classifying the content of a scene through the relationships of objects
that occur together, which generated higher-accuracy descriptions of unknown images, but
without producing fully natural language descriptions. Hendricks et al. (2018) developed a
method for labeling images with visual explanations that detected objects within the image and
explained how classifications were made, with both direct causal and counterfactual explanations
generated by a neural network and selected for appropriateness by an algorithmic “phrase-critic,”
shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4 Example Algorithmic Counterfactual Explanations
Note. Reprinted from Figure 5 (page 12) of Hendricks et al. (2018). Copyright 2018 by Springer
Nature. Reprinted with permission.

II.3.5 Experimental Manipulation of Explanation
Among the earliest experiments with explanations in intelligent systems were those
conducted with expert and decision support systems. Suermondt and Cooper (1993) examined
explanations in a decision support system in a medical context, finding that explanations
improved diagnostic accuracy. Rook and Donnell (1993) compared two means of presenting
information to justify a decision. That study identified that cognitive limitations in interpreting
output was critical in the design of explanations. Template explanations of procedures were
examined in Gregor (2001), which found relationships between their use decreasing cognitive
effort and increasing usage of explanations in cooperative tasks. Rose (2005) identified that
when accounting students were provided a decision-aid system to assist with decision making
regarding tax-related rules, students with low cognitive loading learned the rules similarly to
those without the system, but those with high load knew less about the rules than if they did not
have the system. These early cases of research identified performance increases and the
foundations of many of the challenges in explanation that remain today.
The recent increase in interest in explanation has resulted in reviews collecting the past
findings across intelligent system technologies. The review by Nunes and Jannach (2017) was
specific to experiments with explanation and analyzed 217 studies of explanation in decision
support and recommender systems. They found that the performance benefits identified by early
studies did not hold over time, and that the persuasiveness of explanations was a potential
confound to understand the presented output. Abdul et al. (2018) analyzed the connections and
isolation of areas of research and Adadi and Berrada (2018) surveyed the body of XAI research,
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and both identified a lack of articles which focused on the human factor. The review of the
interpretability of explanations by Doshi-Velez and Kim (2017) identified that experiments with
humans have preferred simplified tasks over realistic settings to focus on algorithm and
explanation performance (Doshi-Velez & Kim, 2017).
Some recent studies have focused on the subjective quality of explanations. Narayanan et
al. (2018) manipulated the length and complexity of explanations and measured a subjective
score from users on an artificial task, finding that long explanations were less preferred, though
not as sensitive to the number of concepts in an explanation. The study by van der Waa, van
Diggelen, van den Bosch, and Neerincx (2018) requested that users evaluate multiple
explanations, and asked them to measure them in dimensions of preference for long or short,
strategy versus policy, and sufficiency of information, with the highest preference for
explanations related to policy and greater information. In the study by Lakkaraju, Bach, and
Leskovec (2016), humans were employed to evaluate the interpretability of machine-generated
explanation in logic form (rather than natural language) and to recreate the explanation in natural
language. The responses were evaluated qualitatively by two judges, finding widely much better
performance with interpretable decision sets which applied rules independently than Bayesian
decision lists, which required interpreting an explanation sequentially.
Several studies evaluated compliance with system decisions based on providing an
explanation. Gedikli, Jannach, and Ge (2014) examined explanations within explanation systems,
identifying transparency as a key antecedent of trust and compliance. Arnold, Clark, Collier,
Leech, and Sutton (2006) looked at definition, justification, rule-trace, and strategic justifications
with the performance metric of acceptance of the recommendation, finding that explanations did
increase compliance with differences in the types of explanations that were persuasive to novices
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as compared to experts. In a classification task for microblogs, the explanation, control, and
metadata available to the user were manipulated with the primary finding that system
recommendations should be provided ahead of search results and tools to achieve compliance
(Schaffer et al., 2015). In a robotic experiment Nikolaidis, Kwon, Forlizzi, and Srinivasa (2018)
found an increase in adaptation to the robot’s intentions when an explanation was provided, but
with decreasing trust, and belief that the robot was not being truthful.
Among more interactive uses of explanation, three studies were identified. Soundness of
recommendations and completeness of explanations in recommendations was examined by
Kulesza et al. (2013) in a music preference context. They tested the impact of completeness and
soundness of explanations on user’s mental models, recommending that both completeness and
soundness are required, but only if users believe their input is improving the intelligent agent. In
Sklar and Azhar (2018) the researchers experimented with coordination of a robot that could
provide an explanation in dialogue through argumentation. They found that subjective preference
and objective performance criteria did not vary significantly between explanation and black box
conditions. Holliday, Wilson, and Stumpf (2013) compared the effect of users being provided an
explanation that they could then correct to a system that did not provide explanations. They
found that participants in the condition where they were not providing explanations exhibited
more control-exerting behaviors and reported such while “thinking aloud,” but there were no
perceptual differences in control when the same concept was tested in a questionnaire. They
deduced that there were differences between perception and behavior related to perception of
control.
Several experiments introduced intentional errors to evaluate conditions where users
accepted erroneous output and the effects on other measures. Ribeiro et al. (2016) manipulated
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the quality of the model being explained in human experiments of trust between unexplained and
explained classifications, and found that explanations of erroneous performance decreased trust
but increased accuracy of user perceptions about the quality of the classification model.
Poursabzi-Sangdeh, Goldstein, Hofman, Vaughan, and Wallach (2018) examined the effect of
modifying the information interpretable from a linear regression model which predicted
apartment prices in New York. They also introduced mistakes and measured trust. They found
that the timing of offering explanations and the design of optimal interpretability was not
intuitive to designers of the interface, and that different levels of local explanation did not
produce statistically significant differences in perception. In the medical context a mixedmethods analysis was conducted with an experiment involving a simulated clinical decision
support system. Half of the eight scenarios provided to the subjects had an incorrect
recommendation. They found that that confidence statements did not sway trust but that
“comprehensive why” explanations induced over-reliance, and “selective why” explanations led
to better confidence in the user’s decisions (Bussone et al., 2015).
The closest experiment identified to the design of this study was conducted by Tan, Tan,
and Teo (2012). They evaluated how differences in explanation impacted cognitive measures by
manipulating explanations into forms of trace, justification, and strategic explanations. They
measured perceived confidence in the decision and cognitive capacity (preferences on how much
to think) in a consumer context with types of recommendations. No single configuration of
explanations produced an optimal outcome and they instead identified trade-offs in decision
quality, confidence, and speed. For instance, conditions with explanations based on a table of
metrics and benchmark comparisons resulted in the fastest decision times and highest
confidence, but the quality of decision was lower than that for other conditions of the
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experiment. They proposed combining multiple explanation approaches into the same interaction
as the solution; however, such a configuration was not experimentally evaluated.
II.3.6 Open Issues
There has been relatively little study done on what explanations should contain to balance
persuasive power and use of logic. The most logically rigorous models consider the ability for
explanations to be able to defend claims against those of competing explanations. Models based
on more subjective criteria do not reject the value of compelling logic, but instead prioritize
human outcomes of interpreting explanations. This is not without risk as well, as persuasive
explanations may be more accepted based on subjective criteria than complete, accurate, and
transparent explanations (Gilpin et al., 2018). The review by Nunes and Jannach (2017)
identified open concerns over the lack of clarity in the differences between stakeholder goals,
user goals, and the purposes of explanation, challenges in selecting the best content for
explanations, user interface options for revealing explanations, responsive explanations that were
adjusted to the needs and requirements of users, and objective evaluation protocols and metrics
which do not rely on stated behavioral intentions or subjective assessment of the explanations.
Additionally, while the explanations generated for images have been tested in terms of
preference and trust, they have not been evaluated in terms of to what extent users process them
beyond those attitudes. Experiments have found widely varying results with the most consistent
“successful” outcomes based on achieving trust and compliance. Systems that introduced errors
identified that compliance and trust were not always the ideal outcomes for explainable systems
to achieve partnership with the human user.
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III RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
III.1

Research Model
This chapter develops a research model to address the research questions by

hypothesizing relationships between theoretical constructs identified from the literature that
represent the concepts in the conceptual framework.
Self-efficacy in the task was selected as the ultimate dependent variable due to its
predictive power for future engagement in the task, investment of mental effort, and task
performance and satisfaction. Cognitive load was selected as a known mediator of self-efficacy
and was expected to be impacted by adding explanations. Attribution of agent intelligence was
selected as explanations should directly influence the perception of mental processes in the
agent, and may be affected by cognitive load. The model focuses on the effects of adding
counterfactual and hedging explanations. These selected theoretical constructs and their
definitions are listed in Table 3. The developed research model appears in Figure 5.
Some prior research which used social cognitive theories has employed repeated measure
designs to study within-subject effects in the development of attitudes (e.g. Compeau & Higgins,
1995) and to monitor feedback loops in cognitive processes (e.g. Leppink & van Merriënboer,
2015). However, no prior between-subjects experiments which utilized repeated measures were
identified that tested the effect of pre-treatment or repeated measurements on outcomes. To avoid
the effects of measurement on the experiment outcome and maximize the realism of the task for
participants, the research model was developed using only post-test measurement of the
constructs. This approach is similar to the sequence in the experiment by Joseph (2013), and
appropriate for a between-subjects test of the effect of explanation types. While a repeated
measure design would decrease the group size required for each condition (Leppink & van
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Merriënboer, 2015), the complexity of the experiment in terms of number of conditions and their
analysis would increase to establish the effects of measurement (Solomon, 1949).
Alternate explanations for self-efficacy outcomes were selected from the literature to
understand their relative ability to explain the experiment results. Previous task experience was
selected as it has potential interactions with each of the dependent variables. Trust, perceived
interdependence, and perceived level of automation have been selected due to their common use
across the human-computer interaction literature and will allow a comparison of their ability to
explain outcomes of the experiment to the study’s theoretical constructs.
In the task and survey instrument the simulated agent was referred to as “Automated
Damage Assessment Machine” with the acronym “ADAM.”
Table 3 Theoretical Constructs
Construct

Definition

Causal Explanation

“A line of reasoning that explains the decision-making
process of a model using human-understandable features of
the input data.” (Doran et al., 2017)

Counterfactual Explanation

An explanation “crafted in such a way as to provide a minimal
amount of information capable of altering a decision, and they
do not require the [lay person] to understand any of the
internal logic of a model in order to make use of it.” (Wachter
et al., 2017)

Hedging Explanation

An explanation which provides “specific information about
what the system cannot do or perform well” such as boundary
conditions and failure modes (Hoffman et al., 2018).
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Cognitive Load

The extent to which short-term working memory resources
are utilized in the task (Sweller, 1988).

Intrinsic Cognitive Load

The inherent and unalterable required mental effort to

(ICL)

complete the task (Sweller et al., 1998).

Germane Cognitive Load

Mental

(GCL)

understanding of the task (Sweller et al., 1998).

Extraneous Cognitive Load

Mental effort which does not contribute toward the task or the

(ECL)

learning of the task (Sweller et al., 1998).

Attribution of Agent

“Attributing abstract causal mental states are not only the

Intelligence

reduction in the cognitive complexity required to understand

effort

expended

to

construct

schemas

and

another’s behavior but also the prediction of the other’s future
behavior.” (Terada & Yamada, 2017)
Self-Efficacy in Task

“Belief in one’s agentive capabilities, that one can produce
given levels of attainment” (Bandura, 1997) here specific to
the task of assessing structure and damage classifications
together with the simulated agent.
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H1a (-)

Counterfactual

Cognitive Load

H4 (-)

H1b (+)
Self-Efficacy in Task

H3 (-)

H2a (+)
Hedging
H2b (-)

Control Condition
Black Box

Attribution of Agent
Intelligence

H5 (+)

Alternate Explanations

Assessment Outcomes

Previous Task
Experience

Trust in Intelligent
Agent

Perceived
Interdependence

Review Timing

Dispositional
Trust for AI

Learned Trust
in AI

Perceived Level of
Automation

Erroneous
Agreement

Figure 5 Research Model

III.2

Independent Variables

III.2.1 Causal Explanation
Explanations of the mathematical causes of a model’s output are the most direct variety
of causal explanation, but in the case of deep learning algorithms, such explanations are unlikely
to be brief or useful. In comparison, explanations which contain human-understandable
statements related to objects and features of the image, such as those from Hendricks et al.
(2018), are useful and particularly relevant when aligned to the task guideline. In this study, the
goal for the causal explanation is to provide what Doran et al. (2017) describes as “a line of
reasoning that explains the decision-making process of a model using human-understandable
features of the input data.” As such, causal explanations were provided using human-observable
attributes of the post-damage image related to the guideline. A causal explanation was included
in all experiment conditions except for the “black box” control condition.
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III.2.2 Counterfactual Explanation
Counterfactual explanations provide the minimal differences capable of altering a
decision, and they do not require knowledge of how the agent operates (Wachter et al., 2017).
They are intended to facilitate counterfactual thought by feeding the simulation heuristic
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1981), and allowing the worker to form better causal connections
between the model’s claims and the data (Keil, 2006). The counterfactual explanations
developed here are similar to the causal explanations in that they cite human-observable
attributes; however, for counterfactual explanations the attributes are cited as missing, thereby
making a specified alternate classification inappropriate.
III.2.3 Hedging Explanation
Explanations of why the simulated output may be incorrect are considered “hedging
explanations.” Unlike the causal and counterfactual explanations, an example system to model
hedging explanations was not identified in the literature. The call for such explanations were
used to inform the potential content. Thelisson, Padh, and Celis (2017) called for safe-guards to
be designed into AI systems to expose the causes behind decisions in order to reveal potential
biases and discrimination. In this context, that can be interpreted as exposing limitations in
damage detection associated with socioeconomic and demographic factors. Bussone et al. (2015)
called for systems to be able to explain when their results would not apply after finding that
medical professionals agreed with erroneous automated diagnoses. This is comparable with the
call from Hoffman et al. (2018) for explanations that help a user apply and measure trust
situationally.
In formal writing it is expected to hedge claims leaving them open to being wrong, with
the degree of hedging providing information on the strength of a claim (Hyland, 1996b). In the
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Toulmin (1958) model of argumentation there is a provision for arguments to contain an element
joined to a claim using the term “unless,” which provides a reason why an argued claim might
not be true, and which is tied to something specific about the support for the claim (“a rebuttal”).
The hedging explanations of this study follow this mode, referencing human-observable
attributes related to a hypothetical failure mode relevant to the image. Failure modes were
identified from the computer vision literature. Each is presented using the advisory phraseology
“consider,” avoiding conveying confidence in a hedge.
III.3

Dependent Variables

III.3.1 Self-Efficacy
The seven items of the Self-Efficacy for Learning and Performance scale (Lodewyk &
Winne, 2005) were adapted to the task of this study, with “will” language modified to “can,”
consistent with measure development guidance from Bandura (2006). These items were rated on
a 7-point Likert-Type scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” with only the ends of
the scale labeled. The adapted item “I’m confident I understand how to use the damage
assessment guide” was dropped after testing due to cross-loading with other concepts, reducing
the scale to six items. Two additional items were developed and considered for addition: “I
believe I won't overly rely on ADAM,” and “I'm confident that ADAM won't distract me;”
however, these items measured reliance rather than self-efficacy. A third item, “The automated
assessment prevents errors in manual damage assessments” was adapted from Singh, Molloy,
and Parasuraman (1993) to evaluate a potential perceived reliance measure, but these three items
did not perform well. Reliability for the six adopted items for self-efficacy was measured (α =
.952).
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III.3.2 Cognitive Load
To evaluate the three theoretical types of cognitive load, the eight-item scale from
Klepsch, Schmitz, and Seufert (2017) was selected and adapted to the damage assessment task.
The naïve methodology was used without briefing respondents on cognitive load theory beyond
the wording of the items. A ninth item was developed to balance the number of items for
intrinsic cognitive load compared to the other two types, intended to be reflective with the other
two: “I had to remember many things to perform the task.” Items were rated on a 7-point LikertType scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” with only the ends of the scale labeled.
Reliability was measured for the three sub-components separately (Intrinsic α = .733, Germane α
= .676, Extraneous α = .733). The Paas (1992) single-item total cognitive load measure has been
well-validated across many studies (Paas, Tuovinen, Tabbers, & Van Gerven, 2003) and has
been shown to correlate with physiological measures (Joseph, 2013). The single item from Paas
(1992) was adapted to the study and presented immediately after the completion of the ten
scenarios. The item asked participants: “How much mental effort did you invest in making your
assessment?” Response was rated on a 9-point scale with ends “Very, Very Low” to “Very, Very
High” and intermediate scale points labeled as in the original scale. While both approaches were
employed in the instrument, validity could not be assured, and the three-component model was
utilized for the structural model.
III.3.3 Attribution of Agent Intelligence
Six items were adopted from Terada and Yamada (2017). The items were: thinks
logically, is knowledgeable, is able to make decisions, is predictable, is insightful, has a mind.
The first five items loaded on the same extracted factor (personal intelligence) and the sixth
loaded on a separate factor (social intelligence). Items were rated on a 7-point Likert-Type scale
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from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” with only the ends of the scale labeled. Reliability
was measured across all of the items in this scale (α = .819).
III.4

Alternate Explanations

III.4.1 Previous Task Experience
Previous research in attribution and self-efficacy has found a ceiling effect with high
levels of pre-existing self-efficacy precluding an effect of attributions (Stajkovic & Sommer,
2000). Gist and Mitchell (1992) evaluated the development of self-efficacy across different
levels of task experience with a novel task. They found that with low experience self-efficacy is
informed by multiple cues in an assessment of requirements, resources, and constraints of the
task. In comparison, those with high task experience form self-efficacy based on past
performance and motivation rather than aspects of the task. High task experience, particularly
experience with the specific damage guideline used in this study, would also greatly decrease the
cognitive load. To account for this potential, participants were given three items to assess their
previous experience in aerial image damage assessment: “How would you rate your experience
in damage assessment of aerial images prior to this study?” with 7-point response options
“None” (coded as 0) and “Very limited” (1) to “Highly Experienced” (6); “How often do you
rate damage to structures in aerial images?” with 7-point response options from “Never” (coded
as 0) and “Yearly, or less” (1) to “Daily” (6); and “Have you previously used a damage guideline
to make ratings?” with three response options: “No” (coded as 0), “Yes – But not the same one”
(3) and “Yes – The same guideline as here” (6). If “None” was answered to the first item, the
remaining two items were not presented. The three components were added into an index value
for the measure.
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III.4.2 Trust in the Intelligent Agent
Trust has been the primary measure of participant attitudes in human-automation research
including XAI. Since the simulated agent provides erroneous classifications in half of the
scenarios, lack of trust is an appropriate response. However, even if the worker does not fully
trust the simulated agent, they may have greater trust in agents that are better able to explain
erroneous performance. To measure trust for comparison against previous studies a single item
from Dzindolet, Peterson, Pomranky, Pierce, and Beck (2003) (“I believe I can trust the
automated assessment”) was adapted here and rated on a 7-point Likert-Type scale from
“Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” with only the ends of the scale labeled.
III.4.3 Dispositional and Learned Trust for AI
The three-level model of information systems and technology trust proposed by Marsh
and Dibben (2003) defines three types of trust: “learned,” based on experience with similar
systems; “situational,” where dispositions are adjusted by cues from the environment; and
“dispositional” where attitudes are based on pre-existing attitudes about technology. Though
participants may have previous experience in the damage assessment task, they are unlikely to
have had experience making assessments with an intelligent agent. The three-level model
predicts that trust in the intelligent agent will be determined by pre-existing and stable
dispositions towards automation and AI. To evaluate these pre-existing attitudes, dispositional
trust for automation was measured using three items adapted from Nees (2016). These items
were rated on a 7-point Likert-Type scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” with
only the ends of the scale labeled. For participants that have experience working with AI, the
inclination to trust the intelligent agent may be better informed by learned trust (or distrust)
attained from working with other AI systems. Participants rated learned trust for AI using a 5-
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point scale of how well AI had met their expectations in their profession with “Far Short of My
Expectations” and “Far Exceeded My Expectations” as the ends of the scale, with an option for
not having used AI in their work.
III.4.4 Perceived Interdependence
The final rating in this task is fully dependent on the human’s judgment, and the human
must actively accept the input by changing their selections after reviewing the agent’s output. As
such, the task is not truly interdependent. However, explanations increase observability and
predictability of the agent, which joint activity theory predicts improves performance (Johnson et
al., 2012). Providing the cause of a disagreeing classification can also produce a greater
understanding of the guideline, creating some level of “directability” by the agent. To assess
attitudes about task interdependence, three items from Morgeson and Humphrey (2006) were
adapted: “My ratings were affected by ADAM's input,” “Assessments depend on the both the
human and ADAM for accuracy,” and “My ratings benefitted by working with ADAM.” Items
were rated on a 7-point Likert-Type scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” with
only the ends of the scale labeled.
III.4.5 Perceived Level of Automation
Participants that perceive a high degree of system automation are likely to rely on the
agent’s assessment in erroneous cases without independently assessing the scenario themselves.
Greater detail in explanation may be perceived as lower automation by creating a burden to the
worker to evaluate the agent. One item was included to measure the participant’s perception of
the level of automation of the microtask. Participants rated a single item “The damage
assessment was” on a 7-point Likert-Type scale from “Highly Manual” to “Highly Automated”
with only the ends of the scale labeled.
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III.5

Scenario Measures

III.5.1 Initial and Review Timing
The average amount of time (in seconds) workers took to provide their ratings was
measured for each step separately. The initial step time was measured between the presentation
of the images and the submission of the initial rating. The review step time was measured
between presentation of the simulated output (and any explanations) and the submission of any
changes in the review step. The average of the ten scenarios was computed for each participant
to match the unit of analysis of the other measures.
III.5.2 Erroneous Agreement
Some prior research has found that producing persuasive explanations causes users to
accept the system’s recommendation (Arnold et al., 2006; Cramer et al., 2008; Glass,
McGuinness, & Wolverton, 2008). In this context there should be no presumption that the agent
has the correct answer, and it is possible to be overly persuasive. Using acceptance of the system
output as the performance criteria might be a measure of the absence of human cognition. While
objectively correct ratings may be impossible to identify, it is possible for the agent’s rating to be
highly inconsistent with the image. Erroneous output, which is coherent with respect to the
guidelines, but references objects that are clearly not in the image, provide an opportunity to
detect overly persuasive explanations.
Five of the scenarios presented to workers were designed and selected for inclusion based
on the implausibility of the objects cited in the explanation. Erroneous agreement was measured
as the proportion of erroneous scenarios where the participant changed their rating to agree with
the agent’s damage rating in the review step. Participants that agreed with the intended erroneous
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rating in their initial review (5.3% of ratings) were not counted as being in erroneous agreement,
as the simulated output and explanation likely had little to no role in the worker’s rating.
III.6

Manipulation Checks
Three measures were included as a check to ensure manipulation of the independent

variables. The measures asked participants to rate their agreement with three statements: “The
Automated Damage Assessment Machine (ADAM) explained why it made its ratings,” “ADAM
compared its rating to at least one other possible classification,” and “ADAM pointed out
features in the image that may lead to incorrect classifications.” Each was rated as “Yes,” “No,”
or “Don’t Know / Don’t Remember.” For detail on the development and testing of the
manipulation check, see Appendix F.2.7.
III.7

Demographics and Feedback
Demographics (age, gender, income, education) were requested. An optional open-text

feedback item was included.
III.8

Hypothesis Development

III.8.1 Effect of Counterfactual Explanations
Explanations with a comparative and contrasting causal explanation will require less
cognitive resources, potentially avoid referrals back to the guidelines, and provide direct
contrasts to other possible classifications (Hilton, 2007; Wachter et al., 2017). These
explanations will both connect to the facts of the image (which can be falsifiable), and inform the
worker of the schema classifications to fill in holes and errors in their own understanding
reducing the perception of information being extraneous (Bandura, 1986). Differences in selfrated cognitive load were detectable between different types of puzzles in Joseph (2013), and
users that have to spend more mental effort evaluating and reviewing damage guidelines will
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have higher load. The interpretation of counterfactual explanations is expected to support the
participant’s construction of a mental schema for the task, resulting in increased germane
cognitive load in the short-run, with decreased total cognitive load as they gain experience in the
task (Sweller, 1988). As these explanations are also composed in the manner in which humans
generally explain themselves (Malle, 2006), counterfactual explanations are also expected to
make it more likely that the agent is perceived as being predictable in terms of having a rational
mind and being intelligent (Dennett, 1989).
Hypothesis 1a: Counterfactual explanations will decrease cognitive load.
Hypothesis 1b: Counterfactual explanations will increase attribution of agent intelligence.
III.8.2 Effect of Hedging Explanations
Hedging explanations provide important information on known failure modes and can
highlight potential flaws and challenges in models that are not obvious to humans (Hoffman et
al., 2018). At the same time, these failure modes cannot be positively detected by the model and
therefore are not certain assertions, but instead notes of caution based on presumptive detection
of boundary conditions which do not necessarily invalidate results. When the classifications and
explanations are coherent with the image and guidelines, the presence of these explanatory
warnings is nearly by definition extraneous cognitive load. They are also likely to be seen as
declaring weaknesses which our biases treat as lack of competence and intelligence (Moulin et
al., 2002). In conflict with this, some evaluation frameworks for explanations cite the importance
of persuasiveness of explanations to human understanding (Gilpin et al., 2018; Tintarev &
Masthoff, 2011). Hedging explanations are speculative in that they are not detectable with
certainty, and as such are likely to increase cognitive load with “seductive details” which may be
misleading and require more effort to evaluate, also consistent with extraneous cognitive load
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(Klepsch et al., 2017). While framed in terms of the content of the image, hedging explanations
describe conditions of the agent and are less inherently understandable to participants unfamiliar
with the function of computer vision algorithms, even if they are experts in damage assessment.
While literature that hasn’t specifically examined hedging explanations expects a benefit, the
related literature in other contexts indicates hedging explanations will increase cognitive load
and be less persuasive by reducing the perception of intelligence and confidence.
Hypothesis 2a: Hedging explanations will increase cognitive load.
Hypothesis 2b: Hedging explanations will decrease attribution of agent intelligence.
III.8.3 Cognitive Load on Attribution of Agent Intelligence
Increasing cognitive load results in people selectively processing information (Sweller,
1988). By reducing information processing resources available, attributions of observed behavior
conform to the pre-existing views of the observer (Molden et al., 2006). Increased cognitive load
also prevents situational information from entering into the judgment of causal processes (Hilton,
2007). This has been further supported by research which manipulated cognitive load to test for
the presence of implicit mind perception, which has found that perception and attention to mental
state requires cognitive resources which are shed under cognitive load (Schneider, Lam, Bayliss,
& Dux, 2012). The agent in this model is fallible and commits errors; however, the explanations
provide a basis by which to attribute intelligence if attributions are made based on the situational
causes (such as errors in interpreting a challenging image) as compared to dispositional causes.
The study by Gilbert and Osborne (1989) examined recovery from incorrect inferences and
found that subjects under high cognitive load made errors in attributions even if misperceptions
of the events those attributions were based on were “retroactively cured.” As such, while the
agent’s explanation may cure incorrect inferences, their attributions of the agent’s behavior may
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remain unchanged. Based on this previous knowledge that cognitive load disrupts the
attributional processes of humans in social situations, the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 3: Increasing cognitive load will decrease attribution of agent intelligence.
III.8.4 Effect of Cognitive Load on Self-Efficacy
Many previous studies in instruction (Hesketh, 1997; Steele-Johnson et al., 2000) and
general technology-mediated task contexts (Crippen & Earl, 2007; P. J.-H. Hu et al., 2017;
Zheng et al., 2009) have found relationships between cognitive load and self-efficacy. Across
each of these studies, increasing cognitive load was associated with decreasing self-efficacy
within their respective tasks.
Hypothesis 4: Greater cognitive load will decrease self-efficacy.
III.8.5 Effect of Attribution of Agent Intelligence on Self-Efficacy
Social cognitive theory anticipates that learning is a social process where we learn
primarily by observing others rather than exclusively from our own independent experience
(Bandura, 1986), and the development of self-efficacy is tied to observational learning (Bandura,
1997) which should be enhanced by explanations. Intentional systems theory states that when an
observed entity appears to behave rationally, we ascribe that behavior to having a mind (Dennett,
1989). To that end, if the worker interprets the behavior of the agent to be rational, the behavior
of the agent can be modeled and guide the worker in the performance of the task. To the extent
that explanations of model output are analogous to example-based instructional techniques, the
review by Van Gog and Rummel (2010) found that those techniques increased self-efficacy, and
that effectiveness was tied to the traits of those being modeled. The review by Gist and Mitchell
(1992) found that assessments of external resources are antecedents of self-efficacy, by means
both automatic and intentional. A second potential mechanism combines instructional attribution

60

theory with early computer interaction research. Weiner (1985) theorized that stable internal
attributions of success are a predictor of positive expectancy and motivation rather than external
causes, and Engelbart (1962) found that people subsumed augmentation by technology into their
own performance and could only differentiate augmentation through its removal. For a task
where the worker is learning the particulars of an assessment guideline and the unique elements
of a new disaster, an agent perceived as intelligent is much more likely to be modeled by the
participant than one that is not and lead to increased expectations of future performance.
Therefore:
Hypothesis 5: Greater attribution of agent intelligence will increase self-efficacy.

61

IV RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
IV.1

Experiment Design
An experiment was developed to test the hypotheses of the research model by varying the

explanations offered by a simulated agent in a crowdsourced damage assessment task.
Participants in the experiment were provided a briefing on the task, expectations, and rating
guidelines. For each scenario participants rated the structure type and damage level, after which
they were provided the simulated output and any explanations along with the opportunity to
change their initial assessment. After completing a total of ten scenarios, participants provided
ratings for the study measures. Only the types of explanations offered were manipulated between
experiment conditions. The unit of observation and analysis for the measures of the research
model was “participant” and all measurements of attitudes were made after the completion of the
task.
An incomplete factorial between-subjects design for type of explanation was employed
with five conditions, shown in Figure 6. One condition included only a causal explanation. The
causal explanation was combined with the counterfactual and hedging explanation separately in
two conditions. One condition included all three explanation types. In addition, a “black box”
condition with no explanation of the simulated output was included. The probability of condition
selection per participant was based on the proportion of remaining quota per condition with the
goal of equal group size per condition.
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Causal Explanation
No
Yes
Counterfactual Explanation
No
Yes
"Black Box"
Control
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Counterfactual

Yes
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Hedging

All Three
Explanations

Hedging

No

Figure 6 Experiment Conditions
The design of the experiment attempted to ensure that differences in the formation of
self-efficacy would be based solely on the explanations. Of the four pathways for developing
self-efficacy through observational learning, the research focuses on “observation” (vicarious
experience). By asking workers to review explanations and controlling for other pathways, the
effect of the explanations on self-efficacy can be assessed. Of the other pathways, “successful
performance” can only be self-assessed or inferred from rating agreement with the agent. The
agent did not attempt to use “persuasion” to convince the participant about their capability to
conduct a task, and any physiological or affective processes that take place outside of the
experiment would be neutralized by random selection into conditions.
The study materials were submitted to the Georgia State University Institutional Review
Board and approved (see Appendix A). Pre-testing was performed prior to the study to evaluate
the measures, selection of scenarios, and manipulation of the independent variables by the
experiment.
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IV.2

Selection of Participants
Participants were recruited using the Amazon Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing platform

and qualified using a separate two-question survey. The requirements for participation were
having proficiency in the English language, having at least 100 approved tasks and 95% approval
rating on the platform, and being an adult within the United States. The qualification survey
asked participants to submit a short description of an aerial photo of an undamaged building that
was not otherwise part of the study using an open-text field in order to evaluate their proficiency
in English. The survey also asked them to select checkboxes if they had previous experience in
crowdsourced citizen science, aerial image interpretation, and related fields. The qualification
task was not compensated. Participants in any phase could be excluded from participation in later
phases of data collection. Participants in the telephone interview pre-test were compensated
$10.00, and all other participants were compensated $2.00.
The requirement to demonstrate proficiency in English was beneficial to ensure that
participants would be able to understand the guideline and natural language explanations. The
example used was a pre-disaster image with several easily identified features, shown in Figure 7.
The qualification step also addressed the identified phenomenon of non-English proficient
Amazon Mechanical Turk workers using technical means to evade the platform’s United States
location requirement (“farmers”) who have been found to produce unintelligible or “clunky”
open-text submissions (Moss & Litman, 2018).
No qualification submissions were rejected based on spelling or grammar. Errors in the
interpretation such as using an incorrect shape name to describe the building or not
understanding the scale of the building were not considered in the assessment of English
proficiency. Examples of submissions appear in Table 4. The consistently interpretable and
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efficiently constructed descriptions of the submissions indicated the participants were both
proficient in English and inconsistent with the farmers identified by Moss and Litman (2018).

Figure 7 Image Provided for the English Proficiency Qualification
Note: Map data from Google (2018)
Table 4 English Proficiency Qualification Examples
Judgment
Qualified

Qualified

IV.3

Submitted Description
“This photo shows a good deal of beach erosion, which is caused by ocean waves,
currents, and high winds. The energy within the water, pulls sand away from the shore,
carrying it elsewhere and depositing the sediment in sandbars.”
“This is an overhead view of a beachside mansion. You can see the beach below, which
has dozens of people enjoying themselves. There may be some erosion of some of the
green right outside right at the edge of the mansion grounds, likely where the high tide
comes in.”

Experiment Process Flow
The process flow for the experiment appears in Figure 8. The qualification process was

employed to ensure that only participants that met the qualification requirements were recruited
for the study. An attention check was utilized to validate adequate participation by participants
following the briefing. Failure to select the correct answer ended the survey and excluded the
participant from the study. The correct option “You may change your answer after reviewing the
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automated assessment” was essential to the design of the experiment, and the remaining options
included elements not mentioned or contradicted by the briefing.
The process flow of the experiment was modified for the testing rounds to support the
development of the instrument. The following changes only applied during the testing:
participants were asked in the initial step of each scenario after rating the image to “Please rate
the difficulty of this classification” on a 7-point semantic differential with scale ends “Very
Difficult” to “Very Easy.” The manipulation checks were performed immediately after the
scenarios to maximize recall to support evaluating the manipulation. The failure of the attention
check did not end the survey.
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Figure 8 Experiment Process Flow

IV.4

Task Design
The findings of previous research and feedback from participants was referenced when

designing the damage assessment task. The goal was to reduce any extraneous cognitive load
induced by the assessment tool and environment. An example rating screen of the final
instrument appears in Figure 9.
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Figure 9 Scenario Interface Example
While the original intention was to recreate the “pybossa” user interface commonly used
by other crowdsourcing disaster assessments, this added additional non-functional user interface
elements and potentially increased the cognitive load of the task. Instead, a fully native
Qualtrics-based interface was developed consistent with recommendations in the literature that
minimized extraneous cognitive load, reduced situational elements of task difficulty, and
supported the participant’s engagement with the rating task.
The participant rated the image before being provided the simulated output and
explanation similar to a “critiquing system” per the recommendations of human-centered
computing (Smith, 2018), and similar to the collaborative human-machine problem-solving
approach from Tianfield and Wang (2004). Pre-centered images and a simple classification entry
method were utilized per Kerle and Hoffman (2013) to minimize mapping knowledge required
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for the task. An interactive magnifying glass that followed the participant’s mouse cursor was
implemented per GIScorps (2013) using the jquery library “magnify” (Doan, 2018), allowing
users to more closely examine image details. Rating guidelines were provided via a link and by
mouse “hover” over rating options per the recommendation of Albuquerque et al. (2016), which
is also consistent with an integrated instructional approach (Chandler & Sweller, 1991).
Geographic information system-based damage assessment tools fall into a wide variety of
designs. Many real-world crowdsourced platforms address the concerns raised in the review by
Kerle and Hoffman (2013), section 3.2, where: (i) clarity of instructions is addressed by
simplified classification frameworks and guidelines, (ii) the need for domain knowledge is
minimized by removing the mapping aspect of the task, (iii) options for interaction are limited to
the selections within the classification guideline, and (iv) the software environment is a lowbarrier user interface within the user’s familiar web browser containing only the task at hand. By
removing the mapping element of the task and providing participants with the building to be
rated centered in the image, as well as a simple rating entry tool, the microtask is focused on
learning the assessment of damage to the guideline in co-production with the agent.
Integrating automation into the workflow brings the challenge of sequencing and
allocating subtasks to both the human and intelligent agent. Poor outcomes are common when
the human is placed in the role of “final arbiter” (Smith, McCoy, & Layton, 1997). Often these
outcomes are diagnosed as confirmation bias or complacency on the part of humans, but
cognitive processes such as satisficing, trust, fixation on solutions, and narrowing may better
explain the state of the human (Smith, 2017). The sequencing of decision steps here is similar to
a “critiquing system” which Smith (2017) claims is superior to human “final arbiter” structure.
Participants may economize their cognition and bypass this requirement by entering a random

69

classification at the initial step to reveal the automated assessor classification and explanation.
Such behavior will be detected by timing and reported as an outcome. Figure 10 shows the
process flow of the microtask loop with an opportunity to change the rating after the agent
assessment is revealed.
Present
Scenario
N
Human
Judgment

Make
Classification

Reveal Agent
Assessment &
Explanation

Human
Judgment

Change
Answer?

Y

Revise
Classification

Green = Human Processes, Blue = Survey Processes

Figure 10 Microtask Process Loop
IV.5

Scenario Generation
The images for damage assessment were from a real-world disaster data set (NGS, 2018)

and pre-disaster images were from sources similar to those available in real-world disaster
assessment (Google, 2018). These images, while of the same structure, were potentially taken
years apart at different times of day and camera angle, which is also consistent with real-world
disaster assessment.
The “Wizard of Oz” approach1 has been developed within the area of computer
interaction research to experimentally evaluate near-term technologies and technologies where
the artifacts are unavailable for examination, but where experiments can produce useful
information about the design of future artifacts (Habibovic, Andersson, Nilsson, Lundgren, &
Nilsson, 2016; Riek, 2012). Guidelines for Wizard of Oz methodologies were reviewed in the
human-robot interaction area by Riek (2012), and several recommendations are explicitly

1

This approach simulates a computer system through the actions of a human operator. The term derives from the
novel “The Wonderful Wizard of Oz” by L. Frank Baum where the character “Oz” appears to other characters in
multiple forms other than his own by artificial means.
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accounted for in the design of the research method for this study. The capabilities and limitations
of the simulated system are specified below. The simulated output and explanations were
developed in an iterative process. Unlike most research involving a Wizard of Oz approach, the
interaction here is not in real-time and instead is based on pre-generated scenarios which are
identical between all participants. Constraints and machine-like errors in system performance are
included in the simulation. “Wizard error” is attempted to be controlled by developing a
specification for the behavior of the simulation and evaluation of the simulated output for
consistency with that specification. That specification appears in Figure 11. The explanations
were generated in an iterative process developing a total of 22 scenarios which were tested. The
steps used to generate the scenarios and their components are shown in Figure 12. The full list of
scenarios appears in Appendix D. See Appendix F.1. for detailed description of the development
process and Appendix F.2. for testing outcomes.
Post-Disaster Images
(NGS, 2018)
Pre-Disaster (Google, 2018)
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Figure 11 Simulated Output and Explanation Specification
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Figure 12 Process to Generate Scenarios
IV.6

Data Analysis Plan
The survey data was exported from Qualtrics in SPSS format. The data was prepared for

analysis using SPSS Version 25, including restructuring and aggregation of the assessment
outcome data. Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) was performed
using Smart PLS 3.2.8 (Ringle, Wende, & Becker, 2015). The alternate explanations were
considered as direct effects on self-efficacy.
Bagozzi and Yi (1989) proposed analyzing experiment data using a covariance structural
equation modeling approach where manipulation groups were indicated with variables, which
was extended by Bagozzi, Yi, and Singh (1991) to PLS-SEM. Streukens, Wetzels, Daryanto, and
De Ruyter (2010) developed a method to analyze a two-factor experiment including a test of the
interaction with a third dummy variable in PLS-SEM, along with mediators of the ultimate
dependent variable. That approach was adopted for the data analysis method in this study, with
the initial evaluation model shown in Figure 13, with single-item dummy variables indicating the
counterfactual (CF) manipulation, the hedging (H) manipulation, and the interaction of the two
(CF×H). To account for the control condition, a fourth dummy variable is included indicating the
presence of the causal explanation (C).
PLS-SEM is a more appropriate estimation method over multivariate analysis of variance
as it was developed to analyze latent constructs and mediation paths simultaneously. PLS-SEM
estimates latent constructs using both reflective and formative models, and partial least squares is

72

well-suited to analyze the cognitive load composite-formative construct (Henseler, 2018), and is
recommended for models with composite measures while covariance-based methods are
inappropriate (Sarstedt, Hair, Ringle, Thiele, & Gudergan, 2016). Additionally, the review by
Hair, Hollingsworth, Randolph, and Chong (2017) supports selecting PLS-SEM for research
where constructs are being evaluated in a new context, and the limited assumptions of PLS-SEM
make it an appropriate choice as the data was generated using Likert-type measures with
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Figure 13 Second-Order Cognitive Load Structural Model
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Estimates of latent constructs per participant from the PLS-SEM analysis were exported
from Smart PLS and into SPSS. Bootstrap2 analysis of path coefficients was conducted in SPSS
and Smart PLS using bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals. Descriptive statistics
were computed for each experiment condition, and a correlation table was constructed in SPSS.
Smart PLS was used to conduct the analysis and evaluation of the structural model. Model
quality criteria were adopted from Hair et al. (2016). Pairwise deletion of missing data was
selected rather than mean replacement as the most appropriate treatment for missing learned trust
for AI and demographic information. Mode A was used for reflective constructs and mode B was
used for the formative cognitive load construct. Path weighting was selected for the analysis.
Path coefficients for relationships with the independent variables and gender are reported
after transformation of the analysis output by dividing the original coefficient by the standard
deviation of the indicator variable. This rescaling allows for conventional interpretation of the
coefficients as changes in the mean by numbers of standard deviation. The standardized
coefficients used by Smart PLS are scaled by the proportion of the indicator, which facilitates the
analysis but produces path coefficients which are arbitrarily scaled and cannot be readily
compared.
The intended second-order cognitive load construct was assessed first to establish the
measurement model. Redundancy analysis was employed with the single-item for total cognitive
load (Cheah, Sarstedt, Ringle, Ramayah, & Ting, 2018). Then the measurement model was
assessed using the following metrics by the thresholds for each recommended by Hair et al.
(2016): indicator loadings, multi-collinearity using variance inflation factor (VIF), discriminant

In “bootstrap” analysis the main procedure is repeated many times with a resampled set of the same size as the
original data composed of randomly drawn members with replacement. Standard errors for model parameters and
quality metrics are estimated by inference of the population from the sample (Hair, Hult, Tomas, Ringle, & Sarstedt,
2016).
2
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validity using heterotrait-monotrait ratio (HTMT), convergent validity for reflective constructs
using average variance extracted (AVE), and cross-loadings of items with other constructs.
Finally, the structural model was assessed for effects and predictive relevance. Manipulation
checks were assessed using tests of differences using SPSS.
IV.7

Determination of Sample Size
The XAI field believes that the effect of providing explanations will be substantial and

open up new areas of application for intelligent systems (Herman, 2017; Miller, 2019). Within
types of explanation, no studies were identified comparing counterfactual explanations with
simple causal explanations on attitudes to estimate the potential effect size. Effect sizes between
explanation and “black box” conditions in the literature are generally large. However, response
differences in trust and prediction error in Poursabzi-Sangdeh et al. (2018), where the number of
model parameters in the explanation was varied, were not practically significant despite being
statistically significant, with approximately 200 respondents per condition. The authors did not
report sufficient detail to determine the effect size of types of local explanations. As the purpose
of this study is to assess practical benefit, the sample size was determined on the basis of
identifying or constraining the effect to at least medium effects (f = 0.25) (Cohen, 1988), but also
sufficient power to validate the hypothesized mediation relationships.
To establish the minimum sample size required to detect medium-size direct effects
between manipulations of explanation type on self-efficacy, the SPSS SamplePower 2x2
ANOVA with non-central F procedure was utilized. The required sample size per group was
calculated as n = 32 with power of 80%. A sample size of n = 50 can detect an effect size of f =
0.20, and n = 88 allows f = 0.15. For f = 0.10, considered a small effect size, a group size of n =
195 would be required.
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Power tests for mediation effects are specific to each proposed mediator, where each is
expected to have unique path strength and statistical power (Thoemmes, MacKinnon, & Reiser,
2010). The inverse square root rule (Kock & Hadaya, 2018) with power threshold of 80% was
utilized to evaluate sample size requirements for the structural model. This analysis finds that
sample sizes appropriate for main effect size f = 0.25 would be sufficient to evaluate mediation
paths as small as of β = 0.197; at f = 0.20: β = 0.157; at f = 0.15: β = 0.119; and at f = 0.10: β =
0.080.
A group size of 88 and sample size of 440 was selected for the ability to detect main
effects at the medium-effect size threshold, while being able to detect statistically significant
mediation for path coefficients as low as 0.119.
IV.8

Development and Testing
The study’s task and damage assessment scenarios and survey instrument were developed

in an iterative process. Measures of the dependent constructs, alternate explanations, and
demographics were selected from the literature. The item to measure level of automation was
developed by the author for this experiment. An initial pre-test using six telephone “cognitive
interviews” was conducted to evaluate the task and instrument, followed by two rounds of pretest data collection with 90 participants to evaluate the measurement model, manipulation check
outcomes, and participant feedback. All composite measures were evaluated using pre-testing
with scale reliability testing using Cronbach’s alpha and factor loading. The development and
testing results of the study materials is detailed in Appendix F.
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V
V.1

DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Sample Description
The study data were collected between February 4th and February 10th, 2019. The

instrument used is provided in Appendix C. A summary of the results of the recruiting process
are shown in Figure 14. A total of 610 potential participants were qualified, of which 90
participated in testing and 445 were recruited for the study (86% of those remaining). No
submissions for qualification were rejected for lack of English proficiency. Seventy-five percent
of all qualifications requested were received and granted on or before the first day of data
collection. Seventy-six percent of the sample was collected in the first three days of data
collection.
Of the 445 potential participants recruited into the study, 20 exited the survey at the
consent screen, 7 at the briefing screen, and 27 failed the attention check. Of the remaining 418
that began the rating process, 23 dropped out during the damage assessment portion of the task.
These partial completions were removed from the data as they provided no measure data. The
second submission of a single participant with the same worker identification number was also
removed from the data. The final sample contained 367 participants with an average of 73 per
condition and between 69 and 79 per condition. While less than the intended sample size, power
analysis for sensitivity of the obtained group and sample size confirmed that medium size effects
could be detected with statistical power of 80% (minimum main effects: f = 0.17, d = 0.34;
mediator effects: β = 0.130).
The mean age of the participants was 38.7 years with a median of 36. The minimum was
19 and the maximum was 71. Sixty percent of participants were female. A total of 55% indicated
they had a college degree (either undergraduate or graduate). Participants had limited previous
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experience with natural disaster damage assessment in aerial images, with 53% indicating having
no prior experience; however, this rate was consistent with the experience of crowdsourced
workers in previous real-world events (Dittus, 2017). Of those with experience, 76% indicated
they had performed the task a few times a year or less in the last year, and 55% had not used a
written guideline previously. A single participant indicated having used the same guideline as in
this study. Participants had previous experience in related tasks: 12% indicated prior experience
in geographic information systems, 12% with natural disaster damage assessment, 29% with
aerial image interpretation, 9.3% with experience in a citizen science project, and 61% with none
of the related experience categories.
Examples of participant open-text feedback appears in Table 5. Participants noted that the
agent produced errors, but also was useful to identify their own errors. Few participants rejected
the agent, and several indicated they felt it was essential to their performance. There was no
indication that participants felt the task was artificial or that the agent was not real. Some
workers provided feedback expressing that they would like the ability to indicate what the agent
got wrong, similar to scrutability (Tintarev & Masthoff, 2011).
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Qualified
n = 610

Participated in
Testing
n = 90

Available
n = 520

Recruited
n = 445 (86%)
Exit at Consent, n = 20
Exit at Briefing, n = 7

Failed Attention Check n = 27
Randomly Selected to a
Condition (Quota)
(n=391)

Causal Only
n = 80

Causal +
Counterfactual
n = 77

Causal +
Hedging
n = 74

All Three
n = 83

“Black Box”
n = 77

Dropped
Out (7)

Dropped
Out (4)

Dropped
Out (5)

Dropped
Out (5)

Dropped Out (2)
Duplicate(1)

Completed
n = 73

Completed
n = 73

Completed
n = 69

Completed
n = 78

Completed
n = 74

Figure 14 Recruiting Flow
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Table 5 Selected Study Feedback
“I thought this was a really interesting survey and it is something I have never done before. I think
that with more practice I could be really knowledgable [sic] in this type of work. It was different
working with ADAM because I perceived things a little differently in some cases. I felt more accurate
in some cases whereas in other cases I felt ADAM was more accurate. I think that it is beneficial to
work with ADAM but not heavily rely on that interpretation alone.”
“I was a bit confused by one very large building that looked like a warehouse. I would say that about
1/5 of the roof was destroyed, but I don't know enough about architecture or engineering to know if
the whole roof needs to be replaced or just that section. I changed my rating to critical because of the
automated rating, but I'm still not convinced.”
“Some of the time it seemed that ADAM had more information that I had access to, such as the
integrity of walls inside of buildings that I only had a strictly overhead view to refer to. I couldn't see
walls or possible damage so most of the time just changed to what ADAM suggested.”
“I thought that this is not only an interesting study, but it also increased my knowledge and I feel will
help assist in damage assessment. It's a very meaningful study.”
“I found it very interesting. I think with the combination of AI and human intelligence, damage
assessment can be a lot easier.”
“That was really hard! I am confused on the difference between minimal and significant - ADAM
marked significant if just part of the roof was missing but the descriptions says entirely. Minimal says
part of the roof ... so I wasn't confident in my prediction or his.”
“I enjoyed doing this hit. I think it was helpful to do practice hits like these to get a feel for how the
system works, how things are labeled and scored, etc. It was good to get the feedback of ADAM so I
could compare and rethink how I scored each one so I could accurately assess and change any
mistakes I made but also be able to have someone check the AI's ratings for major discrepancies or
mistakes too. I think with both sides on board it would give an overall better rating or picture of reality
in general in the future during natural disasters and get help to those in need faster. Thanks!”
“Very interesting HIT. I enjoyed working with ADAM, and while I didn't agree with all of ADAM's
assessments, it helped guide me to the correct assessment in a lot of cases. Since I'm just a beginner
at this, it helped me to get better at identifying structures and assessing damage.”
“I enjoyed doing this HIT. I think that ADAM made me second guess myself but also helped me
learn to do them correctly. When ADAM was wrong it was very obviously wrong to me.”
“I really enjoyed the assessment. There are evident accuracy issues with using just the ADAN [sic],
but it is a good tool for pointing out things in the photo that may have been missed.”
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V.2

Descriptive Statistics
Scores were computed for each composite measure using the sum of item ratings in SPSS

based on the revised item composition of the structural measurement model. Correlations
between sum of scale scores and the latent construct estimates exceeded 0.9 for all measures.
The descriptive statistics shown in Table 6 are grouped by experiment condition for the study
measures, alternate explanations, and demographics with tests for differences in means between
experiment conditions. A correlation table was computed in SPSS using Pearson correlation with
the extracted latent construct estimates from Smart PLS, with the result shown in Table 7.
Table 6 Descriptive Statistics by Condition and Differences in Means
Measure

Causal Only
n = 73

Total Cognitive Load
Intrinsic Cognitive Load
Germane Cognitive Load
Extraneous Cognitive Load
Attribution of Agent Intelligence
Self-Efficacy in Task
Erroneous Agreement
Initial Review (Seconds)
Review of Automated (Seconds)
Trust in Intelligent Agent
Perceived Interdependence
Percevied Level of Automation
Previous Task Experience
Dispositional Trust
Learned Trust for AI
Gender (0 = male, 1 = female)
Age (years)
Education
Income

7.77 (1.11)
13.9 (3.95)
18.8 (2.07)
9.4 (4.06)
24.6 (7.65)
33.4 (6.07)
0.312 (0.262)
27.8 (20.9)
24.1 (14.1)
4.63 (1.40)
11.8 (1.72)
4.12 (1.49)
2.45 (3.40)
15.5 (3.32)
2.95 (0.82)
0.556 (0.500)
37.5 (9.8)
3.90 (1.04)
4.55 (2.10)

Causal +
Causal +
All Three
Counterfactual
Hedging
Explanations
n = 73
n = 69
n = 78
Mean (Standard Deviation)
8.10 (0.97)
7.81 (1.10)
7.87 (1.18)
15.6 (3.45)
13.7 (4.07)
14.9 (3.50)
19.2 (1.93)
18.8 (2.13)
18.5 (2.52)
9.9 (3.96)
9.2 (3.74)
10.3 (4.54)
24.7 (7.85)
27.0 (6.21)
24.6 (7.20)
33.0 (7.77)
34.3 (6.62)
33.0 (6.95)
0.290 (0.271)
0.270 (0.256)
0.287 (0.253)
30.2 (16.3)
26.4 (14.3)
31.3 (20.1)
28.4 (14.6)
23.8 (11.5)
29.3 (19.4)
4.82 (1.32)
4.67 (1.52)
4.56 (1.35)
11.9 (1.84)
11.8 (1.91)
11.4 (1.90)
4.44 (1.47)
4.51 (1.53)
4.19 (1.49)
2.93 (3.78)
3.23 (4.28)
2.01 (3.34)
15.8 (3.69)
15.8 (3.57)
15.4 (3.52)
3.02 (0.88)
3.19 (0.77)
3.07 (0.67)
0.556 (0.500)
0.652 (0.480)
0.671 (0.473)
43.3 (11.4)
37.5 (9.4)
37.5 (10.3)
3.73 (1.12)
3.59 (0.93)
3.71 (1.11)
4.14 (2.07)
4.25 (1.96)
4.04 (1.72)

Black Box
n = 74
7.81 (1.11)
13.3 (3.83)
19.3 (1.79)
8.0 (3.96)
23.4 (6.62)
35.6 (6.54)
0.165 (0.202)
30.4 (21.4)
19.1 (10.0)
3.88 (1.42)
11.0 (2.58)
3.88 (1.44)
2.58 (4.00)
15.9 (2.94)
3.04 (0.78)
0.608 (0.492)
37.8 (7.7)
3.49 (0.95)
4.36 (1.79)

Test of Differences in
Means
ANOVA
F(4,362) = 1.0
F(4,362) = 4.8
F(4,362) = 1.6
F(4,362) = 3.4
F(4,362) = 2.5
F(4,362) = 1.9
F(4,362) = 4.0
F(4,362) = 0.8
F(4,362) = 6.0
F(4,362) = 5.0
F(4,362) = 2.9
F(4,362) = 2.1
F(4,362) = 1.1
F(4,362) = 0.4
F(4,296) = 0.8
F(4,358) = 0.9
F(4,362) = 4.9
F(4,361) = 1.7
F(4,360) = 0.8

p-value
0.388
<0.001
0.184
0.009
0.046
0.106
0.004
0.499
<0.001
<0.001
0.020
0.080
0.345
0.837
0.550
0.482
<0.001
0.156
0.532

Of the measures expected to be equivalent between experiment conditions, only age
shows a statistically significant difference, where the causal with counterfactual experiment
condition has an average age 6 years higher than the other conditions (0.47 standard deviations).
The difference in median age is consistent with the difference of the mean (43 versus 35 to 36 in
the other conditions), eliminating the potential role of outliers in this outcome. While this
difference arising due to random chance is very rare, a causal relationship with the experimental
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manipulation is not plausible given the low drop-out rates and that the Qualtrics randomization
procedure has no access to the participant’s age. The effect of age was included in the structural
model as a direct path with self-efficacy.
There is a large skewed peak in distribution of prior experience in task measure due to
53% of respondents reporting no prior experience. The effect of this is apparent with standard
deviations greater than the mean scores. This non-normality violates the assumptions of the
analysis of variance test. The non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis Independent-Samples test of
previous task experience by experiment condition was performed in SPSS. It also found no
statistically significant differences between conditions when zero values are excluded (statistic:
3.8, df = 4, p = 0.480), or in the full data (statistic: 4.2, df = 4, p = 0.385).
Manipulation check measures were employed to validate effects of the independent
variables. The “Don’t Know / Don’t Remember” rating for the manipulation checks were
selected by 0.5%, 14%, and 6% of the participants for the causal, counterfactual, and hedging
checks. For those that rated the manipulation checks, 6.5%, 19.3%, and 29.4% of participants
rated them inconsistent with the experiment condition. For participants that provided response,
Independent T-Tests for differences in ratings between the manipulation check between the
manipulation conditions were all significant and in the appropriate direction of difference (causal
z = −27.0, df = 363, p < 0.001; counterfactual z = −11.58, df = 313, p < 0.001; hedging z = −8.4,
df = 343, p < 0.001). This indicates that participants which rated the manipulation checks with
confidence were broadly able to rate their experiment condition consistent with the explanations
they had been provided.
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Table 7 Correlation Table
3
2
1
Measure
1 Total Cognitive Load
.206**
2 Intrinsic Cognitive Load
.201** .088
3 Germane Cognitive Load
.031 .506** -.277**
4 Extraneous Cognitive Load
.015 .104* .097
5 Attribution of Agent Intelligence
.075 -139** .304**
6 Self-Efficacy in Task
-.028
.094
-.007
7 Erroneous Agreement
.053
.010
-.009
8 Scenarios Marked Incorrect
.180** .108* .127*
9 Initial Timing
.183** .193** .080
10 Review Timing
.111* .122* .101
11 Trust in the Intelligent Agent
.038 .201**
.064
12 Interdependence
-.046
.051
-.014
13 Level of Automation
.017
-.030 -.101
14 Previous Task Experience
.017 .307**
-.009
15 Dispositional Trust for AI
.031
.003
.056
16 Learned Trust for AI
.193** .122* .102
17 Gender (0 = male, 1 = female)
.149** .190** .032
18 Age
.045
-.019
.050
19 Education
.019
-.070
.023
20 Income
.028 .177** -.087
Causal Explanation
.083 .240** -.018
Counterfactual Explanation
-.099
.047
-.021
Hedging Explanation
.000 .105* -.088
Interaction of Explanations
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

.063
-.406**
.165**
-.013
-.034
.056
.026
-.156**
.090
-.084
-254**
-.083
-.094
-.023
-.030
-.077
.174**
.150**
.077
.109*

.066
.208**
-.007
.018
.066
.604**
.369**
.307**
.007
.160**
.152**
-.104*
-.040
-.082
-.099
.106*
-.024
.107*
-.026

-107*
.079
.042
-.086
.090
.245**
-.053
.199**
.244**
.067
.011
-106*
.009
.079
-.129*
-.106*
-.028
-.063

-.066
-.088
.018
.332**
.118*
.168**
-.003
.061
.159**
.105*
.047
-.088
.006
.198**
.079
.045
.046

-.100
-.091
.036
-.050
-.046
.007
.038
-.102
-.059
-.031
-.071
-.019
.066
.034
.022
.003

.582**
-.096
.126*
-.076
-.082
-.028
-.005
.196**
.339**
-.066
-.012
-.029
.066
-.012
.056

.017
.150**
.002
-109*
.003
.019
.123*
.350**
-.073
-.081
.200**
.218**
.095
.152**

11

12

13

.547**
.284** .064
.066
.047
.074
.233** .333** -.036
.242** .186** .069
-.041
.075
-.046
.012
.046
.016
.006 -113*
-.060
-.061 -.013 -.024
.222** .125* .116*
.049
.105* .017
.064
-.031
.059
-.075 -.011
.020

14

15

16

17

18

19

.088
.015 .201**
.078
-.129* -.098
-.006 -.115* .137**
.001
.051
-.078 -.040
.033
.080
.045 .214**
.047
.010
.010
-.006
.097
.046
.001
.010
-.025
.006
.010 .132* .027
-.038 -.051 -.007
-.099 -.022
.089
.080
-.009 -.034
.014
-.063
.066
.013
-.085 -.075
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V.3

Assessment Outcomes
The damage assessments were evaluated to ensure the participants produced data with

representative effort and repeatability. A summary table of results appears in Table 8. The
participant consensus ratings in the initial step were identical between the testing and study
groups for 19 of 20 ratings selections. The consensus damage rating for scenario 17 was “no
damage” in the study compared to “minimal” in the testing phase. Agreement was also assessed
by bootstrapped resampling with 500 resamples. Only three images changed modes for damage
ratings: scenario #8 (2% of resamples), #9 (0.4%), and #17 (47%, where the consensus damage
rating varies from “no damage” and “minimal”). None of the structure type rating modes varied.
Changes in ratings were assessed to evaluate differences between scenario type and
agreement in the first step. Changes to agree were more likely for the faithful scenarios, and
participants were unlikely to select the same damage rating as the agent in the erroneous
scenarios indicating the types operated as expected. Participants changed their ratings to agree
with the simulated agent in 36.6% of faithful scenarios, compared to 26.5% for erroneous
scenarios, which was a statistically significant difference in proportion using a Chi-Square test
for independence (χ2 = 43.3, df = 1, p < 0.001). For the erroneous scenarios, 95 of 1,835 initial
participant damage ratings (5.3%) agreed with the intended erroneous agent rating. Of these, a
single damage rating was changed in the following review step by the participant (to the initial
step consensus rating).
The task allowed participants to indicate that the automated rating was incorrect, and this
feedback was assessed for agreement with the scenario types and between-experiment
conditions. Participants with no cases of erroneous agreement indicated the intended number of
scenarios were incorrect, and in a limited number of cases participants changed their rating to
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agree with an agent damage assessment they also had marked incorrect. Descriptive statistics for
the incorrect indication in categories by the number of scenarios with which participants were in
erroneous agreement appear in Table 9. Participants that did not change their ratings to agree
with the erroneous agent damage assessments have a median and mode of five scenarios marked
incorrect, the intended number of erroneous scenarios. Each incremental erroneous agreement
outcome decreased the median number of scenarios rated incorrect by one until the fourth
erroneous agreement. Binary classification analysis comparing the incorrect ratings with the
scenario type (faithful/erroneous) found sensitivity of 0.53, specificity of 0.85, and precision of
0.78, indicating that participants selected the intended erroneous scenarios as incorrect most
often and correctly, though with some lack of sensitivity. Usage of the checkbox was not
consistent between experiment conditions: in the “black box” condition an average of 18% of
participants rated the agent incorrect in faithful scenarios and 66% in erroneous scenarios, which
decreased to 13% and 48% in conditions with an explanation. There were 17 damage
assessments (0.5%) in which 13 participants changed their assessment to agree with the
erroneous automated damage rating but also marked that they believed the agent was incorrect.
Of these, seven took place in the condition with only a causal explanation, six in the condition
with all three explanations, two each in the conditions where a counterfactual or hedging
explanation was offered with a causal explanation, and none in the “black box” condition with no
explanations.
Participants that did not indicate that any scenarios were incorrect (9%) were evaluated
for their use of the “blurry” and “obscured” quality feedback items to detect any possible
laziness on the part of raters. The group that rated no images to be in error marked an average of
1.39 of the 20 other image feedback options compared to 1.35 on average for people that marked
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any number of images in error, indicating roughly consistent usage of the other quality feedback
options between groups.
Table 8 Descriptive Results of Damage Assessments

Type

Scenario
7
8
Faithful
10
18
22
1
9
Erroneous
17
19
21

Initial Assessment
Changed Rating
Consensus
During Review
Structure
Damage
Structure Damage
Medium
Minimal
16%
43%
Heavy
Critical
14%
58%
Medium
Significant
11%
59%
Heavy
Critical
24%
27%
Heavy
Significant
35%
35%
Heavy
Significant
23%
56%
Medium No Damage
24%
39%
Medium No Damage
14%
33%
Light
No Damage
25%
38%
Heavy
Minimal
39%
26%

Rated
Agent
Incorrect
13%
7%
10%
29%
14%
59%
46%
44%
56%
59%

Erroneous
Agreement

n/a

20%
31%
39%
23%
20%

Timing (Seconds)
Initial
Review
34.6
20.1
27.6
17.0
31.0
17.4
20.6
24.3
25.6
18.1
34.8
28.5
26.7
34.2
31.1
30.9
31.5
28.7
29.1
31.0

Table 9 Erroneous Agreement and Incorrect Ratings
Erroneous Agreement
# Scenarios Participants
0
124
1
98
2
75
3
47
4
18
5
5
Total
367

V.4

Cumulative
34%
60%
81%
94%
99%
100%

Scenarios Rated "Incorrect" by Participant
Mean
SD
Median
Mode
4.5
2.1
5
5
3.8
1.9
4
4
2.7
1.6
3
3
1.9
1.0
2
2
0.6
0.6
0.5
0
2.4
3.8
1
0
3.4
2.1
3
3

Model Evaluation
The quality of the measurement and structural model were assessed in three steps. First,

the second-order latent construct measurement model for cognitive load was assessed for
validity. As a result of this check, the second-order construct was replaced with direct
relationships with the three components of cognitive load, and instead the three first-order
constructs were moved to direct relationships. Second, the remainder of the measurement model
was evaluated to understand model quality. This process found that the items for perceived
reliance did not co-vary so the concept was removed from the analysis, and one item was
dropped from perceived interdependence based on low composite reliability and coherence with
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the concept. Finally, the structural model was assessed identifying that cross-loading between
some of the human-computer interaction concepts does not impact conclusions, and that
predictive relevance for the statistically significant path relationships was confirmed.
The second-order latent construct for cognitive load was assessed to confirm its validity
prior to analyzing the full measurement model. There was no significant relationship between the
second-order construct and the single-item total cognitive load (path coefficient = 0.062, p =
0.484). The weights of the first-order constructs on the second-order were: intrinsic = 0.434, p <
0.001; germane = 0.247, p = 0.146; extraneous = 0.648, p < 0.001 where the items for germane
cognitive load are negatively loaded, consistent with theory. While model quality metrics such as
composite reliability, average variance extracted, and heterotrait-monotrait ratios were
acceptable for the cognitive load components, the lack of relationship between the established
measure and the second-order construct does not support its use in the measurement model.
When the repeated indicators of the second-order construct were replaced with the singleitem for total cognitive load, the estimated R2 for second-order construct was 10.5% (formative
path coefficients: intrinsic 0.156, p = 0.010; germane = 0.225, p < 0.001; extraneous = 0.130, p =
0.357). The estimates of path coefficients were most consistent with “model 1” from Klepsch et
al. (2017) which was described as the “worst fit” of the six models they evaluated in their
confirmatory factor analysis of the measures used in the three-component measure adapted for
this study. These results did not support the use of this measurement model.
A structural model was specified replacing the second-order construct with direct
relationships for the components of cognitive load. This was consistent with “model 2” from
Klepsch et al. (2017) which was deemed the best fit in that study. In this model, shown in Figure
15, the number of path relationships evaluated with attribution of agent intelligence and self-
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efficacy is greatly increased. In this model each component for cognitive load had a composite
reliability greater than 0.8 and each item loads with their latent constructs with statistical
significance.
Extraneous
Load

Germane
Load

Intrinsic
Load

CF

CF * H

SE1

Counterfactual

SE2
SelfEfficacy
in Task

Interaction

SE3
SE5
SE6

SE7
H

Hedging
Attribution of
Agent
Intelligence

ATT6

ATT5

ATT4

ATT3

ATT2

Causal

ATT1

C

Figure 15 Revised Structural Model
Note: The three indicators of each cognitive load component are omitted for clarity.
Next, the measurement model of the revised structural model was assessed. Composite
reliability was below the 0.800 threshold for perceived interdependence (0.406) and reliance
(0.606). Removing the first item for perceived interdependence (loading −0.203) increases
composite reliability to 0.819, though Cronbach’s alpha is marginal (0.600). The first item asked
for a rating of whether the agent “affected their ratings,” while the third item asked if “their
ratings benefited” from working with the agent. The first item was dropped from the model as
“being affected” was not as coherent conceptually with interdependence compared to a benefit
from working together. Removing the third item for perceived reliance (loading 0.322) increased
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composite reliability to 0.680, and the remaining items were not strongly tied conceptually, with
one item being about reliance and the other about distraction. The measurement of perceived
reliance was deemed unreliable and the measure was dropped from the study.
Composite reliability exceeded 0.800 and average variance extracted (AVE) exceeded
0.500 with p-values less than 0.001 for all constructs. A table of each metric for model quality
appears in Table 10. Outer loading for each item is listed in Table 11. The first item for intrinsic
load has lower loading than is ideal for a reflective measure (0.675, p < 0.001), along with the
second extraneous load item (0.672, p < 0.001). When reflective indicators load above 0.400 and
the construct is otherwise acceptable measures, it is appropriate to retain the items (Hair et al.,
2016).
As previous research has identified the potential for multiple dimensions of perception of
mental processes, the response for the items of attribution of agent intelligence were assessed to
ensure a reflective measurement model was appropriate for the construct. Principal component
analysis performed in SPSS extracts a single component with eigenvalue 3.17 (52.9% of
variance) where the next component has an eigenvalue of 0.849 (14.1%), with KMO sampling
adequacy 0.828 and sphericity test p < 0.001. All items load greater than 0.600 on the single
extracted component. The individual items were then evaluated. When the fourth item (“has a
mind”) with loading 0.489 is dropped, the loading of the fifth item (“is predictable”) decreases to
0.622, below the desirable loading level of 0.700. Dropping both items improves model metrics
slightly (composite reliability 0.869, average variance extracted 0.626, R2 = 5.7%). As the
majority of the variance of the scale is explained by a single component and dropping items to
increase metrics has a negligible effect on acceptable quality metrics, the items were retained as
well as the reflective measurement model.
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Cross-loading of items between constructs was assessed to determine if any constructs
were not sufficiently distinct, with results shown in Table 12. The second intrinsic load item
cross-loads above the 0.500 threshold with extraneous cognitive load. Otherwise, cross-loading
above the threshold was between the items and constructs for attribution of agent intelligence,
trust in the intelligent agent, and perceived interdependence. Kock and Lynn (2012) identify that
cross-loadings above 0.500 indicate either incorrect association of items to construct, or to
collinearity. No cross-loadings were above 0.700, and the highest outer variance inflation factor
between composite constructs was 2.08 for trust in the intelligent agent and self-efficacy limiting
the potential role of collinearity. To evaluate the potential that cross-loading suppressed
relationships with the other alternate explanations, perceived interdependence was removed, and
the model was re-evaluated. None of the other alternate explanations had a path coefficient with
self-efficacy of absolute value greater than 0.10, or a 95% confidence interval that excluded zero.
As such, the constructs were maintained as separate concepts without altering their composition.
Heterotrait-monotrait (HTMT) ratios were below 0.800 in the 97.5th percentile after
bootstrapping analysis, with the exception of perceived interdependence with trust in the
intelligent agent (0.776 original value and 0.895 at 97.5%). All other pairs were below the 0.800
threshold in the original and 97.5% bootstrapping results. Inner Variance Inflation Factors (VIF)
for reflective measures were below 3.00 for all pairs except with interaction of explanation types
with a maximum value of 3.55.
Finally, the explanatory and predictive quality of the model was assessed. The predictive
relevance Q2 quality metric (“blindfolding”) was computed using the cross-validated redundancy
method with distance of 10. Each endogenous construct exceeded zero, meeting the benchmark.
When the construct items were evaluated only the fourth item for attribution of agent intelligence
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was less than zero (metric: −0.001), which also had lower than desirable loading in the
measurement evaluation. When the three cognitive load constructs are removed from the model,
the effect of cognitive load on self-efficacy was estimated as f 2 = 0.167, and the predictive
effect was estimated as q2 = 0.115, which are above and below the “medium” guideline of 0.150.
The same test of perceived interdependence results in metrics f 2 = 0.023 and q2 = 0.016; and,
for previous task experience, f 2 = 0.037 and q2 = 0.027, which are each of small effect.
Table 10 Latent Construct Quality Metrics
Latent Construct
Intrinsic Cognitive Load
Germane Cognitive Load
Extraneous Cognitive Load
Attribution of Agent Intelligence
Self-Efficacy in Task
Dispositional Trust for AI
Percieved Interdependence

Composite Reliability
Metric T Statistic p-value
0.823
19.6
<0.001
0.809
20.4
<0.001
0.847
56.7
<0.001
0.861
15.9
<0.001
0.962
210.4
<0.001
0.800
18.2
<0.001
0.820
14.9
<0.001

Average Variance Extracted
Metric T Statistic p-value
0.613
13.0
<0.001
0.586
12.1
<0.001
0.652
27.0
<0.001
0.514
11.5
<0.001
0.808
42.3
<0.001
0.506
11.4
<0.001
0.698
14.0
<0.001
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Table 11 Item Outer Loading
Latent Construct
Intrinsic

Item
ICL1
ICL2
ICL3
Germane
GCL1
GCL2
GCL3
Extraneous
ECL1
ECL2
ECL3
Attribution of Agent Intelligence ATT1
ATT2
ATT3
ATT4
ATT5
ATT6
Self-Efficacy in Task
SE1
SE2
SE3
SE5
SE6
SE7
Dispositional Trust for AI
DTRUST1
DTRUST2
DTRUST3
DTRUST4
Perceived Interdependence
INTERD2
INTERD3

Outer Loading
Loading T Statistic p-value
0.675
7.1
<0.001
0.930
17.1
<0.001
0.720
9.0
<0.001
0.734
8.1
<0.001
0.740
7.6
<0.001
0.821
9.3
<0.001
0.869
47.2
<0.001
0.672
10.9
<0.001
0.866
38.9
<0.001
0.746
8.9
<0.001
0.844
10.1
<0.001
0.818
8.9
<0.001
0.489
3.3
0.001
0.622
6.4
<0.001
0.724
7.8
<0.001
0.923
81.5
<0.001
0.932
108.4
<0.001
0.922
83.6
<0.001
0.912
77.4
<0.001
0.837
29.7
<0.001
0.862
40.7
<0.001
0.892
21.3
<0.001
0.653
6.5
<0.001
0.572
4.8
<0.001
0.691
7.2
<0.001
0.933
19.6
<0.001
0.725
6.2
<0.001

95% CI
Lower Upper
0.347 0.786
0.882 0.999
0.453 0.816
0.444 0.842
0.384 0.846
0.691 0.973
0.826 0.898
0.515 0.765
0.818 0.903
0.537 0.829
0.774 0.908
0.748 0.908
-0.347 0.661
0.339 0.737
0.417 0.811
0.895 0.941
0.914 0.948
0.896 0.940
0.885 0.932
0.767 0.880
0.815 0.897
0.816 0.955
0.430 0.827
0.248 0.726
0.455 0.808
0.834 0.997
0.395 0.855
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Table 12 Cross Loading of Items Between Constructs

Germane Extraneous
Intrinsic
Item
0.22
0.29
ICL1
0.52
-0.01
ICL2
0.34
0.10
ICL3
-0.16
0.13
GCL1
-0.16
0.13
GCL2
-0.28
0.00
GCL3
-0.27
0.46
ECL1
-0.21
0.30
ECL2
-0.20
0.44
ECL3
0.02
0.00
0.00
ATT1
0.04
0.15
0.10
ATT2
0.04
0.13
0.16
ATT3
0.19
-0.08
0.07
ATT4
0.03
-0.02
-0.01
ATT5
0.09
0.03
0.05
ATT6
-0.36
0.25
-0.13
SE1
-0.39
0.33
-0.14
SE2
-0.40
0.24
-0.14
SE3
-0.33
0.25
-0.08
SE5
-0.33
0.27
-0.14
SE6
-0.37
0.29
-0.12
SE7
-0.15
0.20
0.02
INTERD2
-0.11
0.11
0.06
INTERD3
0.03
0.10
0.12
TrustItem
0.09
-0.05
0.05
LOAItem
-0.20
0.30
0.03
DTRUST1
-0.30
0.15
-0.08
DTRUST2
-0.11
0.20
0.04
DTRUST3
-0.06
0.22
0.09
DTRUST4
-0.08
0.03
0.00
LTrustItem
-0.08
0.02
-0.10
PTE

V.5

Previous
Perceived Trust in the Perceived Disposition
SelfAttribution
Task
Level of al Trust for Learned
of Agent Efficacy in Interdepen Intelligent
Trust for AI Experience
AI
Automation
Agent
dence
Task
Intelligence
-0.04
-0.01
0.13
0.01
0.06
0.11
0.05
0.07
-0.10
0.01
0.00
0.07
0.14
0.02
-0.19
0.11
-0.08
-0.01
-0.05
0.00
0.04
0.01
-0.08
0.03
-0.01
0.02
0.22
-0.04
0.07
0.15
0.19
0.00
-0.02
0.01
0.31
-0.15
-0.01
0.17
0.19
-0.03
0.04
0.03
0.21
0.03
0.13
0.15
0.29
0.17
-0.09
-0.11
-0.19
0.06
0.04
-0.16
-0.34
0.02
-0.04
-0.04
-0.26
0.05
-0.04
-0.12
-0.24
0.03
-0.07
-0.03
-0.19
0.10
0.04
-0.11
-0.39
0.09
-0.01
0.15
0.13
0.28
0.42
0.28
0.02
0.00
0.12
0.17
0.27
0.57
0.38
0.05
-0.04
0.06
0.15
0.19
0.42
0.23
0.09
-0.05
0.07
-0.06
0.15
0.33
0.08
-0.05
0.01
0.11
0.02
0.27
0.36
0.25
0.00
0.10
0.14
0.11
0.21
0.50
0.28
0.06
0.14
0.03
0.18
-0.07
0.02
0.19
0.00
0.19
0.06
0.24
-0.05
0.11
0.25
0.06
0.19
0.07
0.23
-0.03
0.12
0.25
0.07
0.19
0.04
0.23
-0.08
0.06
0.23
0.05
0.18
0.05
0.16
-0.02
0.09
0.16
0.07
0.17
0.08
0.27
-0.03
0.09
0.23
0.10
0.06
0.10
0.28
0.00
0.39
0.25
0.25
0.00
0.23
0.29
0.16
0.62
0.13
0.44
0.07
0.22
0.23
0.28
0.55
0.09
0.60
0.07
0.06
-0.04
0.28
0.06
-0.05
0.31
0.08
0.11
-0.04
0.19
0.31
0.26
0.14
0.02
0.12
0.01
0.15
0.22
0.16
0.08
0.03
0.17
-0.08
0.04
0.13
0.04
-0.01
0.14
0.21
-0.04
0.24
0.22
0.11
0.20
0.02
0.20
0.07
0.25
0.19
0.07
0.16
0.01
0.09
0.07
0.07
0.05
0.20
0.01

Results
The results of the path analysis appear in Figure 16, excluding the independent variables

for clarity. The complete list of path results is shown in Table 13. The effects of the explanation
types are shown in bar charts in Figure 17 by measure. Both the individual effect (solid bars) of
the explanation type and the total effect in combination (outline only) are shown. Path
coefficients are scaled by the type of measure. Continuous variables are scaled as standardized
beta coefficients (β) where a variation of one standard deviation produces a shift in the mean of
the dependent variable by a proportion of standard deviations. Dichotomous indicator variables
are scaled as the shift in the mean of the dependent variable by proportion of standard deviations
(as in Cohen’s d). The comparison for the causal explanation and total explanation effects are to
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the “black box” condition. The counterfactual and hedging explanations are compared to the
causal explanation condition. For gender, the comparison is female compared to male
participants. Statistical significance of the total effects of the explanation types was calculated
using SPSS. Post hoc Tukey HSD testing was utilized to compare the conditions with
explanations to the “black box” condition. The effect of explanations on self-efficacy is reported
as partial eta-squared to allow direct comparison with the explanation effect on other measures.
The hypothesized relationships of the research model were assessed. The counterfactual
explanation increased each component of cognitive load (intrinsic d = 0.514, germane d = 0.204,
extraneous d = 0.132) where the increase in intrinsic was significant (p = 0.001), unlike the
hypothesized relationship (H1a). The estimates for the effect of the hedging explanation on
cognitive load (H2a) was negligible (d = 0.032, d = −0.001, d = −0.053) and did not reach
statistical significance. The hedging explanation increased attribution of agent intelligence with
statistical significance (d = 0.380, p = 0.042) which was not expected (H2b). None of the
components of cognitive load had a statistically significant relationship with attribution of agent
intelligence (H3) with small positive estimates for effects (d = 0.065, d = 0.117, d = 0.056).
There is a medium-size negative effect of extraneous cognitive load on self-efficacy (β = −0.339,
p < 0.001) and total effect of the causal explanation on self-efficacy (d = −0.314, p = 0.038). The
direct effect of the causal explanation on extraneous cognitive load (d = 0.362, p = 0.028)
confirms that cognitive load mediates the effect of explanations on self-efficacy in the task (H4).
The role of attribution of agent intelligence in self-efficacy (H5) was limited with a very small
estimated effect (β = 0.017, 95% CI [−0.132, 0.170], p = 0.826).
The difference in the effect of cognitive load (H4) and attribution of agent intelligence
(H5) on self-efficacy was assessed. The procedure from Rodríguez-Entrena, Schuberth, and
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Gelhard (2018) was utilized. Differences in the absolute values of the path coefficients were
computed for each bootstrap sample to determine the mean and variance. The 95% confidence
interval of the difference was then calculated using parametric assumptions without biascorrection and acceleration. This confirmed a greater effect of extraneous cognitive load
(βdifference = 0.276, [0.136, 0.416], p < 0.001). The method was also utilized to compare the path
coefficients of germane cognitive load and attribution of agent intelligence with self-efficacy,
with less distinct differences (βdifference = 0.136, [−0.060, 0.324], p = 0.077).
Erroneous agreement was assessed for evidence of illusory understanding effects. The
coincident decreases in self-efficacy are most consistent with participants “going along” with the
simulated agent rather than being convinced by the explanation. Causal explanations increased
erroneous agreement (d = 0.580, [0.285, 0.875], p < 0.001), but decreased self-efficacy (total
effect, d = −0.314, [−0.601, −0.016], p = 0.038), which is inconsistent with explanations
generating false understanding. The counterfactual and hedging explanations do not greatly alter
erroneous agreement, though there is some indication that either other explanation type could
partially offset the effect (counterfactual d = −0.086, [−0.427,0.258], p = 0.619 and hedging
explanations d = −0.168, [−0.494, 0.170], p = 0.327). Presenting all three explanations largely
cancels out any potential benefit of additional explanation for erroneous agreement (interaction d
= 0.156, p = 0.519; total effect d = 0.482, p = 0.023).
Finally, the alternate explanations were assessed. Direct effects on self-efficacy were
identified for previous task experience (β = 0.169, p < 0.001) and perceived interdependence (β =
0.166, p = 0.016), but not for trust in the intelligent agent (p = 0.877), level of automation (p =
0.577), and dispositional (p = 0.414) and learned trust in AI (p = 0.634). The effect of the
explanation types on the alternate explanations was assessed in a post hoc analysis. Only
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perceived interdependence was identified as a potential mediator of explanation types on selfefficacy. Effects were detected for the causal explanation on trust in the intelligent agent (d =
0.525, [0.212, 0.830], p < 0.001, R2 = 5.3%), perceived interdependence (d = 0.400, [0.009,
0.737], p = 0.028, R2 = 3.0%), and level of automation (d = 0.164, [−0.148, 0.485], p = 0.312, R2
= 2.3%). An analysis of comparative effect on self-efficacy between extraneous cognitive load
and perceived interdependence finds less effect for perceived interdependence (βdifference =
−0.185, [−0.354, −0.016], p = 0.016). While the effect of the causal explanation on trust in the
intelligent agent was not statistically distinct from that of extraneous cognitive load (βdifference =
0.065, [−0.107, 0.238], p = 0.229), trust in the intelligent agent did not have a relationship with
self-efficacy in the task (β = −0.012, [−0.161, 0.143], p = 0.877) and therefore is not likely to
have a practical effect on self-efficacy either directly or as a mediator of explanations.
Extraneous
Cognitive
Load

Germane
Cognitive
Load

Intrinsic
Cognitive
Load

-0.339 (<0.001)

SelfEfficacy
in Task

0.158 (0.012)

0.079
(0.168)

0.117
(0.204)

0.065
(0.416)

0.166 (0.016)

0.056
(0.545)

0.017
(0.826)

Attribution of
Agent
Intelligence

R2
5.3%
Adjusted R2
3.4%

Perceived
Interdependence

R2
28.9%
Adjusted R2
25.2%
0.169 (<0.001)

Previous Task
Experience

Figure 16 Structural Model Path Analysis Results
Note: Independent variable paths omitted for clarity, see Table 13.
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Table 13 Model Path Coefficients
Relationship
with Attribution of Agent Intelligence
Intrinsic Cognitive Load
Germane Cognitive Load
Extraneous Cognitive Load
with Self-Efficacy in Task
Intrinsic Cognitive Load
Germane Cognitive Load
Extraneous Cognitive Load
Attribution of Agent Intelligence
Perceived Interdependence
Previous Task Experience
Trust in the Intelligent Agent
Dispositional Trust for AI
Learned Trust for AI
Level of Automation
Age
Gender
Education
Income
Causal Explanation on
Attribution of Agent Intelligence
Self-Efficacy in Task
Extraneous
Germane
Intrinsic
Erroneous Agreement
Counterfactual Explanation (CF) on
Attribution of Agent Intelligence
Self-Efficacy in Task
Extraneous
Germane
Intrinsic
Erroneous Agreement
Hedging Explanation (H) on
Attribution of Agent Intelligence
Self-Efficacy in Task
Extraneous
Germane
Intrinsic
Erroneous Agreement
Interaction of CFxH on
Attribution of Agent Intelligence
Self-Efficacy in Task
Extraneous
Germane
Intrinsic
Erroneous Agreement

Path Coefficient
Estimate T Statistic p-value

95% CI
Lower
Upper

0.065
0.117
0.056

0.814
1.269
0.606

0.416
0.204
0.545

-0.089
-0.090
-0.135

0.216
0.265
0.218

0.079
0.158
-0.339
0.017
0.166
0.169
-0.012
0.037
-0.024
-0.032
-0.129
-0.048
0.071
-0.027

1.380
2.502
5.938
0.220
2.407
4.192
0.155
0.817
0.476
0.558
2.535
0.453
1.519
0.533

0.168
0.012
<0.001
0.826
0.016
<0.001
0.877
0.414
0.634
0.577
0.011
0.651
0.129
0.594

-0.026
0.030
-0.458
-0.132
0.032
0.089
-0.161
-0.058
-0.127
-0.141
-0.231
-0.259
-0.018
-0.126

0.196
0.277
-0.234
0.170
0.300
0.247
0.143
0.115
0.075
0.081
-0.035
0.152
0.164
0.072

0.162
-0.226
0.362
-0.240
0.214
0.580

0.887
1.678
2.205
1.534
1.242
3.846

0.375
0.094
0.028
0.125
0.214
<0.001

-0.196
-0.489
0.025
-0.536
-0.123
0.282

0.506
0.035
0.667
0.072
0.552
0.872

-0.025
-0.038
0.132
0.204
0.514
-0.086

0.121
0.232
0.820
1.265
3.266
0.500

0.904
0.816
0.413
0.206
0.001
0.617

-0.407
-0.352
-0.180
-0.110
0.200
-0.427

0.383
0.280
0.446
0.516
0.818
0.254

0.380
0.091
-0.053
-0.001
0.032
-0.168

2.030
0.654
0.320
0.005
0.169
1.008

0.042
0.514
0.749
0.996
0.866
0.314

-0.003
-0.185
-0.373
-0.336
-0.334
-0.492

0.723
0.357
0.280
0.344
0.398
0.160

-0.383
0.035
0.115
-0.303
-0.207
0.156

1.228
0.157
0.492
1.252
0.871
0.650

0.219
0.875
0.623
0.211
0.384
0.516

-0.971
-0.381
-0.328
-0.774
-0.667
-0.301

0.242
0.480
0.587
0.172
0.265
0.643

95% CI

-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
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Self-Efficacy in Task (Total Effects)
η² = 2.1%

Attribution of Agent Intelligence
R² = 5.3%, Adj. R² = 3.4%

Erroneous Agreement
R² = 4.2%, Adj. R² = 3.1%
0.580 ***

0.542 **
0.380 *

0.7
0.5
0.3

0.162

0.100

0.137

0.494 *

0.412

0.482 *
0.156

0.134

0.1
-0.1
-0.3
-0.5

-0.008
-0.314*

-0.322

0.5

***

Intrinsic Cognitive Load
R² = 6.8%, Adj. R² = 5.7%

0.115

0.553 **

0.514 **
0.246

0.214

0.204

0.032

0.1
-0.1

Germane Cognitive Load
R² = 1.8%, Adj. R² = 0.7%

0.728 ***

0.309
0.132

-0.168

-0.383

0.556 **

0.494*

0.362

0.3

-0.086

-0.328

Extraneous Cognitive Load
R² = 3.8%, Adj. R² = 2.8%
0.7

-0.025

-0.107
-0.214

-0.037

-0.053

-0.3

-0.207

-0.240

-0.001

-0.241

-0.5

Trust in the Intelligent Agent
R² = 5.3%, Adj. R² = 4.2%
0.7

0.525 ***

0.658 **

0.550**

Perceived Interdependence
R² = 3.0%, Adj. R² = 2.0%
0.479*

0.5
0.3
0.1

0.134

Level of Automation
R² = 2.3%, Adj. R² = 1.2%

0.462
0.354
0.143

0.062

0.025

-0.1
-0.3

0.400 *

-0.303
-0.341

0.164

0.375
0.211

0.421
0.257

0.210

-0.046
-0.205

-0.273

-0.5

-0.422

Figure 17 Effects of Explanations Relative to the “Black Box” Condition
Legend: Grey = Causal, Blue = Counterfactual, Yellow = Hedging, Green = Interaction/All Three
Solid Fill = Individual Effect, Box/Bold = Total of Explanation Effect
*** = p < 0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05
Note: Coefficients are scaled as in Cohen’s d.

V.6

Manipulation Evaluation
While the analysis of the manipulation check outcomes produced significant differences

consistent with overall correct recall of the manipulated states, the size of the groups that did not
recall the qualities of the explanation types in their condition was greater than anticipated. This
was identified during pre-testing, and was not resolved by modifying the item wording and
options (see Appendix F.2.7. for details). To understand the differences between manipulation
outcomes, three post hoc analyses were conducted: first, an analysis of the manipulation
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outcomes by experiment condition was evaluated to determine whether the combination of
explanation types interfered with recall; then, an analysis of variance was conducted on the
review step duration, attribution of agent intelligence, and self-efficacy in the task; and finally, a
multi-group analysis of the structural model was employed to assess whether the manipulation
outcome groups were heterogeneous with respect to any relationships. This evaluation finds that
the true manipulation outcomes are consistent with attention to the explanations, with effects of
explanation in the true outcome groups consistent with the overall population; however, the
hedging explanation was not distinctly identified in the condition with both a causal and
counterfactual explanation.
V.6.1 Interaction with Experiment Condition
The first step was to evaluate how manipulation outcomes differed by experiment
condition. Crosstab analysis with Chi-Square test of independence was used to compare true
ratings across experiment conditions. The test of the hedging manipulation identified significant
differences (68.7% true ratings: χ2 = 80.5, df = 4, p < 0.001) where participants rated the check
positive with the presence of other explanation types. For conditions without a hedging
explanation, the true negative ratings were 91.5% for the “black box” condition, 57.4% for
causal only, but 30.4% with causal and counterfactual. For conditions with a hedging
explanation, true positive ratings were 76.9% for the causal with hedging and 86.1% for the all
three explanation conditions where the hedging explanation was present. No differences were
detected for the causal explanation (93.4% true ratings, χ2 = 3.6, df = 4, p = 0.466) and
counterfactual explanation (77.5% true ratings, χ2 = 3.5, df = 4, p = 0.478).
The condition with all three explanations has the lowest false negative rate for the
hedging manipulation check (13.9%) and the counterfactual manipulation check (18.6%).
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However, it is not clear that the hedging explanation type was separately perceived by
participants in the condition with all types from the manipulation check outcomes alone.
V.6.2 Effect on Measures
Next, the effect of manipulation outcome on the study measures was assessed to evaluate
differences in responses between groups. Tests of differences in means for review time,
attribution of agent intelligence, and self-efficacy in task were conducted using two-way analysis
of variance. The counterfactual and hedging manipulation outcomes and the manipulation were
entered as fixed factors in separate tests for each outcome variable and explanation type. Group
sizes for the causal manipulation outcome did not support the use of this method. Effects were
statistically significant for review time (outcome group, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.040) and attribution of
agent intelligence (interaction, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.069). Effects were not statistically significant
for self-efficacy in task (counterfactual outcome p = 0.385, interaction p = 0.946).
Increases in time for participants in the review step were detected for those in the true
outcome groups, compared to the false groups which had little change in review time. These
differences, shown in Figure 18, are apparent for each of the three explanation types. The lack of
distinction between review times in the false manipulation outcome groups when an explanation
was provided is consistent with lack of attention or processing of the explanation. Additionally,
review times are greatest in the condition with all three explanation types for the true hedging
manipulation outcome group (30.8 seconds versus 28.1 seconds for the causal with
counterfactual condition), with 2.7 additional seconds taken to review the added hedging
explanation. In the false outcome group, there is an 8.2 second decrease in time taken when all
three explanations are presented (21.0 seconds versus 29.2 seconds). These results are consistent
with incremental processing time for each added explanation in the true outcome groups
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including a combination of the three types, and the false groups being inconsistent with
processing the explanations.
The manipulation check outcome identifies opposing effects of the explanation types on
attribution of agent intelligence, where the explanations increase the attribution in true outcomes
and decrease it in false outcomes. Figure 19 shows these interactions, which also start from
opposing baselines for attributions of intelligence. Participants that incorrectly recalled the
presence of explanations attributed less intelligence when an explanation was present than when
it was not, but participants that recalled correctly increased in ratings when an explanation was
provided and had lower ratings than the incorrect group when an explanation was not present.
While it is reasonable the false outcome group would attribute greater intelligence in the system,
it is unclear why the presence of an explanation would decrease attributions.
Counterfactual
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Figure 18 Review Times by Manipulation and Outcome
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Figure 19 Attribution of Agent Intelligence by Manipulation and Outcome
V.6.3 Effect on Relationships
A multi-group analysis of the structural model was conducted to evaluate the potential for
differences in relationships between manipulation outcome groups. Several effects of attentional
and retention processes were identified, with increasing role of explanations and decreasing role
of stable traits and attitudes in the true counterfactual manipulation outcome group, consistent
with explanations being processed at some level by participants.
The available sample for false outcomes for the causal condition (n = 24) was insufficient
for this analysis, and the lack of discrimination of the hedging manipulation check for the
counterfactual explanation made it most attractive to evaluate the counterfactual manipulation
outcome groups (false, n = 71; true, n = 244). Model parameters were estimated and compared
using the multigroup analysis procedure in Smart PLS. Differences were evaluated using the
parametric test. Bootstrapping with 5,000 samples was performed.
While the power of this comparison was limited and confidence intervals in the false
outcome group are quite large, two statistically significant differences in path coefficients were
identified. The coefficients in the true outcome groups where differences were statistically
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significant are consistent with overall results and with processing of explanations. In comparison,
the outcomes of the false group have greater role of pre-existing stable attitudes. The
counterfactual explanation has the opposite effect on attribution of agent intelligence between
groups, with path coefficient shifting from a negative relationship in the false outcome group to
positive in the true outcome group (−0.937, p = 0.002 to 0.470, p = 0.064; diff = 1.407, p =
0.005). The effect of counterfactual explanations on intrinsic cognitive load also increases in
effect, becoming positive in the true group (−0.051, p = 0.903 to 0.740, p < 0.001; diff = 0.791, p
= 0.049). The differences without statistical significance have patterns consistent with lack of
attention with increased path strength for stable traits and attitudes such as age, income,
dispositional trust and learned trust in AI, and previous task experience. The direction of the
effect changes for perceived level of automation and trust in the intelligent agent. Full results are
shown in Table 14.
Given these differences, the true outcome group was assessed for differences in support
for the hypotheses. While some support was identified for H1b and H5, the wide confidence
intervals limit the ability to draw conclusions. The hypothesized positive relationship between
counterfactual explanation and attribution of agent intelligence (H1b) has the most practically
significant potential with a path coefficient estimate of 0.470 in the true manipulation outcome
group. Practically significant coefficients of level 0.15 were identified at the 26th percentile, and
0.25 at the 55th percentile, and the difference with the false outcome group is statistically
significant (−1.407, p = 0.005). However, the confidence interval includes zero (95% CI [−0.050,
0.924], p = 0.064). The hypothesized negative relationship between cognitive load and
attribution of agent intelligence (H3) decreases from an estimate of 0.329 in the false group to
−0.022 (difference, p = 0.069). This effect is less practically significant where path coefficients
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of −0.15 occur at the 7.5th percentile and −0.25 at the 0.3th percentile. The hypothesized positive
relationship between attribution of agent intelligence and self-efficacy in the task (H5) finds
some support within the true outcome group; however, the potential effects are also limited in
size. Path coefficients greater than 0.15 occur at the 77th percentile and 0.25 at 97th percentile of
the true outcome group (95% CI [−0.135,0.266], p = 0.431).
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Table 14 Multi-Group Analysis by Manipulation Outcome
Relationship
with Attribution of Agent Intelligence
Intrinsic Cognitive Load
Germane Cognitive Load
Extraneous Cognitive Load
with Self-Efficacy in Task
Intrinsic Cognitive Load
Germane Cognitive Load
Extraneous Cognitive Load
Attribution of Agent Intelligence
Perceived Interdependence
Previous Task Experience
Trust in the Intelligent Agent
Dispositional Trust for AI
Learned Trust for AI
Level of Automation
Age
Gender
Education
Income
Causal Explanation on
Attribution of Agent Intelligence
Self-Efficacy in Task
Extraneous
Germane
Intrinsic
Erroneous Agreement
Counterfactual Explanation (CF) on
Attribution of Agent Intelligence
Self-Efficacy in Task
Extraneous
Germane
Intrinsic
Erroneous Agreement
Hedging Explanation (H) on
Attribution of Agent Intelligence
Self-Efficacy in Task
Extraneous
Germane
Intrinsic
Erroneous Agreement
Interaction of CFxH on
Attribution of Agent Intelligence
Self-Efficacy in Task
Extraneous
Germane
Intrinsic
Erroneous Agreement

Path Coefficients
False
True

Parametric Test
Difference p-value

0.043
0.072
0.329

0.035
0.144
-0.022

-0.007
0.072
-0.351

0.969
0.731
0.069

0.055
0.056
-0.242
-0.122
0.185
0.199
0.088
0.168
-0.072
-0.172
-0.282
-0.049
0.032
-0.102

0.117
0.160
-0.343
0.082
0.195
0.143
-0.073
0.012
-0.003
0.003
-0.104
-0.038
0.080
-0.019

0.062
0.104
-0.101
0.203
0.011
-0.056
-0.161
-0.156
0.068
0.174
0.178
0.011
0.048
0.083

0.672
0.527
0.519
0.347
0.956
0.620
0.453
0.326
0.627
0.265
0.225
0.968
0.710
0.519

-0.129
0.125
0.602
-0.159
0.487
0.494

0.035
-0.358
0.131
-0.114
0.081
0.679

0.164
-0.484
-0.471
0.045
-0.406
0.185

0.733
0.189
0.257
0.921
0.364
0.635

-0.937
0.085
-0.253
0.095
-0.051
0.135

0.470
-0.128
0.374
0.212
0.740
-0.217

1.407
-0.213
0.627
0.117
0.791
-0.352

0.005
0.629
0.123
0.785
0.049
0.426

0.099
-0.163
-0.191
0.109
-0.138
-0.441

0.536
0.167
-0.119
-0.001
-0.060
-0.097

0.437
0.329
0.072
-0.110
0.078
0.344

0.358
0.401
0.859
0.816
0.877
0.460

-0.051
0.031
0.333
-0.767
-0.438
-0.093

-0.680
-0.029
0.088
-0.275
-0.111
0.242

-0.629
-0.059
-0.245
0.493
0.327
0.335

0.390
0.924
0.685
0.453
0.599
0.599

-1.0

Counterfactual Manipulation Groups: Green = True, Orange = False

95% CI
0.0 1.0
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V.7

Discussion

V.7.1 Overview of the Study
Explaining the output of deep learning models aims to improve understanding and may
improve the ability for humans to partner with intelligent agents. Natural language explanations
have long been advocated. Counterfactual explanations have been touted as matching human
thought processes to clarify understanding while providing a contrast to another plausible but
inappropriate decision. Hedging explanations describe potentially applicable boundary
conditions and known error modes which aims to make these limitations more transparent. There
may be an ethical requirement to reveal such limitations, with the potential for future legal
requirements to provide them. Past empirical research into explanations in AI has found mixed
outcomes for explanations. However, deep learning systems may commit errors that can be
readily detected when partnered with a human and explanation may be more valuable than has
been identified in research on other types of AI systems. Further, there is relatively little known
about how people process agent explanations regardless of type of system, with past research
focused on trust, preference, and compliance. A social cognition framework was employed to
focus on how explanations are processed by participants performing the task. An experiment was
conducted where three types of explanations were manipulated between conditions. Participants
were randomly selected into one of five conditions: A “black box” condition with no
explanations (as a control), a causal explanation, two conditions where the causal explanation
was augmented with a counterfactual or a hedging explanation, and a condition with all three
explanation types.
Many of the effects of explanation did not operate as hypothesized and the effects were
relatively subtle when present. The results did not support the hypothesis that counterfactual
explanations reduced cognitive load (H1a), or that hedging explanations increased cognitive load
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(H2a). The results for attribution of agent intelligence also differed from the hypothesized
relationships where counterfactual explanations did not increase these attributions (H1b), while
hedging explanations increased attributions of intelligence instead of decreasing them (H2b). The
effects involving attribution of agent intelligence were insufficient to support the hypothesized
relationships between cognitive load and self-efficacy with attribution of agent intelligence (H3
and H5). Germane cognitive load had a positive relationship with self-efficacy; however, it was
not clear this was related to the explanations. Causal explanations increased extraneous cognitive
load and led to decreased self-efficacy in the task, supporting the hypothesized mediation
relationship between cognitive load and self-efficacy (H4). While trust and compliance increased
when explanations were provided, these were not identified as having positive relationships with
self-efficacy.
As in prior research, the causal explanation increased both trust and compliance (in the
form of erroneous agreement). This indicates that explanations were processed similarly to prior
studies. However, this study offers additional evidence of the depth to which the explanations
were processed by participants to influence their judgments. The four processes of observational
learning from Bandura (1986) provide specific outcomes to evaluate engagement with the task
and the explanations. Attention and retention processes can be partially validated by the true
manipulation outcomes where the effects are generally greater but consistent with the overall
results. In comparison, those that did not correctly recall the explanation types in their condition
have review times consistent with the “black box” condition without explanations, and greater
relationships with stable attitudes and traits. These outcomes are consistent with participants
finding functional value in explanations to trigger the storage of the nature of the explanations
for later retrieval. Production processes are not as clear in the absence of a quality metric for
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faithful agent assessments; however, the consensus ratings for damage assessments were highly
repeatable. Only one scenario failed to reach a strong consensus, with responses split between
two adjacent categories for the damage rating. This makes it plausible that workers referenced
the written guideline and may have learned from the agent during the review step between
scenarios. While some participants provided open-text feedback indicating they worked through
explanations3, and that was similarly identified during cognitive interviews in the testing of the
instrument, these participants were either induced or self-motivated to monitor and evaluate their
cognitive processes during the task. The extent to which other participants engaged in these
meta-cognitive processes cannot be determined. However, it is more plausible that the task
design did not engage these processes rather than these other participants not having the capacity
to use the causal and counterfactual explanations. The feedback also provides insight into
motivation processes. Eighty-three participants (23%) provided comments in the optional field
indicating the task was compelling. Additionally, 20% of participants voluntarily went beyond
the 25-minute maximum stated time for the task, with some noting in the feedback that they
spent extra time due to the importance of the task. Together, these results are consistent with
observational learning pathways being active for at least a subset of the participants and
explanations being processed to a similar extent to prior studies despite finding subtle effects.
V.7.2 Contributions to Theory
The effect of explanation on self-efficacy is greater than that of previous task experience,
and was confirmed to be mediated by cognitive load rather than attribution of agent intelligence.
Perceived interdependence was also identified as a potential mediator of self-efficacy. Insights
from cognitive load areas may inform solutions that answer the call by Nunes and Jannach

3

Example quotes from open-text feedback are provided in Table 5.
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(2017) for responsive explanations that are tailored to users. These findings enhance knowledge
about the types of cognitive load imposed by the evaluated types of explanations as well as
effects on attributions of intelligence. Interdependence was not originally hypothesized or
manipulated extensively by the experiment and was measured with just two items. The literature
on interdependence in human-robot systems offers methods of breaking apart tasks to achieve
objectives that are complementary to the goals of instructional task design from cognitive load
literature. While changes in the perception of interdependence did not necessarily cause
increased self-efficacy, this association offers a second area to explore as tasks are broken apart
to manage cognitive load.
The findings identify limited effects of the explanation types on attributions of
intelligence to the agent. Much of the prior research in explanations has examined trust, and
these attributions had a large correlation with trust in the intelligent agent. Explanations were
expected to increase the predictability and apparent rationality of the agent by revealing hidden
internal processes of the agent, especially in assessments providing erroneous output. The causal
and counterfactual explanations did not result in distinct increases in attribution of agent
intelligence, even compared to the “black box” condition. While it was anticipated that hedging
explanations would appear to participants as weakness and lack of intelligence, the ability to
describe failure modes, admit weaknesses, and be self-aware had a large positive effect on
perception of mental processes. The lack of effect of attribution of agent intelligence as well as
trust on self-efficacy is consistent with the known phenomenon of people generating internal
attributions for causes of success (Weiner, 1985). However, the true manipulation outcome
group for counterfactual explanations provides some indication that attention and more effective
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integration of explanations into the task might increase the role of attribution of agent
intelligence in self-efficacy.
The findings also provide evidence of the types of cognitive load induced by each of the
explanation types. Counterfactual explanations were hypothesized to assist the construction of
mental schema for the task by focusing participants on the relevant elements of the guideline and
reducing cognitive load. The perception of intrinsic cognitive load increased, along with, to a
lesser extent, extraneous cognitive load. As increased intrinsic load was not associated with
decreases in self-efficacy or erroneous agreement, counterfactual explanations may have assisted
participants in constructing more accurate mental schemas as expected, in order to become more
aware of the inherent difficulty of the task. The lack of the hypothesized decrease in cognitive
load might be explained by the short duration of the task. Hedging explanations were expected to
increase extraneous cognitive load; however, there was little effect. The explanations may have
been largely unprocessed, as evidenced by only slight increases in processing time despite the
substantial increase in difficulty to process them compared to the other explanation types. There
is also some indication that hedging explanations improved the contextual application of trust
consistent with expectation in the literature, though the effect was small and did not fully offset
increases in erroneous agreement. While some prior research has recommended combining types
of explanations to achieve the best qualities of each, when all three explanation types were
presented the result was the highest extraneous cognitive load and essentially no benefit for
erroneous agreement, countering the beneficial effects of the hedging explanation.
The results also provide some insight into the nature of erroneous agreement. The
increase in erroneous agreement when explanations were provided is inconsistent with an
illusion of explanatory understanding and instead more consistent with workers “going along”
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with the agent. Participants were at some level aware of decreased competence having rated selfefficacy in the task lower with increasing erroneous agreement, which also co-occur with
increasing perceived trust, automation, and interdependence. This adverse effect was mostly
driven by the causal explanation. These explanations may have decreased the participant’s
suspicion of the agent’s output leading to greater role of cognitive biases, while counterfactual
and hedging explanations provided cues to suspect the simulated output.
V.7.3 Practical Implications
This study provides insight into whether counterfactual and hedging explanations would
be beneficial for partnering with an agent in contexts where both humans and agents are learning.
Utilizing all of the explanation types to gain the advantages of each is tempting, but many
beneficial effects of counterfactual and hedging explanation were counteracted when combined.
Individually adding the counterfactual or hedging explanation to the causal explanation
improved some outcomes. Counterfactual explanations increased awareness of the complexity of
the task with little negative effect on cognitive load or erroneous agreement. Hedging
explanations had the smallest decrease in self-efficacy as a result of explanations and the lowest
erroneous agreement; however, these effects were quite small, and the large increase in
attribution of intelligence by itself has little benefit in other attitudes and outcomes. While
adding only a counterfactual explanation to causal achieves the greatest improvement in
outcomes, the “black box” condition with no explanations has the lowest erroneous agreement
and highest self-efficacy outcomes.
These results also may shed light on why projects seeking to partner humans with
intelligent agents frequently experience difficulties, despite best-efforts by the stakeholders. The
workers in this study rated themselves as confident in performing the task, holding trust in the
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agent, and broadly provided positive open-text feedback. While self-efficacy decreased when
explanations were provided, the absolute ratings were still most often greater than neutral.
However, the detectable performance outcomes were less than ideal. The workers in this study
did not have the opportunity to compare or select between conditions. Based on the results of
other studies of preference for explanation, it is quite plausible workers would have preferred an
agent that offered explanations over working with a “black box,” and thereby unknowingly
advocated for a configuration with inferior outcomes. “Explainability” will also be a compelling
feature in sales presentations of future intelligent systems; however, managers should evaluate
the level of support for the effectiveness of explanations in the system.
In a real-world system it is likely that users will request that the review process be
simplified by presenting the intelligent agent’s assessment immediately and perhaps only
revealing an explanation upon request. The usage of the incorrect rating checkbox in the “black
box” condition indicates that roughly half of workers might have sought an explanation of the
simulated output in scenarios where the output was intendedly erroneous. Additionally, only 5%
of ratings where workers agreed with the agent assessment in the initial step marked the agent
incorrect across both faithful and erroneous scenarios. This suggests that agreement with the
agent was sufficient to suppress critical evaluation of the simulated output. If the participants in
this study performed the review in a single step, participants might be even more likely to
“anchor” onto the agent’s assessment without conducting their own independent evaluation. A
single-step review may be more appropriate when model output is already known or suspected to
be incorrect, compared to tasks involving screening for erroneous output.
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V.7.4 Limitations
The “Wizard of Oz” method employed in this study may not accurately represent any
current or future system, and the “Wizard” in this study was the researcher. The damage rating
task does not allow for certainty in the true rating of an image, compounding the challenge of
replicating system performance. The simulated agent in this task had an intended error rate
consistent with that of a deep learning model being deployed on a new data set. However, the
error rate was higher than most users might be expected to accept from an intelligent system.
While the erroneous agreement measure is useful to compare with other measures, there are
substantial limitations in its interpretation. There was no quality metric to evaluate it in
comparison to correct assessments, and it also does not necessarily reflect the on-going rate of
error. Additionally, it is possible that the agent assisted many workers in reaching more
appropriate classifications which was not detectable by this design. As such this study provides
limited insight into the rating performance of the participants or explaining interaction with an
intelligent agent that is most often correct.
The association between interdependence and self-efficacy was identified after the fact as
an alternate explanation without a hypothesis. This measure only evaluated the perception of
interdependence and used only two items which is not ideal for PLS-SEM structural models. As
such, this finding requires further investigation to confirm that the manipulation of
interdependence will impact self-efficacy in a task.
The workers in this study received no feedback on their performance beyond the
simulated output and explanations to inform their judgment and damage assessment. While the
lack of feedback is consistent with the typical crowdsourced damage assessment task, it is wellknown that the feedback mechanisms in a typical work environment are a critical input to
regulate behavior and establish self-efficacy.
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While the outcomes of this study in terms of trust and erroneous agreement are not
substantially different than in prior studies of explanations with experts, this study is unlikely to
generalize to the information processing of explanations by experts who are highly familiar with
a task. The information processing pathways of experts will not be loaded by learning the task.
Essentially none of the participants had previously used the damage guideline provided, and only
half had previously conducted damage assessments using aerial images. Participants were not
calibrated in the task prior to data collection. The study also offers limited insight into long-term
interactions and learned trust with an explainable intelligent system where expertise is developed
with the system itself. While other studies in explanation and intelligent systems have involved
interacting with a system over several hours or even multiple days, this study involved a single
interaction with most participants having less than ten minutes of interaction with the task.
Finally, this study did not experimentally evaluate multiple user-interface configurations
or the sequencing of user choices. The task design was unconventional in requiring the worker to
conduct their assessment and provide their input before receiving the simulated output. It is
possible that participants would have been inclined to analyze more deeply an explanation that
they requested over one presented to them for review. The explanations were also not
specifically briefed to participants and they were not highlighted by any training, which could
greatly increase the strength of the manipulation. By selecting design choices considered optimal
across multiple research articles that had not previously been integrated, over-specification may
have resulted. It was also impractical to fully optimize the Qualtrics-based user interface, and
users were required to scroll the screen more than the typical Pybossa user-interface would have
required.
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V.7.5 Future Research
Both cognitive load and perceived interdependence can be influenced by the design of the
task, and were both found to be of similar or greater effect as previous task experience. Notably,
cognitive load has been utilized in the computer-based instructional literature to develop
improved tasks. The review by Hollender et al. (2010) provides a survey of methods which may
be immediately transferrable to an XAI context. Interdependence also offers an existing literature
within human-computer interaction to leverage. Several participants provided comments in the
open-text feedback indicating that they would have liked feedback on ratings or the ability to
provide specific feedback on the agent’s ratings. Research in human-robot interaction has
specifically considered the design of joint activity, and the “directability” requirement for
interdependence from the coactive design method (Johnson et al., 2014) could be evaluated for
its ability increase the effectiveness of explanations. The ability to provide feedback also has the
potential to both break the task apart to decrease extraneous cognitive load in each step, while
activating the production pathway of observational learning from social cognitive theory.
Researchers should consider utilizing a repeated measure design and within-subject
longitudinal measurement. These designs could evaluate the effects of sequencing of multiple
task configurations to determine whether configuration or competency through experience
activates effective meta-cognitive monitoring and evaluation processes. This would decrease
required sample size by examining effects on the same participant. Additionally, such a design
offers the ability to identify the extent that “think aloud” verbal protocols induce meta-cognitive
processes. Research in cognitive load and self-efficacy frequently uses a repeated measure
approach to address large variance in measures between subjects (Beckmann, 2010).
This study attempted to model cognitive load as a hierarchical composite construct
combining the three theoretical components of cognitive load. The resulting model estimated
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path coefficients for the second-order construct that were roughly consistent with theory, but
variation in the measure was not associated with study measures other than gender. The
criticality of the single-item total cognitive load in the original measurement model was
recognized in advance, and this item was presented as the first measure after the rating task on its
own screen with the recommended wording, scale points, and labels from the literature. Further,
correlations between the three-component measure cognitive load and dispositional trust might
suggest some interactions between pre-existing attitudes and cognitive load. Previous research in
cognitive science has directly detected a role of trust on objectively measured cognitive load
(W.-L. Hu, Akash, Jain, & Reid, 2016). However, other research in explanation using mixed
methods also identified that observed behaviors differed from subjective questionnaire rating
results (Holliday et al., 2013). Future research that isolates the effects of changes in behavior and
subjective ratings of the same concept can inform the interpretation of subjective cognitive load
measurement.
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VI CONCLUSIONS
A large area of research is developing deep learning systems capable of explaining their
output in natural language as a means to increase transparency and improve human
understanding when evaluating system output. Intelligent agents that utilize deep learning neural
networks to analyze images have reached a high level of demonstrated accuracy in classification
tasks, but their performance is known to decrease substantially when utilized on a new data set.
Explanations are expected to improve the ability for humans to evaluate model performance, and
where the model is more capable may improve human understanding. However, much of the
empirical research on the effectiveness of explanations has evaluated trust in the system and
compliance with system output, which may not be appropriate when humans are intended to
partner with a system to produce judgments.
In this study participants reviewed images taken before and after a natural disaster and
classified the type of structure and degree of damage. After rating each image, a simulated
agent’s rating was provided for their review along with the opportunity for the participant to
modify their rating. A written guideline was provided, which the explanations referenced. Three
types of explanations of those ratings were manipulated between participants: “causal” which
offer reasons the classification selected was appropriate, “counterfactual” which offer why
another classification was not appropriate, and “hedging” which offer hypothesized failure
modes and boundary conditions related to an image. The research and measurement model
focused on the effects of the explanations on the participant. Self-efficacy was chosen as the key
outcome due to its ability to predict future engagement and investment of mental effort.
Manipulation checks and testing of the instrument indicated that participants largely retained and
recalled the qualities of the types of explanations they received.
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Causal explanations increased trust and compliance with the simulated agent’s ratings,
consistent with prior research. However, they also increased extraneous cognitive load, increased
agreement with erroneous agent ratings, and decreased self-efficacy in the task. When a
counterfactual explanation was added to the causal explanation the perception of intrinsic
cognitive load increased without an effect on self-efficacy, suggesting that they assisted the
participant in assessing the complexity of the task. However, they did not substantially offset the
increase in erroneous agreement of causal explanations. When a hedging explanation was
provided with the causal explanation the perception of agent intelligence increased but had little
benefit on other outcomes. Providing all three types of explanation resulted in adverse outcomes
on most study measures. Participants that changed ratings to agree with an erroneous agent
assessment rated lower self-efficacy indicating they were likely “going along” with the provided
rating rather than experiencing an illusion of explanatory understanding.
Two areas of existing research were identified with the potential improve the
effectiveness of explanations. The limitations of the human cognitive architecture can be
managed by breaking tasks into smaller elements to optimize demands on working memory,
utilizing existing knowledge within human-computer interaction and cognitive load theory
(Hollender et al., 2010). Perceived interdependence was also found to have a positive
relationship with self-efficacy, and methods to increase interdependence also start by breaking
tasks apart with the goal of increasing the human and the agent’s ability to observe, predict, and
direct each other (Johnson et al., 2014). The effects of cognitive load and perceived
interdependence were greater than that of previous experience in the task but are under the
control of the designer of the task. In comparison, the most commonly evaluated construct, trust
in the intelligent agent, was not found to have a significant relationship with self-efficacy.
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Consent
Georgia State University
Informed Consent
Title:
Crowd-sourced Damage Assessment in Natural Disasters
Principal Inves gator:
Dr. Pam S. Ellen
Student Principal Inves gator: Sean E. Dougherty
Procedures
You are being asked to take part in a research study. If you decide to take part, you will be asked to rate the damage in ten
images. We will also ask your opinions related the task. You have been invited because of your background in either
crowd-sourced ci zen science or aerial image interpreta on. This survey should take less than 25 minutes of your me in
one si ng. As this study will be completed online, your IP address will be recorded. However, this data will be destroyed
when data collec on is complete. The results of the study will be summarized and reported in group form. You will not be
iden ﬁed personally. Your name and other facts that might iden fy you will not appear in this study.
Beneﬁts
Your par cipa on may provide data that improves the speed and quality of disaster relief eﬀorts.
Risks
There is no physical risk in undertaking the survey beyond a normal adult day. The disaster images are no more disturbing
than would appear in a newspaper or on network television news.
Compensa on
The compensa on will be $2.00 for your par cipa on in the study. Survey comple ons with obvious signs of lack of
par cipa on by comple on me or failed a en on checks will be rejected.
Voluntary Par cipa on and Withdrawal
You do not have to be in this study. You may stop par cipa ng at any me by closing this window.
Contact Informa on
Sean Dougherty at (813) 344-5408 or sdougherty5@student.gsu.edu.
Consent
If you are willing to volunteer for this research, please start the survey by clicking next below.

Briefing
https://gsu.ca1.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview
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Disaster Damage Assessment

B-2

Crowdsourcing has been used for many years to rapidly assess damage after natural
disasters. The results have been used to inform disaster relief officials of the extent of
damage and areas to focus relief efforts. Because of the volume of data and urgent time
sensitivity, automated damage assessments are being tested. Combining crowdsourcing
with automated damage assessments is expected to increase quality and speed, but both
the automated system and crowd workers must learn the unique aspects of each disaster in
a partnership.
Your task is to review 10 images of buildings and classify the type of building and the extent
of damage using the guideline below. Rate only the building at the center of the image as
there may be more than one building. If you place your mouse cursor over the image you
can magnify sections for more detail. After you submit your rating, you will receive the
automated damage assessment for your review. Please evaluate this assessment and, if
necessary, review the images again. You can change your ratings, if desired. If you do not
believe the image is of a building, please mark "no structure".
Overview of Process

Screenshot Example of a Damage Assessment
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In previous disasters it has been found that having a clear damage rating guideline is very
important for data quality. The Harvard Humanitarian Institute's guidelines are shown below.
You can recall this guide at any time while reviewing images.

Harvard Humanitarian Initiative's Aerial Imagry Interpretation Guide
Structure
Type

Symbol

Description

Light

Structures that are built predominantly from light material or locally sourced materials. These
structures may be mobile or possess no real hard roof, in some cases, roofs are made of metal or
light material; they are often small in size. As such, these structures are likely to be the most
vulnerable structures in any impacted region. Examples of these types of structures can include
huts, tukuls or mobile trailers.

Medium

Structures that are built from semi-hard materials or mixed products. These structures have solid
frames built using wood, steel or cement. These type of structures are fixed and possess
hardened walls and roofs which can be made out of wood or cement. Unlike light structures,
these types of structures are able to withstand moderate level of wind, with no to little damage,
while maintaining their structural integrity. These types of structures can be individual or multifamily houses, small stores, places of worship and similar structures.

Heavy

Structures that are built from hard materials such as reinforced cement and steel. Infrastructure of
this type is the least structurally vulnerable in any observed region. These structures are
designed to withstand high level winds without receiving heavy damage or endangering the
structural integrity of the structure. In many areas, these may include multiple story buildings,
strip malls, hospital buildings, or public utilities.

Damage
Classification

Color

Description
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No Visible
Damage

The roof is virtually undamaged and the walls, in effect, remain standing. The structure
appears to have complete structural integrity and does not appear to need repair.

Minimal
Visible
Damage

The roof remains largely intact, but presents partial damage to the roof’s surface, with minimal
exposure beneath. In oblique aerial and satellite imagery, minimal damage may be able to be
observed within the structure and to the exterior walls. The structure appears to have general
structural integrity but needs minor repairs.

Significant
Visible
Damage

The roof is entirely damaged or missing. The walls of the structure remain upright. However,
the interior wall partitions can be partially damaged. Debris inside the structure can also
potentially be visible. The structure does not appear to have complete structural integrity and is
in need of significant repair.

Critical Visible
Damage

The roof is completely destroyed or missing, and the walls have been destroyed or collapsed.
The support structures are completely leveled, and interior objects have also suffered visibly
heavy damage or destruction. The structure does not appear to have any structural integrity
and requires comprehensive reconstruction or demolition of the entire structure

B-4

Briefing Attention Check
Based on the briefing, select the statement which is true.
You are to ignore the type of structure when making your assessment.
You may change your rating after reviewing the automated assessment.
You will be asked to estimate a value for the property.
You will upload pictures you've taken of damaged buildings.

Sharing Notice
Please note:
This is a research study of the damage assessment task. Please do not share the contents
of this study with other potential participants.
Rating Block
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
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Step 1: Damage Assessment #1 of 10
Rate the structure and post-disaster damage for the centered building within
the blue box.
Hover over the image to use the magnifying glass.

Pre-Disaster

Post-Disaster

Click here to open the damage guideline, or hover over the option names.

Please rate the type of structure:
No Structure

Light

Medium

Heavy

Minimal

Significant

Critical

Please rate the damage level:

No Damage

https://gsu.ca1.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview
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Please rate the difficulty of this classification:
Very Difficult

Very Easy

These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks

Step 2: Review Automated Assessment #1
Hover over the image to use the magnifying glass.

Your
Assessment

Automated Assessment

The images are below if you would like to review them again:
Pre-Disaster
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Click here to open the damage guideline (new tab).

If you'd like to change your answer, please select a new structure type: (OPTIONAL)
» No Structure

» Light

» Medium

» Heavy

If you'd like to change your answer, please select a new damage rating: (OPTIONAL)
» No

Damage

» Minimal

» Significant

» Critical

Please indicate if any of the following apply in your opinion:
The structure was hidden or obscured
The image was blurry
The automated assessment was incorrect

Manipulation Checks

https://gsu.ca1.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview

7/13

2/19/2019

Qualtrics Survey Software

B-8

Please rate your opinion of the following statements.
The automated assessor explained why it made its ratings.
Strongly disagree

Somewhat disagree

Neither agree nor disagree

Somewhat agree

Strongly agree

The automated assessor contrasted its rating to another possible classification.
» Strongly disagree

» Somewhat disagree

» Neither agree nor
disagree

» Somewhat agree

» Strongly agree

The automated assessor provided features of the image to consider which could cause
incorrect classifications.
» Strongly disagree

» Somewhat disagree

» Neither agree nor
disagree

» Somewhat agree

» Strongly agree

Attitudes
How much mental effort did you invest in making your assessments?
Very, Very Low

Very Low

Low

Rather Low

Neither Low
nor High

Rather High

High

Very High

Very, Very
High

Please rate your opinion on the following statements about the damage assessment task:
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Many things needed to be kept
in mind simultaneously when
rating damage.
The damage assessment task
was very complex.
I made an effort to understand
the overall task and not just on
the details.
I wanted to make sure I
understood everything I was
provided while completing the
task.
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Strongly
Agree

I was provided information
which supported my ability to
assess damage ratings.
It was exhausting to find the
important information to assess
damage.
The design of this assessment
tool was very inconvenient for
making ratings.
It was difficult to recognize and
link the crucial information
while assessing damage.
I had to remember many things
to perform the task.

Based on your experience, please rate your expectations if you did more damage
assessments using the tool:
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Knowing my skills and abilities,
I think I can do well assessing
damage
I expect I can do well on future
damage assessments with this
tool
I believe I can produce high
quality assessments with this
tool
I’m confident I understand how
to use the damage assessment
guide
I’m certain I have the skills
necessary for damage
assessment
I’m confident I understand the
most difficult categories
I’m confident I know how to use
the damage assessment tool
I believe I won't overly rely on
the automated assessment
I'm confident the automated
assessment won't distract me

Please rate the automated assessor:
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Thinks logically
Is knowledgeable
https://gsu.ca1.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview
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Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Is able to make decisions
Has a mind
Is predictable
Is insightful

Alternate Explanations
Please estimate the number of aerial damage images you've assessed prior to this study.
No Experience

Less Than 10 Images

Between 10 and 50
Images

Between 50 and 100 Between 100 and 500
Images
Images

Over 500 Images

How often do you rate damage to structures in aerial images?
Never

Yearly, or less

A few times a year

Monthly

A few times a
month

Weekly

Daily

Have you previously used a written damage guideline to make ratings?
No

Yes - But a different guideline.

Yes - The same guideline as here.

Please rate the automated assessor on the following statements:
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

I believe I can trust the
automated assessment
My assessment was affected
by the automated assessor's
input
Assessments depend on both
worker and automated
assessor for accuracy
My ratings benefitted by
working with the automated
assessor
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The damage assessment was:
Highly Manual

Highly Automated

Please rate your opinion of the following statements:
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

It is difficult for me to contain
my feelings when I see people
in distress.
I am often reminded by daily
events how dependent we are
on one another.
I feel sympathetic to the plight
of disaster victims.

Please rate your opinion of the following statements:
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

I like to use technology to
make tasks easier for me
I have bad experiences when I
try to use new technology
instead of doing things “the oldfashioned way”
There are tasks in my life that
have been made easier by
computers doing the work for
me
I have a positive view of the
potential for robots and artificial
intelligence

Demographics
The following questions are for descriptive purposes only.

In what year were you born?
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Are you... ?
Male
Female

What is the highest level of formal education you have completed?
Less than high school degree
High school graduate (high school diploma or equivalent including GED)
Some post-high school
Bachelor's degree
Some graduate school
Graduate degree

Which of the following best describes your total family income?
Less than $15,000

$45,000 to $59,999

$100,000 to $149,999

$15,000 to $29,999

$60,000 to $79,999

Over $150,000

$30,000 to $44,999

$80,000 to $99,999

Prefer not to Say

Feedback
How did you find out about this HIT? if you found out on a web forum, please paste a link to
the page.

Finally, we value any feedback concerning this survey. Please let us know your thoughts
and or suggestions.
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onsent
Georgia State University
Informed Consent
Title:
Crowd-sourced Damage Assessment in Natural Disasters
Principal Inves gator:
Dr. Pam S. Ellen
Student Principal Inves gator: Sean E. Dougherty
Procedures
You are being asked to take part in a research study. If you decide to take part, you will be asked to rate the damage in ten
images. We will also ask your opinions related the task. You have been invited because of your interest in crowd-sourced
ci zen science. This survey should take less than 25 minutes of your me in one si ng. As this study will be completed
online, your IP address will be recorded. However, this data will be destroyed when data collec on is complete. The results
of the study will be summarized and reported in group form. You will not be iden ﬁed personally. Your name and other
facts that might iden fy you will not appear in this study.
Beneﬁts
Your par cipa on may provide data that improves the speed and quality of disaster relief eﬀorts.
Risks
There is no physical risk in undertaking the survey beyond a normal adult day. The disaster images are no more disturbing
than would appear in a newspaper or on network television news.
Compensa on
The compensa on will be $2.00 for your par cipa on in the study. Survey comple ons with obvious signs of lack of
par cipa on by repeated random damage ra ngs or failed a en on checks will be rejected.
Voluntary Par cipa on and Withdrawal
You do not have to be in this study. You may stop par cipa ng at any me by closing this window.
Contact Informa on
Sean Dougherty at (813) 344-5408 or sdougherty5@student.gsu.edu.
Consent
If you are willing to volunteer for this research, please start the survey by clicking next below.

Briefing
https://gsu.ca1.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview
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These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks

Disaster Damage Assessment
Crowdsourcing has been used for many years to rapidly assess damage after natural
disasters. The results have been used to inform disaster relief officials of the extent of
damage and areas to focus relief efforts. Because of the volume of data and urgent time
sensitivity, automated damage assessments are being tested. Combining crowdsourcing
with automated damage assessments is expected to increase quality and speed, but both
the automated system and crowd workers must learn the unique aspects of each disaster in
a partnership.
Your task is to review 10 images of buildings and classify the type of building and the extent
of damage using the guideline below. Rate only the building at the center of the image as
there may be more than one building. If you place your mouse cursor over the image you
can magnify sections for more detail. After you submit your rating, you will receive a rating
from the Automated Damage Assessment Machine (ADAM) for your review. Please
evaluate this assessment and, if necessary, review the images again. You can change your
ratings, if desired. If you do not believe the image is of a building, please mark "no
structure".

Overview of Process

Screenshot Example of a Damage Assessment
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In previous disasters it has been found that having a clear damage rating guideline is very
important for data quality. The Harvard Humanitarian Institute's guidelines are shown below.
You can recall this guide at any time while reviewing images.

Harvard Humanitarian Initiative's Aerial Imagry Interpretation Guide
Structure
Type

Symbol

Description

Light

Structures that are built predominantly from light material or locally sourced materials. These
structures may be mobile or possess no real hard roof, in some cases, roofs are made of metal or
light material; they are often small in size. As such, these structures are likely to be the most
vulnerable structures in any impacted region. Examples of these types of structures can include
huts, tukuls or mobile trailers.

Medium

Structures that are built from semi-hard materials or mixed products. These structures have solid
frames built using wood, steel or cement. These type of structures are fixed and possess
hardened walls and roofs which can be made out of wood or cement. Unlike light structures,
these types of structures are able to withstand moderate level of wind, with no to little damage,
while maintaining their structural integrity. These types of structures can be individual or multifamily houses, small stores, places of worship and similar structures.

Heavy

Structures that are built from hard materials such as reinforced cement and steel. Infrastructure of
this type is the least structurally vulnerable in any observed region. These structures are
designed to withstand high level winds without receiving heavy damage or endangering the
structural integrity of the structure. In many areas, these may include multiple story buildings,
strip malls, hospital buildings, or public utilities.

Damage
Classification

Color

Description
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No Visible
Damage

The roof is virtually undamaged and the walls, in effect, remain standing. The structure
appears to have complete structural integrity and does not appear to need repair.

Minimal
Visible
Damage

The roof remains largely intact, but presents partial damage to the roof’s surface, with minimal
exposure beneath. In oblique aerial and satellite imagery, minimal damage may be able to be
observed within the structure and to the exterior walls. The structure appears to have general
structural integrity but needs minor repairs.

Significant
Visible
Damage

The roof is entirely damaged or missing. The walls of the structure remain upright. However,
the interior wall partitions can be partially damaged. Debris inside the structure can also
potentially be visible. The structure does not appear to have complete structural integrity and is
in need of significant repair.

Critical Visible
Damage

The roof is completely destroyed or missing, and the walls have been destroyed or collapsed.
The support structures are completely leveled, and interior objects have also suffered visibly
heavy damage or destruction. The structure does not appear to have any structural integrity
and requires comprehensive reconstruction or demolition of the entire structure

C-4

Briefing Attention Check
Based on the briefing, select the statement which is true.
You may change your rating after reviewing the automated assessment.
You will be asked to estimate a value for the property.
You are to ignore the type of structure when making your assessment.
You will upload pictures you've taken of damaged buildings.

Sharing Notice
Please note:
This is a research study of the damage assessment task. Please do not share the contents
of this study with other potential participants.
Rating Block
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
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Step 1: Damage Assessment #1 of 10
Rate the structure and post-disaster damage for the centered building within
the blue box.
Hover over the image to use the magnifying glass.

Pre-Disaster

Post-Disaster

Click here to open the damage guideline, or hover over the option names.

Please rate the type of structure:
No Structure

Light

Medium

Heavy

Minimal

Significant

Critical

Please rate the damage level:

No Damage
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Please rate the difficulty of this classification:
Very Difficult

Very Easy

These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks

Step 2: Review the automated rating #1
Hover over the image to use the magnifying glass.

Your
Assessment

ADAM's Rating
Automated Damage Assessment Machine

The images are below if you would like to review them again:
Pre-Disaster
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Click here to open the damage guideline (new tab).

If you'd like to change your answer, please select a new structure type: (OPTIONAL)
» No Structure

» Light

» Medium

» Heavy

If you'd like to change your answer, please select a new damage rating: (OPTIONAL)
» No

Damage

» Minimal

» Significant

» Critical

Please indicate if any of the following apply in your opinion:
The structure was hidden or obscured
The image was blurry
The automated rating by ADAM was incorrect

Advisory
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In the next section we want to ask for your honest opinion.
Your answers have no effect on your eligibility for future HITS.
ttitudes
How much mental effort did you invest in making your assessments?
Very, Very Low

Very Low

Low

Rather Low

Neither Low
nor High

Rather High

High

Very High

Very, Very
High

Please rate your opinion on the following statements about the damage assessment task:
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

The damage assessment task
was very complex.
I was provided information
which supported my ability to
assess damage ratings.
I wanted to make sure I
understood everything I was
provided while completing the
task.
I made an effort to understand
the overall task and not just on
the details.
Many things needed to be kept
in mind simultaneously when
rating damage.
It was exhausting to find the
important information to assess
damage.
The design of this assessment
tool was very inconvenient for
making ratings.
It was difficult to recognize and
link the crucial information
while assessing damage.
I had to remember many things
to perform the task.

Based on your experience, please rate your expectations if you did more damage
assessments using the tool:
Strongly
Disagree

https://gsu.ca1.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview
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Strongly
Agree

I’m confident I understand the
most difficult categories
Knowing my skills and abilities,
I think I can do well assessing
damage
I’m certain I have the skills
necessary for damage
assessment
I’m confident I know how to use
the damage assessment tool
I expect I can do well on future
damage assessments with this
tool
I believe I can produce high
quality assessments with this
tool

Please rate the Automated Damage Assessment Machine (ADAM):
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Thinks logically
Is predictable
Is able to make decisions
Is insightful
Is knowledgeable
Has a mind

Manipulation Checks
Please rate your opinion of the following statements.
The Automated Damage Assessment Machine (ADAM) explained why it made its ratings.
Yes
No
Don't Know / Don't Remember

ADAM compared its rating to at least one other possible classification.
» Yes
» No
https://gsu.ca1.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview
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» Don't Know / Don't Remember

ADAM pointed out features in the image that may lead to incorrect classifications.
» Yes
» No
» Don't Know / Don't Remember

Alternate Explanations
Please estimate the number of aerial damage images you've assessed prior to this study.
No Experience

Less Than 10
Images

Between 10 and 50 Between 50 and
Images
100 Images

Between 100 and Between 500 and
500 Images
5,000 Images Over 5,000 Images

How often have you rated damage to structures in aerial images in the last year?
Never

Yearly, or less

A few times a year

Monthly

A few times a
month

Weekly

Daily

Have you previously used a written damage guideline to make ratings?
No

Yes - But a different guideline.

Yes - The same guideline as here.

Please rate the Automated Damage Assessment Machine (ADAM) on the following
statements:
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

I'm confident that ADAM won't
distract me
I believe I won't overly rely on
ADAM
My ratings benefitted by
working with ADAM
ADAM prevents errors in
manual damage assessments
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Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

My ratings were affected by
ADAM's input
I believe I can trust ADAM
Assessments depend on the
both the human and ADAM for
accuracy

The damage assessment task was:
Highly Manual

Highly Automated

Please rate your opinion of the following statements:
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

I like to use technology to
make tasks easier for me
I have bad experiences when I
try to use new technology
instead of doing things “the oldfashioned way”
There are tasks in my life that
have been made easier by
computers doing the work for
me
I have a positive view of the
potential for robots and artificial
intelligence

In your own work or profession, how has artificial intelligence (AI) performed for you?
Far exceeded my
expectations

Exceeded my
expectations

Equaled my
expectations

Short of my
expectations

Far short of my
expectations

Have not used AI in
my work

Demographics
The following questions are for descriptive purposes only.

In what year were you born?
https://gsu.ca1.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview
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Are you... ?
Male
Female

What is the highest level of formal education you have completed?
Less than high school degree
High school graduate (high school diploma or equivalent including GED)
Some post-high school
Bachelor's degree
Some graduate school
Graduate degree

Which of the following best describes your total family income?
Less than $15,000

$45,000 to $59,999

$100,000 to $149,999

$15,000 to $29,999

$60,000 to $79,999

Over $150,000

$30,000 to $44,999

$80,000 to $99,999

Prefer not to Say

Feedback
How did you find out about this HIT? if you found out on a web forum, please paste a link to
the page.

https://gsu.ca1.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview

12/13

2/17/2019

Qualtrics Survey Software

C-13

Finally, we value any feedback concerning this survey. Please let us know your thoughts
and or suggestions.
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Scenarios: Images and Explanations
Contents
Template for Scenarios (Definitions) ............................................................................................................ 2
Scenario 1 – Factory ...................................................................................................................................... 3
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Scenario 10 – Tarp Colored Roof ................................................................................................................ 12
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Scenario 16 – Funeral Home ....................................................................................................................... 18
Scenario 17 – Recreation Center ................................................................................................................ 19
Scenario 18 – Hangar .................................................................................................................................. 20
Scenario 19 – Former Forest ....................................................................................................................... 21
Scenario 20 – Retention Ponds ................................................................................................................... 22
Scenario 21 – Place of Worship .................................................................................................................. 23
Scenario 22 – Supermarket ......................................................................................................................... 24
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Template for Scenarios (Definitions)
Scenario [X]
Image [XXX] – [Pre-Disaster Image Source] / [Post-Disaster Image Source]

Pre-Disaster Image

Post-Disaster Image

Type:

[ Faithful (consistent with guideline) / Erroneous (object not in the image) ]

Model Output:

Structure and Damage Classification provided to user

Next Best:

Classifications used as the counter-factual contrast

Failure Mode:

Plausible boundary condition or outlier in the image

Objects:

List of detected objects and features (bold items are simulated erroneously
detected objects)

All Conditions (Model Output): This structure was automatically classified [C-BEST-SLOT].
C (Causal): Because it is a [O-STRUCTURE-SLOT] with [O-FACTUAL-SLOT1] [ and …].
CF (Counterfactual): It is not a [C-NEXT-SLOT] classification because it [does not] have [O-COUNTERFSLOT1] [ and …].
H (Hedge): Consider: [H-ERROR-MODE-SLOT].
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Scenario 1 – Factory
Image 008 – Google 2018 / NGS Michael 2018

Type:

Erroneous

Model Output:

Heavy No Damage

Next Best:

Heavy Minimal

Failure Mode:

Distractions

Objects:

Large Commercial Building. Changed roof structure (intact roof). No debris.
Multi-story.
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Scenario 2 – Grocery Store
Image 007 – Google 2018 / NGS Michael 2018

Type:

Faithful

Model Output:

Medium Critical

Next Best:

Heavy Significant

Failure Mode:

Illumination

Objects:

Medium Commercial Building. Roof damage. Wooden Roof. Debris adjacent to
structure (classified as wall collapse).
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Scenario 3 – Government
Image 009 – Google 2018 / NGS Michael 2018

Type:

Faithful

Model Output:

Heavy Minimal

Next Best:

Heavy Significant

Failure Mode:

Feature Count

Objects:

Large Government Building. Multiple story. Metal roof. Roof damage. No debris.
Intact walls. No visible debris.
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Scenario 4 – Clear Trailer
Image 010 – Google 2018 / NGS Michael 2018

Type:

Faithful

Model Output:

Light Critical

Next Best:

Light Significant

Failure Mode:

Illumination

Objects:

Residential Trailer. Roof damaged. Interior debris. Adjacent debris.

D-7

Scenario 5 – Obstructed Trailer
Image 012 – Google 2018 / NGS Michael 2018

Type:

Faithful

Model Output:

Light Minimal

Next Best:

Light Significant

Failure Mode:

Obscuration

Objects:

Residential Trailer. Roof damaged. Intact walls. Wooden roof materials. Trailer
shape.
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Scenario 6 – Trailer Roof Error
Image 013 – Google 2018 / NGS Michael 2018

Type:

Erroneous

Model Output:

Light Significant

Next Best:

Light Minimal

Failure Mode:

Obscuration

Objects:

Damaged roof (classified as internal visible debris). Adjacent debris. Intact
walls. Missing roof. Trailer shape.
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Scenario 7 – Intact Trailer
Image 002 – Google 2018 / NGS Michael 2018

Type:

Faithful

Model Output:

Light No Damage

Next Best:

Light Minimal

Failure Mode:

Obscuration

Objects:

Residential Trailer. Intact roof. Intact walls. Trailer shape.
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Scenario 8 – Shipyard
Image 021 – Google 2018 / NGS Michael 2018

Type:

Faithful

Model Output:

Heavy Critical

Next Best:

Heavy Significant

Failure Mode:

Spectral Distinction

Objects:

Large Industrial Building. Metal roof. collapsed wall with adjacent debris.
collapsed roof and internal visible debris.
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Scenario 9 – Coastal Condo
Image 005 – Google 2018 / NGS Michael 2018

Type:

Erroneous

Model Output:

Medium Critical

Next Best:

Heavy Critical

Failure Mode:

Feature Density

Objects:

Multi-Family Residential Building. Intact roof. adjacent debris (classified as
collapsed wall). Multiple stories. (seen as single story)
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Scenario 10 – Tarp Colored Roof
Image 003 – Google 2018 / NGS Michael 2018

Type:

Faithful

Model Output:

Medium Significant

Next Best:

Heavy Critical

Failure Mode:

Feature Density

Objects:

Multi-Family Residential Building. Missing roof. Wooden roof materials.
adjacent debris. Multiple stories.
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Scenario 11 – Large Condo
Image 006 – Google 2018 / NGS Michael 2018

Type:

Faithful

Model Output:

Heavy Significant

Next Best:

Heavy Critical

Failure Mode:

Feature Distinction

Objects:

Multi-Family Residential Building. Multi-story. Adjacent debris. Missing roof
sections. Intact walls.
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Scenario 12 – Day Care
Image 015 – Google 2018 / NGS Michael 2018

Type:

Erroneous

Model Output:

Medium Significant

Next Best:

Heavy Minimal

Failure Mode:

Feature Distinction

Objects:

Attached Building Commercial Complex. Adjacent debris. Light roof damage.
Wood Roof Materials. (collapsed wall with adjacent debris)
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Scenario 13 – Boat Dealer
Image 016 – Google 2018 / NGS Michael 2018

Type:

Erroneous

Model Output:

Medium Significant

Next Best:

Heavy Significant

Failure Mode:

Object Count

Objects:

Medium Commercial Building. Light roof damage. Adjacent debris (boats on
building side classified as collapsed wall).
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Scenario 14 – House with Pool
Image 001 – Google 2018 / NGS Michael 2018

Type:

Faithful

Model Output:

Medium Minimal

Next Best:

Medium Significant

Failure Mode:

Roof Complexity

Objects:

Single-Family Home. Light roof damage. No debris.
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Scenario 15 – Artificial Island
Image 004 – Google 2018 / NGS Michael 2018

Type:

Faithful

Model Output:

Medium Minimal

Next Best:

Medium Significant

Failure Mode:

Illumination

Objects:

Single-Family Home. Light roof damage. No debris.

D-18

Scenario 16 – Funeral Home
Image 014 – Google 2018 / NGS Michael 2018

Type:

Faithful

Model Output:

Medium Significant

Next Best:

Heavy Significant

Failure Mode:

Spectral Distinction

Objects:

Medium Commercial Building. Missing roof segment. Adjacent debris. Wooden
roof.
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Scenario 17 – Recreation Center
Image 017 – Google 2018 / NGS Michael 2018

Type:

Erroneous

Model Output:

Medium Critical

Next Best:

Medium Minimal

Failure Mode:

Feature Density

Objects:

Attached Building Commercial Complex. Collapsed wall with adjacent debris
(classified as wall collapse). Missing roof section. Wooden roof construction.
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Scenario 18 – Hangar
Image 018 – Google 2018 / NGS Michael 2018

Type:

Faithful

Model Output:

Heavy Significant

Next Best:

Medium Critical

Failure Mode:

Unusual Scale

Objects:

Large Industrial Building. Intact walls. Collapsed roof and internal visible debris.
Metal roof materials.

D-21

Scenario 19 – Former Forest
Image 019 – Google 2018 / NGS Michael 2018

Type:

Erroneous

Model Output:

Medium Significant

Next Best:

Heavy Critical

Failure Mode:

No Pre-Disaster Image

Objects:

Medium Commercial Building. Intact walls. collapsed roof and internal visible
debris. Wooden construction. (entire description)
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Scenario 20 – Retention Ponds
Image 020 – Google 2018 / NGS Michael 2018

Type:

Erroneous

Model Output:

Medium No Damage

Next Best:

Medium Minimal

Failure Mode:

Spectral Distinction

Objects:

Attached Building Commercial Complex. pre-existing poor condition roof. Intact
walls. (entire description)
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Scenario 21 – Place of Worship
Image 011 – Google 2018 / NGS Michael 2018

Type:

Erroneous

Model Output:

Medium No Damage

Next Best:

Medium Significant

Failure Mode:

Obscuration

Objects:

Place of Worship Complex. Missing roof shingles. Intact walls. (Missing roof
section). Multiple stories. No debris.
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Scenario 22 – Supermarket
Image 022 – Google 2018 / NGS Michael 2018

Type:

Faithful

Model Output:

Medium Significant

Next Best:

Medium Critical

Failure Mode:

Object Count

Objects:

Medium Commercial Building. Missing roof segment. Adjacent debris. Intact
walls.
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Appendix E: Pre-Test Interview Guide

See following page.
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INTERVIEW GUIDE: Crowd-sourced Damage Assessment in Natural Disasters
December 21, 2018
Student Principal Investigator: Sean Dougherty (sdougherty5@student.gsu.edu)
Principal Investigator: Pam Ellen (pellen@gsu.edu)

1. Recruiting
Directions: Ensure the participant can see the consent on their screen. Read the participant the
consent form and ask them to verbalize that they agree and then to click the next button on the
consent page of the survey.

2. Interview
Briefing
Directions: Allow the participant to read the briefing on their own without describing the survey
or the experiment.
Interview Questions:
1. Did you find any part of the briefing unclear?
2. Did you find the structure and damage guideline to be clear?
3. Can you describe the task as you understand it?

Initial Rating Step
Directions: Ask the following question when the image appears for them to rate in the initial
step. Allow them to complete 7 of the 10 ratings on their own. Ask them to verbalize as much of
their decision process as possible for all images.
Interview Questions:
1. Did the images appear clearly and a useful size?
2. Did the magnifying glass functionality work for you?

Review Rating Step
Directions: Ask the following questions for the first three image ratings.
Interview Questions:
1. How confident were you in selecting your damage rating for this image?
2. How do you feel about the automated rating for this image?
3. Is the information provided useful to evaluate the rating?
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Survey Measures
Directions: Allow the participant to complete the survey measures and ask any questions as
they complete the items on their own.
Interview Questions:
1. Did the questions make sense?
2. Did the options for rating your answers make sense?
3. How do you feel about the number of questions we asked you to rate?

Close Out
Directions: Instead of the participant completing the optional feedback questions on the survey,
ask them the following questions.
Interview Questions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Do you have any suggestions to improve the damage assessment task?
Do you think any of the images should not have been used in the study?
Do you have any feedback about how the automated assessment was presented?
Do you have any other feedback we did not cover?

Ending Script:
Please remember to complete the survey and enter the completion code into the HIT. Thank
you for participating in this study and helping us to test and improve this survey.
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See following page.
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F. INSTRUMENT DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING
F.1

Task Development
The scenarios for the task were generated in a multi-step process to create the elements

needed for the specification of the simulated agent. The steps used to generate the scenarios and
their components are shown in Figure 1 and discussed in detail below. The full list of scenarios
appears in Appendix C.
The literature was reviewed to identify the required components to support an
explanation engine at the current state-of-the-art capability. The simulated output and
explanations are synthetic with the goal of plausibility and agent behavior authentic to what the
participant would experience if the agent were real, but not intended to replicate a single specific
system. Building damage and object classes were generated by author evaluation of the images
using the damage assessment guideline and land use classifications in a multiple-cycle process.
Failure modes were collected from the literature considering the images selected for this
experiment. Natural language explanations were generated by transforming example
explanations from the XAI literature into templates. The model simulated here most closely
resembles definitions of objects of buildings as in Mayer (1999), roof damage detection as in F.
Wang (2017), general damage detection by Vetrivel et al. (2018), and semantic object
recognition and classification as in Hendricks et al. (2016) to classify portions of an image and
generate explanations. The specification for the simulated agent appears in Figure 2.

F-2

Revise Coding
for Consistency

Failure Modes
for Automated
Classification

Generate
Classifications
and Outcomes

Image
Selection and
Simulated
Output

TemplateBased
Explanation

Qualtrics
Integration

Appendix F.1.1

Appendix F.1.2

Appendix F.1.3

Appendix F.1.4

Appendix F.1.5
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Figure 2 Simulated Output and Explanation Specification

F.1.1 Failure Modes for Automated Classification
A set of real-world failure modes and boundary conditions for automated classification
was identified by a literature search of “convolutional neural network” and “aerial” and
“damage” since 2014 with the goal of covering the components of the specification rather than
an exhaustive review of the literature. Articles not related to the assessment of structures were
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excluded. When an article was included, a “snowball” approach was used for references relevant
to building damage assessment. A two-cycle coding method was used to collect the disclosed
failure modes with second-cycle analytic codes generated based on the causes within the image
leading to the failure. The finished list is shown in Table 1. Two of the failure modes in the
literature (“unexplained error,” “imbalanced classes”) were not used to generate scenarios as
they are not readily detectable by an intelligent agent or by the participant.
Table 1 Failure Modes Identified in Aerial Damage Assessment Literature
ID
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Failure Mode
Atmosphere
Distraction
Object Count
Feature Density
Feature Distinction
Illumination
Obscuration
Pre-Existing Conditions
Roof Complexity
Spectral Distinction
Unusual Scale
No Pre-Disaster Image
Unexplained Error
Imbalanced Classes

References
[D,N]
[C,N]
[C,D,I]
[A,E]
[G,H,J]
[B,E]
[E,N]
[A]
[A,K,M]
[F,N]
[H,L]
[I]
[B]
[G]

Hedging Slot
Clouds, fog, and smoke may decrease the accuracy of assessments.
Large numbers of different objects may decrease the accuracy of assessments.
Large numbers of the same object may decrease the accuracy of assessments.
Tightly grouped features may decrease the accuracy of assessments.
Complex textures may decrease the accuracy of assessments.
Shadows, reflections, and color changes may decrease the accuracy of assessments.
Overlapping objects may decrease the accuracy of assessments.
Poorly maintained structures may be misclassified as disaster damage.
Windows, chimneys, and roof textures may be misclassified as damage.
Bodies of water, parking lots, and shadows may not be identified properly.
Very large and very small structures may decrease the accuracy of assessments.
Lack of pre-disaster image may decrease the accuracy of assessments.
n/a - not used in this research
n/a - not used in this research

[A] Vetrivel, A., Gerke, M., Kerle, N., Nex, F., & Vosselman, G. (2018); [B] Kersbergen, D. (2018); [C] Attari, N., Ofli, F., Awad, M., Lucas, J., &
Chawla, S. (2017); [D] Mather, P. M., & Koch, M. (2011); [E] Moranduzzo, T., & Melgani, F. (2014); [F] Kluckner, S., Mauthner, T., Roth, P. M., &
Bischof, H. (2009); [G] Nguyen, D. T., Ofli, F., Imran, M., & Mitra, P. (2017); [H] Qi, K., Yang, C., Guan, Q., Wu, H., & Gong, J. (2017); [I] Fujita, A.,
Sakurada, K., Imaizumi, T., Ito, R., Hikosaka, S., & Nakamura, R. (2017) ; [J] Duarte, D., Nex, F., Kerle, N., & Vosselman, G. (2017); [K] Duarte, D., Nex,
F., Kerle, N., & Vosselman, G. (2018); [L] Wang, F. (2017); [M] Cao, Q. D., & Choe, Y. (2018);

F.1.2 Generate Classifications and Outcomes
Targeted classifications for structure images for twenty scenarios were selected in
advance of identifying images to ensure a diversity of structure type and damage classification
categories. Half of the scenarios were selected at random for erroneous performance of object
detection prior to image selection. This failure rate is not implausible for a model being
transferred to a new disaster or geographic region without labeled training data (Vetrivel et al.,
2015), especially where classifications are sought for images with classification disagreements.
Two scenarios were designated to have no structure in the image as a means to detect low
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participatory effort; however, this phenomenon is also consistent with the user experience
reported by GIScorps (2013) where some images crowd workers are exposed to are not
appropriate for damage assessment.
F.1.3 Image Selection and Simulated Output
Images were selected for the target structure type and damage classification by an initial
review by the author. Aerial imagery for post-disaster images was sourced from the National
Geodetic Survey for Hurricane Michael, which was collected aerially from an altitude of 5,500
feet (NGS, 2018). Pre-disaster images were sourced from Google Earth with images originally
from Google Satellite as disclosed by the user interface (Google, 2018) in “2D” overhead
orientation at an eye altitude of less than 500 meters. Images did not include overlays of street
names or provide geographic coordinates identifying the location depicted. Images were selected
to reflect a mix of levels of difficulty and plausibility of the identified failure modes in the
literature.
The selected images were coded for structure and objects in a two-step process. For
structure type, land use classifications for structures were identified based primarily on predisaster conditions; however, some structure type classifications benefited from exposed
construction materials visible in post-disaster images. Damage visible in images was coded
referencing the definitions contained in the damage guideline (Achkar et al., 2016) and the
damage detection literature referenced in Chapter 2, Table 2. For erroneous scenarios, plausible
erroneous detection of objects was used to generate an incorrect image object description and
hedging explanation from Table 1. In the first step codes were expanded based on objects
contained in the images and preliminary explanations were drafted. In the second step, the list of
generated object codes was reviewed with codes combined and modified for parsimony, class
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discrimination, consistency with the guidelines, and considerations of algorithmically generating
explanations using templates. The final list of codes generated are shown in Table 2.
Simulated output was revised for consistency between coded damage and structural
features and the generated output classifications. The “next best” classification for counterfactual
explanation was selected to be that classification which would result from testing for what
addition or subtraction of an object would modify the classification. A decision tree was
computed using R version 3.3.2 “rpart” library to confirm that the simulated output was
consistent with the detected objects (decision tree visualized in Figure 4). Building structure
classification was similarly compared to the land use classification specification. The list of
scenarios generated for the pilot is listed in Table 3.
Example images are shown in Figure 3 for pre-disaster and post-disaster conditions from
Scenario 10. The simulated output for the scenario is a medium structure (multi-family home
with multiple stories and wooden roof) and significant visible damage (the walls remain intact,
but the roof material is nearly entirely missing, and there is adjacent debris). This example
demonstrates the value of the pre-disaster imagery. The blue areas on the roof of the post-disaster
image could be interpreted as having tarps covering roof damage or revealing underlying roofing
material, where the pre-disaster image makes clear that the blue portions of the roof are likely the
only remaining small areas of undamaged roof. The challenge of automatically comparing
images taken of different angles and color balance is also apparent.
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Map Data Pre-Disaster: (Google, 2018); Post-Disaster: (NGS, 2018)
Figure 3 Example Pre-Disaster and Post-Disaster Images
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Table 2 Table of Structures, Objects, and Classifications
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Significant
.24 .19 .19 .38
100%
collapsed.wall.with.adjacent.debris >= 0.5

yes

no

2

3

Critical
.56 .00 .00 .44
43%

Minimal
.00 .33 .33 .33
57%

collapsed.roof.and.internal.visible.debris >= 0.5

light.roof.damage >= 0.5

5

7

Significant
.33 .00 .00 .67
29%

No Damage
.00 .00 .50 .50
38%

intact.roof >= 0.5

intact.roof >= 0.5

11

15

Significant
.20 .00 .00 .80
24%

Significant
.00 .00 .20 .80
24%

m issing.roof.sections >= 0.5

4

10

Critical
1.00 .00 .00 .00
14%

Critical
1.00 .00 .00 .00
5%

22

Critical
1.00 .00 .00 .00
5%

m issing.roof.shingles >= 0.5

23

Significant
.00 .00 .00 1.00
19%

6

Minimal
.00 1.00 .00 .00
19%

14

No Damage
.00 .00 1.00 .00
14%

30

No Damage
.00 .00 1.00 .00
5%

31

Significant
.00 .00 .00 1.00
19%

Figure 4 Validation of Simulated Output Classifications

Table 3 Pilot Scenario Listing
Scenarios
Intended
ID Land Use
Model Output
1 Large Commercial
Erroneous
2 Medium Commerical
Faithful
3 Large Government
Faithful
4 Residential Trailer
Faithful
5 Residential Trailer
Faithful
6 Residential Trailer
Erroneous
7 Residential Trailer
Faithful
8 Large Commercial
Faithful
9 Multi-Family Residential
Faithful
10 Multi-Family Residential
Faithful
11 Multi-Family Residential
Faithful
12 Medium Commercial Complex Erroneous
13 Medium Commerical
Erroneous
14 Single-Family Home
Faithful
15 Single-Family Home
Faithful
16 Medium Commercial
Faithful
17 Medium Commercial Complex Erroneous
18 Large Industrial
Faithful
19 [no building]
Erroneous
20 [no building]
Erroneous
21 Place of Worship
Faithful
22 Medium Commercial
Faithful

Error
Mode
9
6
3
6
7
7
7
10
4
4
5
5
3
2
6
10
4
11
12
10
7
3

Simulated Model Output
Model Output
Next Best
Structure Damage
Structure Damage
Heavy
No Damage Heavy
Minimal
Medium Critical
Heavy
Significant
Heavy
Minimal
Heavy
Significant
Light
Critical
Light
Significant
Light
Minimal
Light
Significant
Light
Significant Light
Minimal
Light
No Damage Light
Minimal
Heavy
Critical
Heavy
Significant
Medium Critical
Medium
No Damage
Medium Significant Medium
Critical
Heavy
Significant Heavy
Critical
Medium Significant Heavy
Minimal
Medium Significant Heavy
Significant
Medium Minimal
Medium
Significant
Medium Minimal
Medium
Significant
Medium Significant Heavy
Significant
Medium Critical
Medium
Minimal
Heavy
Significant Medium
Critical
Medium Significant Heavy
Critical
Medium No Damage Medium
Minimal
Heavy
No Damage Heavy
Significant
Medium Significant Medium
Critical
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F.1.4 Template-Based Explanation
The neural network structures used by state-of-the-art explanation engines such as those
by R. Hu, Rohrbach, Andreas, Darrell, and Saenko (2017), Mao, Xu, Yang, Wang, and Yuille
(2014), Donahue et al. (2015), and Hendricks et al. (2018) use varieties of recurrent neural
networks which predict the word sequences of explanations based on training the network on
exemplar explanations. Natural language generation researchers looking to increase available
training data beyond human-generated exemplars have developed a method of replacing
keywords from existing exemplars into a template algorithmically to transfer grammar between
domains (Wen et al., 2016). That method is used here to produce templates for explanations
without the use of a neural network.
In the visual explanation approach by Hendricks et al. (2016) visual explanations are
generated from image descriptions and class definitions.1 To be consistent with other literature,
the human-recognizable elements of images which are termed “features” in Hendricks et al.
(2016) are termed “objects” here while individual measurable properties of images which may
not be measurable or recognizable by humans are termed “features” (e.g. histograms of oriented
gradients). Class definitions are comprised of lists of objects which are indicative of the class.
Explanation templates for causal and counterfactual explanations were created in a manner
similar to Wen et al. (2016) with slots where object labels could be substituted into delexified
statements. Fixed strings were used for hedging explanations. Classification slots, object support
slots, and object slots were identified based on the classes from the guideline and objects in the
images. For each post-disaster image, objects were identified with classifications to feed the slots

1

Italics are used in this section to note terminology adopted from the literature to define the behavior of the
simulated agent. Terms in quotes differ from the cited literature for reasons cited.
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and slot-value pairs for explanations. Class definitions were created for building damage based
on extractable objects in an iterative process through images selected for the scenarios. The list
of structures, classes, and objects are listed in Table 2.
The causal explanation template was framed in the form “Because” then listing objects
present as in the image, which was discriminative to the next best classification using a
supporting structure classification slot in the “with” form. The counterfactual explanation was in
the form “It is not [next best class] because” with objects listed with “does not have” where an
object is distinctive of and contained within the next best class definition and “has” when an
object is not contained within the next best class definition. The slots listed for the objects in
Table 2 were substituted into the templates joined with “and” when more than one object was
inserted into a slot.
An approach to algorithmically generate hedges for image explanations was not
identified in the literature. Hedges can be made in a continuum which includes disclaimers,
warnings, cautions, alerts, precautions, advisories, considerations, notices, and messages. Hyland
(1996a) analyzed mitigating statements to claims in academic writing, and three categories
identified were relevant to explanations as claims here: epistemic adjectives (possible, consistent
with), speculative judgment (suggest, indicate), and modal verbs (may, could) used in an
epistemic sense. Where feasible, the hedge was placed in the form of “Consider: [failure mode]
may decrease the accuracy of assessments.” Each hedge used the modal verb “may” with the
mitigating “consider,” allowing the hedge to be either true or false and to convey minimal
information on the probability of the hedging statement being true. The final hedging
explanations are listed in Table 1.
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F.1.5 Qualtrics Integration
Simulated output and explanations for the five conditions of each of the 22 scenarios
were transformed into static images programmatically. A python script was developed for this
purpose. These static images were referenced by the Qualtrics survey based on the scenario and
experiment condition. Images were hosted on Amazon S3. The Qualtrics “Loop and Merge”
feature was utilized to randomly select and sequence scenarios for presentation.
F.1.6 Participant Briefing
The following briefing was provided to workers:
Crowdsourcing has been used for many years to rapidly assess damage after
natural disasters. The results have been used to inform disaster relief officials
of the extent of damage and areas to focus relief efforts. Because of the volume
of data and urgent time sensitivity, automated damage assessments are being
tested. Combining crowdsourcing with automated damage assessments is
expected to increase quality and speed, but both the automated system and
crowd workers must learn the unique aspects of each disaster in a partnership.

Your task is to review 10 images of buildings and classify the type of building
and the extent of damage using the guideline below. Rate only the building at
the center of the image as there may be more than one building. If you place
your mouse cursor over the image you can magnify sections for more detail.
After you submit your rating, you will receive a rating from the Automated
Damage Assessment Machine (ADAM) for your review. Please evaluate this
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assessment and, if necessary, review the images again. You can change your
ratings, if desired. If you do not believe the image is of a building, please mark
"no structure".
An adapted presentation of the text of the damage assessment guide by Achkar et al.
(2016) was included below the briefing, shown in Figure 5. The guide could be recalled for
review while assessing images in a separate user-interface window. At the end of the survey
participants were debriefed to inform them that their contribution supported future efforts in
disaster damage assessment, but ensured they understood it was a research project.

Figure 5 Classification Guideline
Note. Categories and descriptions adopted from Achkar et al. (2016).
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To ensure the validity of the task and instrument a series of tests were conducted with
multiple improvement cycles. All participants were recruited from Mechanical Turk, as in the
study. In the first round a telephone interview was conducted while the participant concurrently
completed the survey. “Individual debriefing” (Ruel, 2015) was employed to evaluate the
briefing and study measures, and “cognitive interviewing” (Ruel, 2015) was employed for the
damage assessment task. The ten scenarios selected for this initial test had the same 50% mix of
faithful and erroneous automated classification performance and variation in structure types. The
erroneous automated classification scenario with square retention ponds and retaining walls
(Scenario 20) was selected to evaluate how participants reacted to a “no structure” true rating.
For erroneous automated classifications two “heavy,” one “light,” and two “medium” structure
scenarios were selected. For faithful classification scenarios, one “heavy,” four “medium,” and
three “light” scenarios were selected. The order of scenarios was fixed for all participants in the
pre-test in the same randomized order to simply the interview process. The later pre-tests
recruited participants, as in the study, completing the instrument independently. The second
round of testing assessed the recruiting and qualification procedures, the assessment outcomes
for scenarios, the effectiveness of the manipulation of the independent variables, and the
measurement of the reliability of scales. Ten scenarios were selected randomly per participant
from the full set. As such the number of erroneous scenarios varied between participants, which
allowed evaluating the effect of the number of erroneous scenarios during testing. Later rounds
primarily refined manipulation checks, and the final test was the initial set of respondents for the
final instrument as used in the study.
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F.2

Instrument Testing

F.2.1 Interview Pre-Test
The initial pre-test using a telephone interview was performed between January 11th and
13th, 2019 to evaluate the simulation task and assess how participants interpreted the measures. A
total of six participants were recruited from Mechanical Turk. The recruiting advertisement was
modified to add the telephone interview requirement, but was otherwise identical to the later
phases. Each experiment condition was utilized in the pre-test, with the control condition
appearing twice. The briefing, rating task, and attitude survey questions were separately
discussed for impressions and feedback. The interview guide appears in Appendix E. Two
participants had no prior damage assessment experience, two had some prior experience, and two
had evaluated many hundreds of images using multiple platforms. The interviews were between
16 and 47 minutes long. Feedback on the overall task about the length and number of images and
survey questions was positive with no participants reporting fatigue. None of the participants had
previously rated images with the assistance of an automated assessment.
Participants with prior experience reported the tool as “similar to” or “better than” other
tools they had used. The images were expressed by participants to be better quality with clearer
and less obscured images. More experienced raters had the longest interviews and verbalized
their decision-making process in the greatest detail. None of the participants was familiar with
the exact rating guideline used in this study, but those with prior written guideline experience felt
the guideline in this study was clearer and more useful.
F.2.2 Pre-Test Sample Description
The second round of pre-testing was performed from January 15th to 18th, 2019.
Participants were recruited as in the study to test overall procedures and measurement reliability.
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The instrument utilized appears in Appendix B. Data from this second round was used to
evaluate rating of the scenarios and selection for the study. No submissions for qualification
were eliminated by the English proficiency requirement. A total of 58 participants were
recruited, of which 5 failed the attention check (91.4% pass rate). The median completion time of
the survey was 16 minutes. Each condition had between 9 and 14 responses. Scenarios were
assessed by between 17 and 32 participants with an average of 24.
The composition of the sample was 42% female, 58% male with an average age of 37
years (median 36). A total of 15% of participants had a high school diploma or equivalent, 34%
had some post-high school education, 43% Bachelor’s degree, and 7.5% with some graduate
schooling or a graduate degree. Seven participants reported no prior experience in damage
assessment of aerial images. The 46 respondents with previous experience self-rated a mean 6.98
on an 18-point composite scale, standard deviation 3.04. The highest category of experience was
reported by 26% of respondents (more than 500 images), indicating the potential to meaningfully
increase discrimination among the most highly experienced.
F.2.3 Scenario Assessment Outcomes
The consensus of participant assessments was compared to individual assessments in the
initial step (prior to seeing the automated assessment). The goal was to check for participants that
answered randomly in the initial step, evaluate any role of expertise in rating outcomes, and
evaluate any relationship between time for submission and consensus agreement. Because there
are no assumed “correct” ratings for the scenarios, consensus among participants was used to
evaluate repeatability of outcomes rather than their accuracy. The number of participants by
number of scenarios they agreed with the consensus appears in Table 4.

F-16
Table 4 Pilot Agreement with Consensus
Pilot Participant Agreement with Consensus
(# of pilot participants)
# of Scenarios
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Damage
1
4
9
19
11
8
1

Structure
1
2
3
3
6
10
14
12
2

Most participants (48 out of the 53) produced damage assessments in agreement with the
consensus in at least 50% of the scenarios they assessed. Within this group there was no
statistically significant relationship between completion time and agreement with the consensus
(Pearson correlation, p = 0.61). Within the group of five low-consensus participants, the
respondent with the least agreement and ratings consistent with random chance also did not have
high agreement with the automated assessment in the review step. While that participant
completed the survey in five minutes and 23 seconds, other participants that completed the
survey between five and six minutes achieved 80% agreement. While it is likely the single low
agreement participant input random ratings, the time to complete the survey was not predictive
of rating agreement with the consensus. These results support the validity of the damage
assessment task and respondent pool achieve repeatable structure and damage assessments.
F.2.4 Effect of Number of Erroneous Scenarios
The number of erroneous scenarios participants received varied as the ten scenarios were
randomly selected from the full set for pilot participants. The median number of erroneous
scenarios was 4, with minimum of 2 and maximum of 7. The number of participants for each
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count in increasing order was 4, 17, 14, 13, 4, and 1. The conclusions that can be reached are
limited due to differences in experimental manipulation and small group sizes; however, any
collapse in trust as a result of error rate would be observable. The study variables were assessed
for correlation with the number of erroneous scenarios received as well as general linear models
using the count as a covariate, and none of the differences in means or correlations were
statistically significant. Means with the greatest differences between conditions were the singleitem measures of the trust in the intelligent agent and cognitive load. These measures show a
potential greater trust and lower cognitive load for the four participants with only 2 erroneous
scenarios (6.25 on a 7-point scale and 7.5 on the 9-point scale, respectively), but from 3 to 6
there were only small differences in means (between 4.5 and 4.8, and 7.75 and 8.24). The single
participant that received 7 erroneous scenarios rated trust in the intelligent agent “5” and total
cognitive load “6.” Without evidence to suggest adjusting the error rate, 50% was retained.
F.2.5 Scenario Selection for the Study
The consensus “initial step” participant assessment prior to being presented the
automated assessment for each of the evaluated scenarios appears in Table 5. Scenarios are
grouped into those selected for the study to represent faithful scenarios, erroneous scenarios, and
those not selected. Ratings highlighted in green indicate agreement of the participant consensus
with the simulated automated assessment. The table also shows sample size per scenario and the
automated assessment presented in the “review step.” The percentages indicated are the
proportions of participants that agreed with the consensus for structure type and damage
classification, and the proportion that disagreed with the automated damage assessment. In the
initial step the consensus was shared by an average of 72% of participants on structure type and
62% for damage classification. One-way analysis of variance was used to evaluate differences in
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outcomes between scenarios. The test of perceived difficulty was significant F(21,529)=1.783, p
= 0.018; however, a Tukey HSD test did not differentiate means between scenarios (p = 0.058).
Differences in the duration of the initial assessment were not significant F(21,529)=1.425, p =
0.100.
Table 5 Pilot Scenario Ratings and Outcomes
Initial Step Assessment
Participant
Scenario
Consensus Rating
Agreement
Type
#
n Structure
Damage
Structure
Damage
7
19
Light
Minimal
74%
58%
8
25
Heavy
Critical
48%
52%
Faithful 10 25 Medium Significant
80%
52%
18 28
Heavy
Critical
61%
79%
22 21
Heavy
Significant
57%
62%
1
17
Heavy
Significant
76%
53%
9
32 Medium No Damage
84%
56%
Erroneous 17 29 Medium
Minimal
90%
41%
19 23 No Structure No Damage
91%
74%
21 21
Heavy
Minimal
62%
76%
2
29
Heavy
Significant
62%
59%
3
24
Heavy
Minimal
83%
46%
4
22
Light
Critical
82%
50%
5
22 Medium
Minimal
59%
45%
6
24
Light
Critical
71%
83%
11 27
Heavy
Significant
70%
59%
Not Selected
12 25 Medium Significant
60%
72%
13 20 Medium
Minimal
50%
60%
14 22 Medium
Minimal
73%
86%
15 26 Medium
Minimal
88%
69%
16 29 Medium Significant
62%
48%
20 20 No Structure No Damage
95%
90%

Automated Assessment
Automated
Disagree
Time
Perceived
Damage
(seconds) Difficulty
79%
57
3.1
48%
39
3.2
48%
41
3.7
79%
26
2.5
38%
42
3.1
100%
30
3.3
100%
36
3.4
100%
36
3.2
96%
36
3.3
100%
29
3.5
69%
40
3.2
54%
28
2.5
50%
29
3.3
55%
33
3.4
17%
21
2.8
41%
33
3.2
28%
27
3.2
60%
27
3.7
14%
24
2.2
31%
32
2.8
52%
29
3.4
10%
23
2.4

Structure
Light
Heavy
Medium
Heavy
Medium
Heavy
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Heavy
Light
Light
Light
Heavy
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium

Damage
No Damage
Critical
Significant
Significant
Significant
No Damage
Critical
Critical
Significant
No Damage
Critical
Minimal
Critical
Minimal
Significant
Significant
Significant
Significant
Minimal
Minimal
Significant
No Damage

Green highlight indicates agreement of participant consensus and the automated assessment.

Erroneous scenarios were selected on the basis of: (a) inconsistency of the automated
output with the guideline, and (b) lack of agreement with the automated assessment in the initial
review. None of the participants selected the same damage classification as the automated
assessment in the initial step for four of the erroneous scenarios selected, and one scenario had
one participant (4%) select the erroneous rating. While the correct answer is not necessarily
determinable, this will ensure the erroneous answers were unlikely to be agreeable to the vast
majority of participants.
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Faithful scenarios were selected on the basis of being (a) most clearly consistent with the
damage assessment guideline compared to the other faithful scenarios, and (b) exhibiting a level
of disagreement with participants in the initial review such that the automated assessment acts as
more than a confirmation of initial assessments. The selected faithful scenarios had average
consensus agreement of approximately 64% for structure and 60% damage classifications;
however, that consensus was not in agreement with the yet-to-be-revealed automated assessment
for three scenarios. Disagreement with the automated damage classification was 59% on average,
ranging between 38% to 79% by scenario.
F.2.6 Evaluation of the Measurement Model
Scale reliability was assessed with Cronbach alpha calculated using SPSS version 25
using the pre-test data collection of participants after the interviews were completed. Each of the
dependent and alternative explanation composite measures was found to have Cronbach alpha
metrics of 0.708 or greater. Exploratory factor analysis using principal components analysis with
varimax rotation was employed to analyze the multi-item dependent measures.
For the self-efficacy items, SE8 and SE9 extracted into a second component with an
eigenvalue of 1.27, item loadings greater than 0.850, and first component item loadings of 0.133
and 0.192. These two items were most closely related to the automated assessor’s impact on the
ability to perform the task. Reliance has been found as a separate dimension from both
confidence and trust in automation complacency (Lee & See, 2004; Singh et al., 1993). Item SE4
had the lowest loading on the first component (0.700) and greatest cross-loading (0.524) and as
least distinct on either dimension, was dropped from the study. By removing items SE4, SE8,
and SE9 alpha increased from 0.905 to 0.930.
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The deleted self-efficacy items SE8 and SE9 were relabeled RE1 and RE2 to evaluate the
explanatory potential of “automation reliance.” Their composite score (by simple addition) had
correlations greater than an absolute value of 0.200 with germane cognitive load (r = 0.307, p =
0.025), extraneous cognitive load (r=−0.250, p = 0.071), previous task experience (r=−0.265, p =
0.056), and dispositional trust (r = 0.240, p = 0.084). A third item RE3, “I think the automated
assessor prevents manual assessment errors” was added to meet recommendations of having at
least three-items for PLS-SEM analysis of a composite construct (Hair et al., 2016), and the scale
was retained as an alternate explanation.
Cronbach’s alpha for the three components of cognitive load were: intrinsic 0.786,
germane 0.829, and extraneous 0.708. The nine items of cognitive load extracted three
components with 73% of the variance, with the items loading 0.654 or greater on their respective
dimensions. ICL2 was the highest cross-loading item loaded 0.690 on the intrinsic load
component and 0.493 on germane load component, followed by ECL1 loading 0.654 on
extraneous load component and 0.295 on intrinsic component load. The remaining cross loadings
were below 0.200. All items were retained since they loaded most strongly on their original
dimensions as developed by Klepsch et al. (2017). Total cognitive load did not have a
statistically significant correlation with the sum of all cognitive load scores (r = 0.172, p =
0.217), however it is known that the three components are not best modeled as additive with
equal weight (Klepsch et al., 2017). The single item for total cognitive load had a statistically
significant correlation with the germane load composite score (r = 0.504, p < 0.001). Across all
pilot participants only the top three points of the 9-point scale were utilized.
The six items of the attribution of agent intelligence scale extracted a single component
with eigenvalue of 3.402 representing 56.7% of the variance of the items. The lowest loaded item
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was ATT5 “is predictable” with loading of 0.575. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.839 for the whole
scale, however deleting ATT5 would increase to 0.847. With limited improvement and
consistent membership from the source study (Terada & Yamada, 2017), the item was retained.
The viability of the alternate explanations was assessed. With the exception of previous
task experience, each had a correlation with dependent variable of an absolute value of r = 0.2 or
greater. As a result, all of the alternate explanations were retained.
F.2.7 Manipulation Check Refinement
The test of manipulation of the independent variables for explanation types produced
significant differences in means using Independent T-Tests in the correct association with the
presence of the manipulation with the original items: causal explanation difference=3.20 (t =
9.81, df = 51, p < 0.001), counterfactual explanation difference=1.38 (t = 3.71, df = 51, p =
0.001), and hedging explanation difference=1.16 (t = 3.20, df = 51, p = 0.002).
The original measures were opinion statements about the agent rated on a 7-point Likerttype scale. Binary classification tests2 were utilized to analyze participant response to the
manipulation items making the responses Binary with a threshold of “Agree” and above being
considered a “Yes.” A score of 1.00 on a test metric indicates perfect matching of participant
response and the manipulation state and 0.00 indicates answering inverse to the intended state.
The initial item wording found sensitivity for the causal explanation was 0.91 indicating a high
ability for participants to detect the explanation, and specificity was 1.00 indicating that no
participants incorrectly identified the presence of the explanation. Further, precision was 1.00
showing that no participants falsely indicated the condition while also indicating the presence of

2

Sensitivity = Count of true positives divided by the sum of count of true positive and false negative.
Specificity = Count of true negatives divided by the sum of count of true negatives and false positives.
Precision = Count of true positives divided by the sum of count of true positives and false positives.
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the condition correctly. For counterfactual and hedging conditions sensitivities were 0.78 and
0.83, specificities were 0.67 and 0.53, and precision was 0.64 and 0.58. These results indicate
that the majority of respondents recalled the presence of the explanations consistently with the
intended manipulation, with some lack of sensitivity, specificity, and precision for counterfactual
and hedging explanations. While these results were consistent with successful manipulation,
revisions to the items and rating options were tested to understand the false positive ratings for
the presence of counterfactual and hedging explanations when they were not present.
In the final revision of the items wording was simplified further and more directly
connected to the manipulation, and responses were made binary “Yes” or “No” with a third
option “Don’t Know/Don’t Remember” which was treated as a missing response. Reviewing the
feedback from testing, some participants were viewing the task as a qualification for future
damage assessment work. To address any potential of participants rating the tool and the agent
with future qualification in mind, a message was added at the start of the measures which asked
the participants to rate their opinion honestly and that their answers would have no effect on their
eligibility for future tasks. The first 56 valid respondents for the study in the final form were used
to evaluate the final revisions. Sensitivity, specificity, and precision for the explanation types
were: causal 89%, 90%, 98%; counterfactual 76%, 60%, 57%; hedging 83%, 69%, 67%. Five
respondents (9%) reported not knowing/remembering whether another classification was
compared, and no respondents of the other explanation types used that option. These revisions
reflected small improvements for hedging explanations, and small decreases in classification
matching for causal and counterfactual explanations. With a similar response pattern across
multiple revisions and false responses occurring in the lack of presence of the explanation type,
data collection was completed without further modifications.
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F.2.8 Improvements to the Task
Over the course of testing the following improvements were made to the task: a notice
was placed after the briefing to ensure that participants understood the task was part of a study,
and a reminder was given not to share the contents with other potential participants. Each of the
participants interpreted the simulation as a genuine damage assessment tool and two participants
discussed how they expected participants to compare interpretations of guidelines and images on
public forums in an effort to improve their understanding and the quality of their results. The
notice was added to limit the extent that the manipulation might be exposed by comparison
across participants. Some participants evaluated buildings in the image other than the intended
building. This was primarily occurring in the second step following the automated assessment
output to rationalize erroneous assessments. To increase clarity of the task, a box with a blue
boundary was added around the subject building in the post-damage image to highlight the
subject of the classification but not to highlight specific elements of the explanation. Checkboxes
were added in the second step on each image to provide feedback for images that were (a)
obscured or (b) blurry, and to (c) indicate that the automated assessment was incorrect. The
ADAM (Automated Damage Assessment Machine) acronym was added to simplify references to
the simulated agent. An advisory statement that the answers would not impact eligibility for
future tasks was included.
Only half of the participants passed the original attention check despite otherwise being
attentive in the telephone interview. The distractors were made less challenging and the “none of
the above” option was replaced with a fourth distractor. No revisions were suggested or made to
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the wording of the briefing or to the study measures and participants expressed meanings behind
the items of the measures that was consistent with their constructs.
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